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No language stands alone. It draws life from its back-
ground.
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son that there are, as I said, very few laws, and the crudest
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ought to do, so the more ingenious the interpretation, the
less effective the law, since proportionately fewer people
will understand it-whereas the simple and obvious mean-
ing stares everyone in the face.
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Complete self-confidence is not merely a sin; complete self-
confidence is a weakness.
G.K. Chesterton3
I. INTRODUCTION
Karl Llewellyn was a man who understood the power of context.
Llewellyn knew that the meaning of a text was not simply a function
of the words used to compose it. He knew that the meaning of a text
varied with the identity of the author and the audience and the cir-
cumstances surrounding their encounter through the text. He knew
that a change in context could radically alter the meaning of a text.
He knew that what had been said in the past could affect the meaning
of what is said in the present. Llewellyn understood that meaning
was not conveyed by words alone. He understood that what is not
written down may be of as much importance as what plainly appears
in the "four comers" of the document. He understood that one's
background of experiences and beliefs comes into play well before
the acts of textual composition and interpretation have visibly begun.
Accordingly, Llewellyn was deeply skeptical of any legal system that
would hope to guide men's actions and direct the power of courts by
words alone. Instead, Llewellyn believed that both the articulation
and the interpretation of legal language was always done with a pur-
pose in mind, and that one could best grasp the purpose by grasping
the context in which the text was situated.
Llewellyn's deep appreciation of the power of context is re-
flected only obliquely and intermittently in his academic writings.4
It was not the focused study of any of his many law review articles or
books. Instead, Karl Llewellyn's understanding of the power of
context and its importance for law appear most vividly in the Uni-
form Commercial Code ("UCC" or "Code"). Although this statute
was the work of many individuals, more than any other person, Karl
Llewellyn was responsible for the creation of the UCC.5 Llewellyn
3. G.K. CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY 14 (1959).
4. See infra Part II.C.2-4.
5. See Arthur Linton Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code - Sales;
Should It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821, 821 (1950) (noting that "[w]ithout
January 2000] 267
LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LA WRE VIEW [Vol. 33:263
acted as Chief Reporter for the Code from its inception in 1940 until
his death in 1962.6 Even in light of his other accomplishments, the
Code stands as Llewellyn's greatest contribution and lasting legacy
to American law and jurisprudence.
Llewellyn's influence over the Code, while pervasive, was par-
ticularly strong with respect to Articles 1 and 2. Article 1 sets forth
the "General Provisions" for the UCC, including a lengthy defini-
tions section and a number of principles of interpretation to be used
with respect to agreements under the Code as well as the Code it-
self.7 Article 2 contains the statute's rules governing the sale of
goods.8 Each article of the Code had a principal drafter or "reporter"
assigned to it, and Llewellyn served as the reporter for both Articles
1 and 2.9 Accordingly, "[t]he relationship of Llewellyn's philosophy
to the Code's content and drafting style can be seen most clearly in
these two articles."'10
Articles 1 and 2 bear the imprint of a man who understood the
power of context. These provisions clearly reflect the view that the
meaning of a sales contract depends upon the commercial and
Llewellyn"); Grant Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813,
814 (1962) ("Make no mistake: this Code was Llewellyn's Code; there is not a
section, there is hardly a line, which does not bear his stamp and impress; from
beginning to end he inspired, directed and controlled it.").
6. See WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST
MOVEMENT 278-300 (1973).
7. See U.C.C. §§ 1-101 to 1-209. Llewellyn was the primary drafter of the
definitions in section 1-201. See TWINING, supra note 6, at 300.
8. See U.C.C. §§ 2-101 to 2-725 (1995).
9. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 1, at 3-4 (3d ed. 1988); TWINING, supra note 6, at 284-85, 300.
10. Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and
the Merchant Rules, 100 HARv. L. REV. 465, 466 n.4 (1987) (also noting that
"Llewellyn's Sales Act of 1940 became the 'first draft' of articles 1 and 2 and
a testing ground for the idea of a Uniform Commercial Code"). See also
Eugene F. Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay
On the Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L. REV. 213,
223 (1966) (noting that Llewellyn, as the "coordinator" of the drafters of the
various articles, "exercised both tremendous influence and practical control
over the whole project" and that through the numerous Code drafts, "the sales
article and the all-important introductory article (Article 1) retain most of the
characteristics built into them by Llewellyn"). Llewellyn's control over the
Code as a whole, and Articles 1 and 2 in particular, was also greatly enhanced
by the work of his wife and former pupil Soia Mentschikoff as Assistant Chief
Reporter for the Code. See TWINING, supra note 6, at 283-84, 286, 300-01.
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historical context within which it is made and executed. Section 2-
202, for example, contains the UCC's quite relaxed version of the
parol evidence rule. The rule allows for the introduction of "any
prior agreement or of [any] contemporaneous oral agreement" so
long as it does not contradict the "final expression" of the parties'
contract." Section 2-202 likewise permits the introduction of "evi-
dence of consistent additional terms' 12 in order to explain or supple-
ment the final contract so long as that contract does not have an ef-
fective integration clause. 13 This section also allows the parties to
introduce evidence of "course of dealing," "usage of trade," and
"course of performance" in order to explain or supplement the final
expression of the parties' agreement.' 4 These sources of contextual
evidence are so vital to the "true understanding" of the parties' sales
agreement that "[u]nless carefully negated," the Code assumes that
these sources "were taken for granted when the document was
phrased," and thus "have become an element of the meaning of the
words used."' 5 Prior to the creation of the UCC, trade usage and
prior dealings between the parties were not foreign to the law of
contract interpretation, but the use of such evidence was severely re-
stricted by the courts.' 6 The clear, direct, and presumptive way in
which the Code made contextual evidence an integral part of
11. U.C.C. § 2-202.
12. Id. § 2-202(b).
13. See WrTE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 2-12, at 111-17 (arguing that
only a strict merger clause that closely mimics the language of section 2-202
ought to be effective). For a discussion as to why courts should narrowly con-
strue the ability of parties to exclude consistent additional terms by use of a
merger clause, see infra notes 256-269 and accompanying text.
14. U.C.C. § 2-202. Other provisions in the Code define these terms and
specify a hierarchical ordering among them. See id. §§ 1-205, 2-208. For an
excellent overview of how courts initially responded to the Code's embrace of
contextual evidence in the interpretation of sales contracts, see Roger W. Kirst,
Usage of Trade and Course of Dealing: Subversion of the U. C. C. Theory, 1977
U. ILL. L.F. 811 (arguing that courts have subverted the theory of contextual
meaning underlying the Code by subjecting usage of trade and course of deal-
ing evidence to the requirement that it explain or supplement and not contra-
dict express terms).
15. U.C.C. § 2-202 cnt. 2. The comment further remarks that "the course
of actual performance by the parties is considered the best indication of what
they intended the writing to mean." Id.
16. See UNW. SALES ACT § 71, 1 U.L.A. 410 (1950); infra Part II.B.
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contractual meaning was an important innovation present even in the
early drafts of the statute.
17
The significance of this change is nowhere more evident than in
the Code's definition of "agreement." Section 1-201(3) defines
"agreement" as "the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their
language or by implication from other circumstances including
course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as pro-
vided in this Act."' 8 Thus, under the Code, the background is no
longer something that can be casually acknowledged and then ig-
nored. Instead, the context of an agreement-the unspoken back-
ground of beliefs and understandings formed by repetition within an
industry and familiarity among individuals, which are taken for
granted by the parties involved-becomes central to the meaning of
the contract. Contextual evidence is thus fully recognized as an "ef-
fective part" of the agreement itself.'9
Llewellyn's approach to contract interpretation is present
throughout the UCC, but is especially visible in Article 2. The the-
ory behind this approach is that the meaning of a written agreement
is determined not only "by the language used by [the parties]" but
also by "their action[s], read and interpreted in the light of commer-
cial practices and other surrounding circumstances."'  That is,
Llewellyn believed that the true meaning of a text can be correctly
determined only by a proper appreciation of and reference to the
context in which the text appears.
A. The Problem Stated
That this contextual and historical approach to textual meaning
should be so prominently featured in Llewellyn's Code nevertheless
gives rise to an enigma. This enigma derives from the fact that the
17. See infra Part II.C.5.
18. U.C.C. § 1-201(3). Eugene Mooney was the first commentator to note
the significance of this change and its departure from Langdell and Williston's
understanding of contract as formal promise. See Mooney, supra note 10, at
224-29.
19. U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 3.
20. Id. § 1-205 cmt. 1.
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Code, as originally envisioned by Llewellyn, contained a starkly an-
tithetical approach to interpretation. Beginning in the spring of 1951,
the Code contained a provision that was plainly a-historical and a-
contextual with respect to interpretation of the Code itself. Section
1-102(3)(g) provided that "[p]rior drafts of text and comments may
not be used to ascertain legislative intent."21 In the first Code draft to
have explanatory comments following the insertion of this provision,
the drafters explained that section 1-102(3)(g) was intended
to preclude resort to prior drafts either of text or comment
to ascertain intent. Frequently matters have been omitted as
being implicit without statement and language has been
changed or added solely for clarity. The only safe guide to
intent lies in the final text and comments.
22
Section 1-102(3)(g) was dropped from the Code in 1956 in re-
sponse to criticism from the New York Law Revision Commission.23
Since 1953, the Law Revision Commission had been engaged in a
thorough study of the Code pursuant to a charge from then New
York Governor Thomas E. Dewey.24 In its final report to the New
York legislature, the Commission stated that "it [did] not believe that
21. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT No. 2 TEXT
EDITION (Spring 1951) [hereinafter SPRING 1951 DRAFT] § 1-102(3)(g), re-
printed in 12 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 28 (Elizabeth S. Kelly
ed., 1984) [hereinafter U.C.C. DRAFTS].
22. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: OFFICIAL DRAFT, TEXT AND
COMMENTS EDITION (1952) [hereinafter 1952 OFFICIAL DRAFT] § 1-102 cmt
2, reprinted in 14 U.C.C. DRAFTS, supra note 21, at 47.
23. See 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1957) [hereinafter 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS]
§ 1-102, reprinted in 18 U.C.C. DRAFTS, supra note 21, at 25-27.
24. See TWINING, supra note 6, at 293. In four years of study, from 1953 to
1956, the Commission compiled six lengthy volumes of hearings, memoranda,
comments, and suggestions. See NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION,
REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1954 AND RECORD OF
HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Legis. Doc. No. 65 (1954)
[hereinafter N.Y. REPORT 1954]; NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION,
REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1955: STUDY OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Legis. Doe. No. 65 (1955) [hereinafter N.Y.
REPORT 1955]; NEw YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE LAW
REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1956: REPORT RELATING TO THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, Legis. Doe. No. 65 (1956) [hereinafter N.Y. REPORT
1956].
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courts and lawyers should be prevented or discouraged from using
the many rules of interpretation ordinarily employed to determine
[the] meaning of [a] text. '25 Because these rules authorized refer-
ence to the "immediate background and legislative history" of stat-
utes, the Commission recommended that the prohibition be deleted. 6
Sensitive to the concerns of the Law Revision Commission and
mindful of the need to gain New York's adoption of the UCC for the
success of the entire Code project, the drafters acceded to the Com-
mission's recommendation. Today it is common for courts to refer
to Code drafting history in resolving interpretive questions.2 8 Al-
though not a part of the current Code, it is clear that the prohibition
against use of prior drafts of the Code and comments was a part of
Llewellyn's original design for a comprehensive statute governing
commercial transactions. 9
25. N.Y. REPORT 1956, supra note 24, at 26.
26. See id. (concluding that "[i]t is inadvisable to limit by statute the
sources from which the reason for the text - and in this way the meaning of the
text-may be found"); see also infra Part IlI.G.4.b.
27. With respect to the importance of New York's adoption of the UCC,
see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.9, at 27 (1982) (noting that with
New York's adoption in 1962, "the complete success of the Code was as-
sured"); TWINING, supra note 6, at 293 (noting that, of all the major commer-
cial states targeted for adoption, "New York was the most important"); Robert
Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58
COLUM. L. REv. 798, 806 (1958) (noting that "[1]egislative action in New
York could obviously add tremendous force to the drive for enactment in other
states"); William A. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enact-
ment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1967)
(discussing the Commission's study of the Code, and noting that New York
was deemed by many to be "the most important commercial state in the coun-
try"). With respect to the influence the New York Law Revision Commission
had on the drafting of the Code, see TWINING, supra note 6, at 295-98; Walter
D. Malcolm, Panel Discussion on the Uniform Commercial Code, 12 Bus.
LAW. 49, 49-54 (1956) [hereinafter Malcolm, Panel Discussion].
28. See, e.g., Herzog Contracting Corp. v. McGowen Corp., 976 F.2d 1062,
1069-70 (7th Cir. 1992); Julien Co. v. Rollins Cotton Co., 168 B.R. 647, 665-
66 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1994); Northpark Nat'l Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 572
F. Supp. 524, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Getty Petroleum Corp. v. American Ex-
press Travel Related Servs. Co., 683 N.E.2d 311, 316 (N.Y. 1997); United
States Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Boge, 814 P.2d 1082, 1089 (Or. 1991); Southwest-
ern Resolution Corp. v. Watson, 964 S.W.2d 262, 263-64 (Tex. 1997) (per cu-
riam).
29. Although section 1-102(3)(g) did not appear in the Code until the
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The view of interpretation set forth in section 1-102(3)(g) and its
accompanying comment stands in stark contrast to the view ex-
pressed in section 2-202 and the related sections 1-201(3), 1-205, and
2-208. Although both sections 1-102(3)(g) and 2-202 acknowledge
that the full meaning of a text may depend upon something outside
the document in question, each prescribes a different interpretive
method in response. Whereas section 2-202 encourages further in-
quiry into the context which gives rise to this meaning, section 1-
102(3)(g) mandates a stalwart retreat into the "four comers" of the
text at hand. Although section 2-202 allows courts to examine the
prior drafts and collateral agreements of the contracting parties, sec-
tion 1-102(3)(g) prohibits courts from having recourse to legislative
history and other extrinsic aids. Whereas section 2-202 is predicated
on the belief that "the true understanding of the parties as to the
agreement" may be found in trade usage, and prior dealings between
the parties, as well as in agreements not found in the final written
contract,30 by contrast, section 1-102(3)(g) was based on the belief
that "[t]he only safe guide to intent lies in the final text and com-
ments."3' Simply put, one provision is deeply contextual and
Spring 1951 Draft, the comment that explains and justifies the prohibitions
contained in the rule first appeared in the May 1950 Draft. See UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE: PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, TEXT AND COMMENTS EDITION
(May 1950) [hereinafter MAY 1950 DRAFT] § 1-102 cmt. 3, reprinted in 10
U.C.C. DRAFTS, supra note 21, at 45; see also N.Y. REPORT 1956, supra note
24, at 165-66 (commenting on this point). It is quite clear, however, that well
before the publication of the May 1950 Draft; Llewellyn wished to limit the
materials courts could review in their search for legislative meaning. From the
very beginning of the Code project, Llewellyn stated that it would be desirable
to provide an authoritative interpretation of the Code to guide courts. See Karl
N. Llewellyn, Memo No. 1 to William H. Schnader on Code (May 19, 1940)
[hereinafter Memo No. 1] in KARL LLEWELLYN PAPERS [hereinafter KLP],
J.II.1.a, at 3 ("No Code can either hope for adoption or hope for use, if
adopted, without the kind of buttressing by a book which Williston gave his
Sales Act, and the Negotiable Instruments Law failed to get. A Code law, as I
see it, will stand or fall on what it gets in the way of buttressing from such an
authoritative textbook."). This citation follows the form used in RAYMOND M.
ELLINGWOOD, JR. & WILLIAM L. TWINING, THE KARL LLEWELLYN PAPERS: A
GUIDE TO THE COLLECTION (rev. ed. 1970) (cataloguing the Llewellyn archive
in the library of the University of Chicago Law School). See also infra Part
III.F-G.
30. See U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 2 (1995).
31. 1952 OFFICIAL DRAFT, supra note 22, § 1-102 cmt. 2, at 47.
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historical in its approach to interpretation, while the other is strictly
a-contextual and a-historical.
Llewellyn's embrace of these radically different interpretive ap-
proaches raises a number of questions worthy of inquiry. What can
account for this odd combination? What can explain the startlingly
queer juxtaposition of these antithetical approaches to interpretation?
What could possibly cause a careful drafter and thoughtful jurisprude
like Llewellyn to suddenly disregard his deeply felt appreciation for
context when the object of interpretation was no longer an agreement
under the Code but the Code itself? Are contracts and statutes so
radically different that they require these antithetical interpretive ap-
proaches, or do they share something common that overshadows
their differences? Can these disparate methods of interpretation be
reconciled or are they hopelessly incoherent? What role do these dif-
ferent approaches foresee for courts? What values did Llewellyn
seek to foster by requiring courts to refer to the context of sales
agreements and by prohibiting the use of legislative history in statu-
tory construction? Was the New York Law Revision Commission
correct in its approval of the Code's approach to contract interpreta-
tion? Was it also correct to suggest that contextual evidence should
be available to courts in the interpretation of statutes?
B. The Contemporary Debate
The answers to these questions are no mere historical curiosity.
They are not simply details from a legal history that may be of inter-
est to academics but which are ultimately irrelevant to current legal
practice. Rather, the questions raised by this strange episode in the
history of the UCC are of immediate relevance today.
In the past fifteen years, there has been an enormous growth of
interest in statutory interpretation. 2  While some attribute this
growth to the "dynamic" theories of interpretation championed by
32. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Suprem-
acy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 281 (1989) (remarking that "there has been something
of a renaissance of scholarship about statutory interpretation"); Philip P.
Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statu-
tory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REv. 241 (1992) (tracing the history of the
revival of interest in statutes).
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academics, 3 others believe that the "new textualism" advocated by
several prominent federal judges has been responsible for this re-
newed interest.34 Certainly the new textualism of Justice Antonin
Scalia35 and Judge Frank Easterbrook3 6 has inspired an abundance of
commentary from legal scholars, much of it critical in nature.37
33. See Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of Statutory In-
terpretation: Underenforcement, Overenforcement, and the Problem of Legis-
lative Supremacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 767, 767 n.1 (1991) (asserting that "Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr., now leads the renaissance in statutory interpretation
analysis").
34. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Con-
struction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988) [hereinafter Easterbrook,
Role]; Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533
(1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Statutes]; Frickey, supra note 32, at 245
(identifying Richard Posner, Frank Easterbrook, and Antonin Scalia as the per-
sons who "triggered the revival of interest in this subject').
35. Much of Justice Scalia's textualist approach to statutes is best evi-
denced in the rhetoric of his opinions. For cases that incorporate Scalia's
method, see Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 590-600
(1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 254-65
(1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218
(1994); Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 544-56 (1992) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S.
151, 163 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); West Virginia Univ. Hosp. v. Casey,
499 U.S. 83 (1991); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). For a defense of his position in a more scholarly format; see
ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3 (1997); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The
Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law
as a Law ofRules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989).
36. See, e.g., Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321 (7th Cir. 1998); NBD Bank v.
Bennett, 67 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 1995); Israel Aircraft Indus. v. Sanwa Bus.
Credit Corp., 16 F.3d 198 (7th Cir. 1994); NAACP v. American Family Mut.
Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992); In Re Grabill Corp., 976 F.2d 1126,
1128-30 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); Chapman v. United
States, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990), aff'd., 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
37. The sheer number of law review articles generated in response to the
new textualism is remarkable. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating
Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20 (1988); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge,
New Textualism]; Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's
Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
401 (1994); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Inter-
pretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 827 (1991); Stephen
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Likewise, the advocates of dynamic interpretation have not been
without their critics.
38
1. Dynamic interpretation
Briefly put, those who favor a dynamic approach believe that
judges who interpret statutes should attempt "to weave [them] into
today's legal system, to make [them] responsive to today's condi-
tions. 39 Judges are not to act like historians "searching out the facts
of the past ' 40 but are instead to provide us with "visions of a norma-
tive present and future.",41 Although they generally regard statutory
text and legislative history as relevant, 42 proponents of "dynamic"
interpretation do not believe judges should be limited to these
sources in their search for meaning. The "background assumptions
about law, society, and the operation of the statute itself' when it was
enacted may no longer be valid when a claim is ripe for review.
43
Accordingly, where "[t]he passage of time has rendered most of the
legislative history obsolete," that history ought to be viewed as "less
important. ' 4  Moreover, judges should consider "the subsequent
A. Plass, The Illusion and Allure of Textualism, 40 VILL. L. REv. 93 (1995);
William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of
Statutory Interpretation, 76 MNN. L. REV. 1133 (1992); Lawrence M. Solan,
Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997 Wis.
L. REv. 235; Nicholos S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New"
New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597 (1991); Nicholos S. Zeppos,
Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding
Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295 (1990) [hereinafter
Zeppos, Fact-Finding].
38. See, e.g., Anthony D'Anato, The Injustice of Dynamic Statutory Inter-
pretation, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 911 (1996); Martin H. Redish & Theodore T.
Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process: Mourning the Death
of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TuL. L. REv. 803 (1994); see
also Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 226
(1988); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985).
39. Aleinikoff, supra note 37, at 49-50.
40. Id. at 57.
41. Id. at59.
42. See WilliamN. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U.
PA. L. REv. 1479, 1483 (1987) [hereinafter Eskridge, Dynamic].
43. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEo. L.J.
319, 333 (1989) [hereinafter Eskridge, Spinning].
44. Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 37, at 689. As Eskridge further
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evolution of the statute and its present context, especially the ways in
which the societal and legal environment of the statute has materially
changed over time.' 4  Only by honestly confronting assumptions
that are "revealed as flawed" by changed circumstances, by over-
coming a "blind adherence to the textual language and legislative
history,' '46 and by "tak[ing] into account evolutive considerations, or
social and legal circumstances not anticipated when the statute was
enacted ' 47 can judges genuinely serve the purposes that underlie the
statute and thereby promote legislative supremacy.
48
2. New textualism
New textualism also purports to augment the principle of
legislative supremacy,49 but it does not seek to firther this goal by
explains, "[t]he problems that concerned the original legislature have either
been solved or have changed, new problems have arisen in response to changes
in society or even to the statutory scheme, and new legal developments pro-
vided a different context for evaluating the statute." Id. at 689-90.
45. Eskridge, Dynamic, supra note 42, at 1483.
46. Eskridge, Spinning, supra note 43, at 337.
47. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation
as PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 359 (1990).
48. See Eskridge, Spinning, supra note 43, at 337; see also Aleinikoff, su-
pra note 37, at 42 ("As time passes, courts may shift the 'purpose' of the stat-
ute to accommodate changed circumstances."). In their critique of dynamic
interpretation, Redish and Chung distinguish two distinct strains. One they
identify as "functionalist," the other as "neo-republican." See Redish &
Chung, supra note 38, at 831-40. The functionalist strain "is less concerned
with the institutional source of policy decisions than with the practical conse-
quences that flow from those decisions." Id. at 834. Accordingly, this strain
assigns a curative role to the judiciary with considerable discretion so that
courts can "rehabilitate" what are thought to be "bad outcomes" through dy-
namic interpretation. See id. The neo-republican strain focuses on the pathol-
ogy in the law-making process identified by public choice theory. See id. at
838. Thus, this strain "emphasizes the rent-seeking nature of legislative be-
havior and attempts to rectify what it perceives to be the failure of Congress to
legislate in the public interest." Id. at 837-38. In the brief exposition of dy-
namic interpretation provided above, I have stressed what is common to both
strains, namely, "that judges should be allowed to look beyond originalist
sources in resolving questions that arise under a statute." Id. at 833.
49. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword:
The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REv. 4, 60 (1984) [herein-
after Easterbrook, Foreword] (arguing that legislative supremacy requires
courts interpreting statutes to "be honest agents of the political branches [be-
cause t]hey carry out decisions they do not make"); see also Redish & Chung,
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encouraging the use of extra-textual sources. Instead, new textual-
ism seeks to make judges "faithful agents" of the legislature" by
"curtail[ing] opportunities for judicial lawmaking by limiting the
tools available to judges seeking to escape plain statutory mean-
ing."'" Thus, unlike dynamic interpretation, new textualism seeks to
limit the discretion exercised by judges in the interpretation of stat-
utes. Proponents of this theory contend that recourse to legislative
materials other than the statute itself will not constrain judges, but
will instead enable them to introduce their own policy choices into
the adjudicative process. 52 The primacy that the statutory text enjoys
supra note 38, at 818 (noting that new textualism has "retained the originalist
commitment to the legislature's supreme policymaking function").
50. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). But see Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 49, at 60; Eskridge,
New Textualism, supra note 37, at 626.
51. Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 37, at 654 (further explaining
that Justice Scalia has argued that a textual focus "reduces the possibility of
judicial usurpation of Congress' lawmaking responsibilities, by curtailing
judges' discretion to impose their own values onto the statute itself').
52. See Aleinikoff, supra note 37, at 31 (paraphrasing Scalia's approach as:
"If activist judges manipulate legislative history to achieve their own goals,
stop relying on it"); Easterbrook, Role, supra note 34, at 62 ("The use of
original intent rather than an objective inquiry into the reasonable import of the
language permits a series of moves. Each move greatly increases the discre-
tion, and therefore the power, of the court"); Eskridge, New Textualism, supra
note 37, at 648 (noting the new textualist concern that "judges' use of legisla-
tive history, especially when it alters the apparent textual meaning, increases
their discretion to make illegitimate policy choices"); Redish & Chung, supra
note 38, at 821 (asserting that new textualism is "perhaps best understood as an
attempt to cabin judicial discretion"); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in
the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 405, 430 (1989) (noting that by fo-
cusing on the statutory text, adherents of new textualism hope to "minimize
judicial discretion by barring judges from relying on policies and principles of
their own").
Not surprisingly, many have argued that, to the contrary, the added con-
text of legislative history works to restrict judicial discretion. See Eskridge,
New Textualism, supra note 37, at 674-75 (asserting that "it is mildly counter-
intuitive that an approach asking a court to consider materials generated by the
legislative process, in addition to statutory text... canons of construction...
and statutory precedents... leaves the court with more discretion than an ap-
proach that just considers the latter three sources"); Earl M. Maltz, Statutory
Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a Modified Intentionalist
Approach, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1, 27 (1988) ("To the extent that courts are willing
to rely consistently on specific extrinsic legislative materials to determine the
legislative understanding, the problem of legislative uncertainty can be obvi-
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under new textualism derives in part from the fact that only "[tihe
words of the statute, and not the intent of the drafters, are the
'law.' 53 Neither legislative history nor legislative intent, however
conceived, has survived the constitutional rigors of bicameral pas-
sage and presentment to the executive.
5 4
a. skepticism regarding legislative intent
New textualism's emphasis on the statutory text also derives
from a deep-seated skepticism about the existence of a coherent and
identifiable "legislative intent." "Because legislatures comprise
many members, they do not have 'intents' or 'designs,' hidden yet
discoverable."55 Although "[e]ach member may or may not have a
design" it is nonetheless "difficult, sometimes impossible, to aggre-
gate these lists [of designs and preferences] into a coherent collective
choice.
56
Further, the notion that legislative intent is chimerical in nature
has been given added intellectual vigor with the introduction of
ated.").
The corollary to this assertion, and the opposite of what new textualists
claim, is that the failure to consider legislative history will actually invite
judges to exercise greater policy-making discretion in the resolution of cases
involving statutes. See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 37, at 667-68
("Once the statutory text is unencumbered by evidence of original legislative
expectations, it is free to evolve dynamically, especially where the statute is
open-textured."); Maltz, supra, at 11 (arguing that if legislatures cannot estab-
lish the context of their enactments through legislative history then they "have
the power only to create a kind of free-floating text; by creating an appropriate
interpretational context, judges would have the power to determine the actual
political/legal implications of that text"); Redish & Chung, supra note 38, at
825 (arguing that by ignoring legislative history "new textualism can be seen
to permit virtually unfettered judicial discretion in through the back door"); id.
at 828 (remarking that "exclusive focus on text, without any attempt to discern
an underlying legislative purpose, may ultimately undermine the new textual-
ist's goal of judicial deference to legislative policymaking"); Sunstein, supra,
at 430 (noting that legislative history "provides a sense of the context and pur-
pose of a statutory enactment" and that "[w]ithout reference to the history, in-
terpretation sometimes becomes far less bounded").
53. Easterbrook, Role, supra note 34, at 60; see also ScALIA, supra note 35,
at 17 ("It is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver."); infra notes
629-630, 679-683, 719-722 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 681-682 and accompanying text.
55. Easterbrook, Statutes, supra note 34, at 547.
56. Id.
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public choice theory into legal scholarship. Public choice theory, as
developed by Kenneth Arrow," demonstrates that the specific choice
selected by a group of individuals with different priorities is contin-
gent upon the order in which the several options are considered.
Thus, the legislators who have "control of the agenda can manipulate
the choice so that the legislature adopts proposals that only a minor-
ity support."58 In addition, legislators may behave in a "strategic"
fashion by voting against a measure which they prefer to one alter-
native because they believe it will increase the likelihood that a third
alternative which they most prefer will be enacted.5 9 They may also
behave strategically by "logrolling," that is, trading votes on one
measure in order to obtain votes on another.6 0 These practices en-
hance the skepticism with which proponents of new textualism
57. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d
ed. 1963). For an excellent exposition of Arrow's Theorem, see Daniel A.
Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L.
REv. 423 (1988).
58. Easterbrook, Statutes, supra note 34, at 547 (footnote omitted); see also
Sunstein, supra note 52, at 447 n.148 ("Even if legislators vote according to
their actual preferences, the outcome may not reflect a coherent aggregation of
preferences because the outcome eventually chosen depends on the order in
which different proposals were considered rather than on a collective prefer-
ence for that outcome."). For a simple demonstration of this phenomenon,
called "cycling majorities," see Farber & Frickey, supra note 57, at 425-27 n.9.
See also Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 37, at 643; John F. Manning,
Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 685 n.53
(1997). Professor Manning forcefully argues that courts should not refer to
contextual evidence, such as legislative history, in the process of statutory in-
terpretation because this would violate the constitutional principle of non-
delegations. For a convincing response to Manning see Stephen F. Ross &
Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and Its Implications for New
Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195, 238-42 (1998). Clearly
the use of legislative history in statutory construction is not delegation in the
strict sense, rather these extra-statutory materials are simply the reasonable ba-
sis for an inference regarding the intended meaning of the statutory text. See
infra notes 706-714, 731-740 and accompanying text
59. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 57, at 427 n.13; Sunstein, supra note
52, at 447 n.148.
60. See Easterbrook, Statutes, supra note 34, at 548; Farber & Frickey, su-
pra note 57, at 427 & n.12; Sunstein, supra note 52, at 447 n.148.
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regard the concept of legislative intent.61  For them, "talk about
the collective intent of a legislature is fiction compounded.,
62
61. See Easterbrook, Role, supra note 34, at 63 (remarking that "the origi-
nal intent approach to legislation ignores the fact that laws are born of com-
promise"); Easterbrook, Statutes, supra note 34, at 548 (concluding that "be-
cause control of the agenda and logrolling are accepted parts of the legislative
process, a court has no justification for deciding cases as it thinks the legisla-
ture would in their absence"); see also Aleinikoff, supra note 37, at 28 (con-
cluding that "[p]ublic choice theory provides a new basis for the old claim of
the realists that 'legislative intent' is and can only be a fiction"); Redish &
Chung, supra note 38, at 874 ("Public choice theory disputes that individual
motivations can be aggregated to form a coherent and public-regarding legis-
lative intent or purpose that can then be applied to resolve a specific interpre-
tive issue."); Sunstein, supra note 52, at 447 (noting that public choice theo-
rists "conclude that statutes reflect unprincipled 'deals' and not intelligible
collective 'purposes"'); id. at 450 (arguing that there are strong normative ar-
guments against interpreting statutes according to public choice theory). But
see Farber & Frickey, supra note 57, at 435 (concluding after surveying other
public choice literature that there are "very strong reasons, both empirical and
theoretical, for believing that actual legislatures do not suffer from the insta-
bility and incoherence some public choice theories have predicted"); Richard
A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes
and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 179, 195-96 (1986-87) ("Pub-
lic-choice theory makes the attribution of unified purpose to a collective body
increasingly difficult to accept-though I think it is possible to overdo one's
skepticism in this regard."). See generally Mark Kelman, On Democracy-
Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the
Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REv. 199 (1988); Richard H. Pildes &
Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory,
Value Pluralism and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2121 (1990).
In addition to these criticisms, there are also strong reasons for believing
that, even if the insights of public choice theory are correct, they do not lead to
a rejection of legislative intent as a hopelessly incoherent concept This is be-
cause public choice theory focuses on the reasons why legislators vote for pro-
posed legislation. In this regard, "public choice has confused motive with pur-
pose." Redish & Chung, supra note 38, at 875. That is, "the reason that
legislators vote for a particular statute is irrelevant to the authority of the stat-
ute." Maltz, supra note 52, at 7. In other words, one's motive for voting for or
against a proposed statute may be wholly unrelated to the meaning of the stat-
ute. Motivation and intention are not the same thing. See also Kay, supra note
38, at 236 n.49 ("Thus, the fact that an enactor favored a provision because he
received a bribe is irrelevant to his intent with respect to the effect of the
rule."); ef Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 47, at 326 (confusing intent and
motive).
62. Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 37, at 642; see also Antonin
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (remarking that "the quest for the 'genuine' legislative in-
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Even assuming that a coherent statutory intent does exist, pro-
ponents of new textualism doubt the ability of courts to ascertain this
intent and faithfully apply it to the case at hand. This doubt derives
both from the creation of the materials, which comprise legislative
history and from the use of these materials by courts. First, propo-
nents of new textualism fear that committee reports, sponsor state-
ments, hearing transcripts, and the like may not accurately reflect
either the legislators' common assent or even what they jointly con-
sidered.63  The legislative record may be incomplete,64 or it
may contain language that supports the narrow interest of some
specific constituent or political contributor but does not reflect
the views of the wider legislative body. 65 Most often, the materials
that make up the legislative history will not have been drafted
personally by a legislator but by a legislative aide or lobbyist.
66
tent is probably a wild-goose chase"); Sunstein, supra note 52, at 433 (con-
eluding that "legislative intent, like legislative purpose, is largely a fiction in
hard cases-a problem aggravated by the extraordinary difficulties of aggre-
gating the 'intentions' of a multimember body").
63. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 47, at 327 ("Committee members
and bill sponsors are not necessarily representative of the entire Congress, and
so it is not necessarily accurate to attribute their statements to the whole
body.") (citation omitted); Redish & Chung, supra note 38, at 830 ("To be sure
... the process of creating legislative history is subject to abuse and manipula-
tion.").
64. As a practical matter, collecting all legislative history is a "philosophi-
cal impossibility." See Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein's New
Canons: Choosing the Fictions of Statutory Interpretation, 57 U. CHI. L. REv.
1203, 1215-16 (1990) ("On the practical side there lies the task of exhaustively
documenting the complex reality that is the legislative process. Must a tran-
script of every telephone call, every lunch-table conversation with a lobbyist,
and every arm-twisting message from the White House or the Democratic Na-
tional Committee chairman be available to explain why Congress employed a
particular verbal subterfuge to render indistinct the politically charged conse-
quences of pending legislation? Just the documentation of the public portion
of the legislative process, if exhaustively undertaken, is a daunting task.").
65. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 47, at 327 ("Interest groups often
have their legislative allies pack committee reports and stage planned collo-
quies to suggest a meaning for the statute that they cannot place in the statutory
language.") (citation omitted).
66. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment). In Blanchard Scalia wrote:
As anyone familiar with modem-day drafting of congressional com-
mittee reports is well aware, the references to the cases were inserted,
at best by a committee staff member on his or her own initiative, and
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Consequently, the legislative history "may contain material that
simply lacked the political force to make its way into the statute."67
at worst by a committee staff member at the suggestion of a lawyer-
lobbyist; and the purpose of those references was not primarily to in-
form the Members of Congress what the bill meant... but rather to
influence judicial construction. What a heady feeling it must be for a
young staffer, to know that his or her citation of obscure district court
cases can transform them into the law of the land, thereafter dutifully
to be observed by the Supreme Court itself.
I decline to participate in this process. It is neither compatible
with our judicial responsibility of assuring reasoned, consistent, and
effective application of the statutes of the United States, nor conducive
to a genuine effectuation of congressional intent to give legislative
force to each snippet of analysis, and even every case citation, in
committee reports that are increasingly unreliable evidence of what
the voting Members of Congress actually had in mind.
Id.
This same criticism may, however, prove too much for the new textualist.
It is often the case that legislators do not read the actual text of a bill before
they vote on it. See Farber, supra note 32, at 290 ("Most legislators do not
have time to actually read and come to an independent understanding of the
statutes on which they vote."); Zeppos, Fact-Finding, supra note 37, at 1311-
12 ("It strains credulity to argue that members of Congress read the text of all
the bills they vote upon, or that the President carefully reads each bill he signs.
The sheer volume of statutes and the numerous commitments placed on mem-
bers make it impossible for them to read all bills.") (citation omitted).
Moreover, the statutory text is frequently drafted by non-legislators.
"Virtually no members of Congress draft their own legislation. Rather, that
task is left to committee staff, the Office of Legislative Counsel, or lobbyists."
Id. at 1313 (citation omitted). This was certainly the case with respect to the
Uniform Commercial Code, which was jointly prepared by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law In-
stitute. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 1, at 1-6; Braucher, supra
note 27, at 799-800; Schnader, supra note 27, at 1-7. This of course raises
questions concerning the relevance of prior Code drafts and comments. In
short, although such materials may not be "legislative," they are nevertheless
"authoritative" in the original sense of that word, i.e., having a special signifi-
cance ("authority") because of their relation to the author. See infra Part IV.A.
67. Farber & Frickey, supra note 57, at 444 (citation omitted); see also
Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the means by which legislative his-
tory is generated and courts' reliance upon it create "strong incentives for ma-
nipulating legislative history to achieve through the courts results not achiev-
able during the enactment process").
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Accordingly, new textualists conclude that legislative history ought
to be ignored because it is not reliable.
68
Second, proponents of new textualism are also fearful that
courts will manipulate legislative history by stressing what supports
their favored interpretations while minimizing the importance of that
which does not. New textualists worry "that judicial interpretation of
a statute will be skewed by legislative history planted just for that
purpose., 69 They fear that "under the guise or even under the self-
delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, common law
judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires, extending
their lawmaking proclivities from the common law to the statutory
field., 70  Thus, the proponents of new textualism believe that the
skill and judgment necessary both to fairly review the legislative
history behind a statute and to incorporate that history into a bal-
anced opinion exceeds the capacity of most judges. 71 Even where
judges are up to the task, research of legislative history constitutes a
wasteful allocation of judicial resources.72 Rather, by focusing on
the importance of the statutory text and by refusing to rely on legis-
lative history, new textualists hope to encourage better statutory
drafting and greater deliberation in the process of enactment.73
68. See Easterbrook, Role, supra note 34, at 65 ("The meaning of statutes is
to be found not in the subjective, multiple mind of Congress but in the under-
standing of the objectively reasonable person.").
69. Farber & Frickey, supra note 57, at 445; see also Aleinikoff, supra note
37, at 29 (summarizing the new textualist position that "legislative reports once
written to inform legislators about pending legislation, and legislative floor de-
bates once intended to provide a forum for deliberation, are now primarily con-
structed to influence future interpreters") (citation omitted).
70. SCALIA, supra note 35, at 17-18; see also Eskridge, New Textualism,
supra note 37, at 648 ("As Judge Leventhal once said, citing legislative history
is like 'looking over a crowd and picking out your friends."') (citation omit-
ted); Easterbrook, Role, supra note 34, at 66 (concluding that an "appropriately
modest judicial role would depend less on imputed intent--' intent' that ulti-
mately can be found only in the mind of the judge").
71. See infra notes 667-669 and accompanying text
72. See infra notes 670-671 and accompanying text.
73. See United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 345-46 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part) ("It should not be possible, or at least should not be easy, to
be sure of obtaining a particular result in this Court without making that result
apparent on the face of the bill which both Houses consider and vote upon,
which the President approves, and which, if it becomes law, the people must
obey. I think we have an obligation to conduct our exegesis in a fashion which
284
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C. The Thesis Presented
To a remarkable extent, Llewellyn's own views of statutory
construction presaged these current theories of interpretation. For
example, like the proponents of new textualism today, Llewellyn
largely rejected the idea of legislative intent as imaginary. Like the
advocates of dynamic interpretation, however, Llewellyn believed
that statutory construction was essentially the search for purpose and
the creative application of that purpose to the facts at hand.74
Although the historical and jurisprudential connections between
Llewellyn's thought and these current theories are many and varied, I
do not wish to explore them in depth in this Article. Nor do I pro-
pose to review in detail all the faults and merits of either new textu-
alism or so-called dynamic interpretation. My goal is much more
modest than this.
The simple thesis I wish to advance is that legislative history is
always relevant to the process of statutory interpretation. That is not
to say that legislative history will always provide a ready solution to
the interpretive question at hand, nor is it to suggest that the reliabil-
ity of such history as a reflection of the legislature will never be in
fosters that democratic process."); see also Eskridge, New Textualism, supra
note 37, at 677 (concluding that "Justice Scalia seems to argue, if Congress is
aware that its statutes will be read with a strict literalism and with reference to
well-established canons of statutory construction, it will be more diligent and
precise in its draffing of statutes"); Farber, supra note 32, at 298 (arguing.that
judges "must not allow legislators to use statutes to strike poses, knowing that
courts will bail them out later"); Sunstein, supra note 52, at 457-58 (arguing
that a new textualist approach might "tell Congress to be careful with statutory
language" and that such an approach may "force Congress expressly to delib-
erate on an issue and unambiguously to set forth its will"). But see Aleinikoff,
supra note 37, at 25 (arguing that "a textualist court may think it is improving
the legislative process" while in reality it "may actually be imposing huge
costs on a legislature too busy to redraft 'unclear' statutes or not prescient
enough to provide for future possibilities") (citation omitted); Farber &
Frickey, supra note 57, at 458-59 (arguing that under public choice theory a
new textualist approach to statutes would result in numerous "undesirable
practical effects"); Redish & Chung, supra note 38, at 831 (noting that, al-
though one could argue "that new textualism's exclusive focus on text and its
refusal to examine legislative history could ultimately prove beneficial, by
giving Congress an incentive to adopt clearer, more precise texts," that this
view "ignores the inescapable ambiguities and uncertainties that inherently
flow from attempting to apply general directives to specific fact situations").
74. See infra Part IM.A.
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doubt. Inevitably there will be instances in which the legislative rec-
ord will be of little help in resolving the immediate issue before the
court. Likewise, it will sometimes be the case that the legislative re-
cord is plainly unreliable because of the circumstances surrounding
its creation. These matters go to the weight to be accorded statutory
history, however, not to its relevance. They suggest caution in the
use of legislative materials and a healthy respect for the way in
which such materials can be manipulated by legislators, judges, and
advocates. They do not suggest the complete elimination of such
materials from the interpretive process. On the contrary, courts
should be free to take such contextual sources into account in the in-
terpretation of statutes just as they are free to consider contextual
sources in the process of contract interpretation.
My argument in support of this thesis consists of three parts. In
Part II of this Article, I shall explain in greater detail Llewellyn's
historical and contextual approach to contract interpretation. As will
be shown, Llewellyn's contribution in this regard "was not a radical
innovation. ' '75 At common law and under the Uniform Sales Act,
some courts had in fact recognized the importance of contextual evi-
dence in determining the meaning of contracts.76 Instead, the rules
introduced by Llewellyn in the UCC were "an attempt to state the
governing principle clearly and to follow the better reasoned opin-
ions that recognized the value of evidence that explained the com-
mercial context of a disputed transaction. 7 7 Under the Code's new
approach, the introduction of contextual evidence became an integral
part of contract construction rather than an occasional and haphazard
event. In relaxing the parol evidence rule and in easing the introduc-
tion of contextual evidence, the Code aimed to help courts arrive at
"the true understanding of the parties as to the agreement., 78 It is
after all, "[t]he parties themselves [who] know best what they have
meant by their words of agreement., 79 Thus, the stated goal of
75. Kirst, supra note 14, at 812.
76. See id. at 812-13.
77. Id. at 813; see also infra note 189 and accompanying text.
78. U.C.C. § 2-202 cnt. 2 (1995).
79. Id. § 2-208 cmt. 1.
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contract interpretation under the Code is much the same as it was at
common law, namely, ascertaining the intent of the parties to the
contract.Y0
Although the stated goal has remained the same, clearly the
methods employed for discerning this intent have changed substan-
tially. This point is significant because, as I shall argue in detail be-
low, it demonstrates that what is commonly described as "the intent
of the parties to the contract" is and always has been a matter of con-
vention.8' The means we employ may aspire to capture the "rear'
intent of the parties, but, at best, they will yield an accurate approxi-
mation. The fact that the intent of the parties can be understood only
as a matter of convention does not undermine the legitimacy of the
inquiry as there is no alternative available. If the intent of those who
authored the contract is relevant to its meaning, then those who in-
terpret the text must satisfy themselves with some conventional un-
derstanding of that intent.
In Part III of this Article, I shall explain Llewellyn's views of
statutory interpretation, paying particular attention to Llewellyn's
work on the UCC. By precluding the use of legislative history in
statutory interpretation, Llewellyn hoped to foster judging in the
"Grand Style" or "Manner of Reason" according to which judges
would "not only... read the statute but also ... implement [it] in ac-
cordance with purpose and reason., 82 In drafting the Code, Llewel-
lyn sought to craft provisions "which make sense on their face, and
which can be understood and reasonably well applied even by me-
diocre men.",83 He believed that he could write a statute that was so
clear and explicit in purpose as to make recourse to legislative
80. See infra notes 247-252,290-296 and accompanying text.
81. See infra Part l.C.6.
82. Karl N. Llewellyn, On the Current Recapture of the Grand Tradition, in
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
215, 217 (1962) (reprinted from 9 U. Cm. L. SCH. REc. 6 (1960)) [hereinafter
Llewellyn, Current Recapture]; see also infra Part III.C.
83. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING
APPEALS 37-38 (1960) [hereinafter LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION]; see also Karl N. Llewellyn, Plans for Uniform Commercial Code
(Dec. 1944) [hereinafter Plans], in KLP, supra note 29, at J.VI.l.e, at 5 ("The
principle of the patent reason: Every provision should show its reason on its
face. Every body of provisions should display on their face their organizing
principle.").
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history unnecessary. Thus, Llewellyn's disdain for the use of statu-
tory history derived not only from a skepticism concerning the exis-
tence of legislative intent, but also from the confidence he had in his
theory of "patent reason" as a means of creating legislation. Where
the reason behind a provision was less than patently clear, the statu-
tory text would be supplemented by the official comments which
would function as a sort of uniformly packaged legislative history.84
In this way, Llewellyn sought to mollify the calcification that
occurs when fluid policies are fixed in statutory language by codify-
ing principles that would continue to grow and expand like the com-
mon law. Indeed, he hoped to lay down "rules to be developed by
the courts, as common law rules are themselves developed by the
courts, and molded to the succession of unforeseen circumstances. "85
Llewellyn believed that one of the greatest virtues of the common
law was its adaptability. He believed that it was difficult for the
fixed language of a statute "to deal with circumstances utterly un-
contemplated at the time of its passage., 86 A common law rule, by
contrast, "expands or shifts direction according to the reason which
is its life."8 7 He feared that recourse to history would degenerate into
84. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Commercial Law Materials, Part I, Se-
lected Comments on Revised Sales Act (Spring 1948), [hereinafter Selected
Comments], in KLP, supra note 29, at J.X.2.h, at 2 ("[T]he courts are expressly
authorized to consult the Comments in interpreting and applying the principles
of the Act. The Comments thereby acquire a status more than equivalent to
that of a Committee Report on the basis of which a proposed bill has been en-
acted by the legislature."); see also TwINING, supra note 6, at 326 (describing
the comments as "the main device for articulating and explaining the policies
of the Code provisions"); infra notes 436-461, 645-654 and accompanying
text.
85. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Needed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REv. 558,
562 (1940) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Federal Sales Act]; see also infra notes
413-435 and accompanying text.
86. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REv. 395, 400 (1950) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Remarks].
87. REPORT AND SECOND DRAFT: THE REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT
(1941) [hereinafter 1941 DRAFT] § 1-A(c) crnt., at 47, reprinted in 1 U.C.C.
DRAFTS, supra note 21, at 327. Llewellyn summed up this principle of com-
mon law growth in an adage: "Whither the reason leads, thither goeth the rule,
as well." Llewellyn, Current Recapture, supra note 82, at 229. The con-
comitant principle of limitation he described as "where the reason stops there
stops even the enacted rule." Id.; see also Selected Comments, supra note 84,
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a kind of rigid formalism in which words would matter more than
policy. By precluding courts from fixating on the drafting history
behind the Code, Llewellyn hoped to keep his statute up-to-date in
the ever-changing world of commerce and thereby avoid the problem
of statutory obsolescence.88
I shall conclude the Article in Part IV by arguing that Llewellyn
was wrong to attempt to prohibit courts from referring to prior drafts
of the Code and comments. More importantly, courts and legisla-
tures today should resist the misguided impulse to restrict the materi-
als that judges and lawyers may consult in the process of statutory
interpretation.
The best approach to the interpretation of any legal text is the
approach exemplified by Article 2's open invitation to consider fully
the context in which the text in question is generated. This context
includes the intent of the draftsmen as reflected in the background
assumptions and tacit understandings that they had in mind. It also
includes their attempts to articulate the meaning that they sought to
communicate to one another and to the world. This contextual ap-
proach to interpretation correctly reflects the essential nature of lin-
guistic meaning, namely, the fact that language is always used by
someone with a purpose in mind who is situated within a particular
historical and social context. Language is always language and it
does not stop being language even when it is used in a statute. Al-
though Llewellyn was an acknowledged leader among the legal re-
alists of his generation, to ignore the nature of language in the proc-
ess of statutory interpretation, to pretend that the statutory text was
not created within a particular context and that it was not the work of
someone, is plainly counterfactual and fundamentally "unrealistic."
Thus, I shall argue that ultimately Llewellyn's approach to the inter-
pretation of agreements under Article 2, reflected in sections 1-
201(3), 1-205, 2-202, and 2-208, cannot be reconciled with his origi-
nal vision for the interpretation of the Code itself under the now dis-
carded section 1-102(3)(g).
in KLP, supra note 29, at J.X.2.h, at 2 ("'[T]he rule follows its reason wher-
ever the reason leads."'). Stated in such a crude fashion neither adage de-
scribes the proper boundaries of demarcation for a legal rule.
88. Indeed, Llewellyn repeatedly referred to the Code as "a semi-permanent
piece of legislation." Selected Comments, supra note 84, in KLP, supra note
29, at J.X.2.h, at 2; see also infra notes 404-412 and accompanying text.
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Although statutes and contracts surely differ in many important
respects"9 because each involves the use of language, their similari-
ties are profound. Neither statutes nor contracts come into existence
in an instant, complete and fully-formed. Instead, each is the product
of a complex set of interactions among individuals which frequently
include drafting, negotiation, and debate. As such, even the most ba-
sic contract or statute emerges from a social and historical context
that informs its identity. Even Athena, who came into the world
fully-formed from the mind of Zeus, emerged from a particular con-
text. She did not come from the head of Poseidon or Hera or Hades
but from Zeus, and this source of origin informed her identity.
90
The Code definitively rejected both the notion that business
agreements are formed in the abstract and the theory that their
meaning can be understood without considering the process of for-
mation. To treat a statute as if it were formed in the abstract and as if
its meaning were wholly independent of the process of drafting and
enactment is equally fallacious.
Indeed, I shall argue that, contrary to both the new textualists of
today and Llewellyn's own approach, reference to the full context
out of which the statute emerges actually furthers the goals of statu-
tory interpretation that Llewellyn sought to advance while upholding
the rule of law. Llewellyn believed that statutory interpretation was
principally the determination of purpose and the application of that
89. For a thoughtful piece distinguishing the two, see Mark L. Movsesian,
Are Statutes Really "Legislative Bargains"? The Failure of the Contract
Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1145 (1998). Professor
Movsesian cites to a number of sources that have suggested the analogy be-
tween contracts and statutes. See id. at 1147 n.6. In addition to these sources,
see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, §§ 7.10, 7.12, at 513, 520; Frank H.
Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI. KENT L. REv.
441, 445-46 (1990) [hereinafter Easterbrook, What Does]; Farber, supra note
32, at 310, 313. For an article that, like this piece, finds support for the use of
legislative history in statutory interpretation in the use of contextual evidence
in contract interpretation see Ross & Tranen, supra note 58. Although Profes-
sor Ross and Mr. Tranen reach conclusions similar to the conclusions I reach
in this piece, we made our way to these conclusions quite independently of one
another. I discovered their fine article only several months after I finished my
work on the present piece.
90. See HESIOD: THEOGONY, WORKS AND DAYS, SHIELD 36 (Apostolos N.
Athanassakis trans. 1983).
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purpose to a specific set of facts.9' Guided by an equitable sense of
the situation, courts should, according to Llewellyn, either expand or
curtail a statute according to its purpose.92 A judge, however, cannot
know whether one is expanding or curtailing a statute according to
its purpose unless he or she understands that purpose in the first in-
stance. The best way to grasp the meaning of any text is to situate
the text within the context in which it was articulated. Thus, to fur-
ther the interpretation of statutes "in accordance with purpose and
reason," 93 courts should have recourse to contextual evidence, in-
cluding legislative history. Indeed, contrary to Llewellyn's fears, the
proper use of contextual evidence will not hasten statutory obsoles-
cence 94 nor will it encourage courts to base their decisions on words
rather than on policies. 95 It is surely possible that the use of contex-
tual evidence in statutory interpretation may regress into a mechani-
cal formalism.96 It is also possible that judges may manipulate this
evidence in bad faith in crafting their opinions.97 The mere possibil-
ity of abuse, however, does not justify the prohibition required by
former section 1-102(3)(g) and urged today by so-called new textu-
alists.
Indeed, any number of provisions taken from the UCC demon-
strate the failure of this noncontextual method of interpretation, a
method that "commands us to ignore a significant portion of the
context that we would ordinarily use."98 I shall conclude my argu-
ment by briefly reviewing some examples which clearly illustrate the
value of referring to prior drafts of the Code and comments. Refer-
ence to contextual evidence will not always yield decisive results in
statutory construction. In much the same way, contextual evidence
will sometimes fail to clarify the intent of the parties to a sales
91. See generally infra Part El.
92. See infra notes Part III.A-C.
93. Llewellyn, Current Recapture, supra note 82, at 217.
94. See infra Part m.D-E.
95. See infra Part B.B-C.
96. See infra Part 1H.G.
97. See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative
History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L. REv. 195, 214 (1983).
(quoting Judge Leventhal as having said that citing legislative history is like
"looking over a crowd and picking out your friends"); see also infra Part
IV.C.1.
98. Solan, supra note 37, at 256.
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contract. Nevertheless, I shall argue that these examples demonstrate
both the error of former section 1-102(3)(g) and of those today who
would prohibit courts and lawyers from having recourse to legisla-
tive history.
II. LLEWELLYN, CONTEXTUAL EVIDENCE, AND THE INTERPRETATION
OF CONTRACTS
In order to appreciate the importance that Llewellyn attributed to
contextual evidence in the interpretation of contracts and how his
ideas were incorporated into the UCC, we must first understand the
law as it existed prior to the Code. While this prior law did not
wholly exclude contextual evidence from the interpretative process,
it was far less receptive to the use of such evidence. The significant
changes brought about by UCC section 2-202 and other Code sec-
tions demonstrates Llewellyn's sensitivity to context and his clear
rejection of the folly of textualism with respect to contracts. These
changes also make Llewellyn's embrace of this folly with respect to
statutes under UCC section 1-102(3)(g) all the more in need of ex-
planation.
A. The Parol Evidence Rule at Common Law
Always in theory and often in practice the common law re-
stricted the use of contextual evidence in the interpretation of con-
tracts. Under the rubric of the parol evidence rule the common law
employed a number of concepts and doctrines that accorded the
written terms of the contract "a position of interpretive priority."
99
For example, under the plain meaning doctrine, courts often found
"that the words of a writing [were] too 'plain and clear' to justify the
admission of parol evidence as to their interpretation" or that "testi-
mony [was] admissible only when the words of the writing [were]
themselves 'ambiguous. °""00  Likewise, common law courts
99. Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary
Acceleration: Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial Code,
68 TEx. L. REv. 169, 186-91 (1989) (describing Samuel Williston's "classical
model" of contract); see also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 2-9, at 95
(describing the effect of the parol evidence rule as "giv[ing] preference to the
written version" of the agreement).
100. 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 542, at 108-09
(1960) (citation omitted). Corbin goes on to say that "[s]uch statements as-
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frequently held that the written contract at issue constituted "a com-
plete and final integration" of the parties' agreement and so refused
to consider extrinsic evidence that would vary or contradict the inte-
grated writing.'o
In practice, however, courts frequently referred to material out-
side the "four comers" of the written contract. Indeed, they had to
do so for several reasons. First, as a matter of logical priority, the
court must initially determine the existence of a written, legally
binding contract. Before such a contract is established "there is no
rule which excludes [parol] evidence."' 0 2  No written document,
however, is sufficient in itself to establish its own status as a legally
binding agreement. 0 3  Evidence that is extrinsic to the contract
and perhaps "paror' in nature will be necessary to identify and
authenticate the parties involved, the document itself, and the signa-
tures contained within it.10 4 Thus, as a logical matter "[i]t seems,
sume a uniformity and certainty in the meaning of language that do not in fact
exist; they should be subjected to constant attack and disapproval." Id. at 109-
10 (citation omitted).
101. See El Zarape Tortilla Factory, Inc. v. Plant Food Corp., 90 Cal. App.
2d 336, 341-43, 203 P.2d 13, 17-18 (1949); Sumner v. General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corp., 186 S.E. 747, 748 (Ga. Ct. App. 1936); City of Des Moines v.
City of West Des Moines, 56 N.W.2d 904, 905-07 (Iowa 1953); State Highway
Dep't v. Duckworth, 172 So. 148, 150 (Miss. 1937); Wilkins v. Bailey Eng'g
Co., 91 A.2d 98, 100 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952); Cohn v. Krauss, 67
N.E.2d 62, 64 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943); First Nat'l Bank of Scranton v. Payne, 37
A.2d 568, 569 (Pa. 1944); Wood v. Southern Shale Brick Corp., 4 S.E.2d 360,
362-63 (Va. 1939); Mitterhausen v. South Wis. Conference Ass'n of Seventh-
Day Adventists, 14 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Wis. 1944). Today the rule of integration
is still recognized, both in the law of sales in particular and in contracts in gen-
eral. See United States v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 124 F.3d 1194, 1200-01 (10th
Cir. 1997); Apollo Group, Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 58 F.3d 477, 482 (9th Cir. 1995);
Midwest Great Dane Trailers, Inc. v. Great Dane Ltd. Partnership, 977 F.
Supp. 1386, 1390-91 (D. Minn. 1997); In re Pandeff, 201 B.R. 865, 872
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Urschel Farms, Inc. v. DeKalb Swine Breeders, 858 F. Supp.
831, 837 (N.D. Ind. 1994); Traumann v. Southland Corp., 842 F. Supp. 386,
390-91 (N.D. Cal. 1993); I.C.C. Protective Coatings, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg.
Co., 695 N.E.2d 1030, 1036 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Handy Boat Serv., Inc. v.
Professional Servs., Inc., 711 A.2d 1306, 1308-09 (Me. 1998); Farley Inv. Co.
v. Webb, 617 A.2d 1008, 1010 (Me. 1992); Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Laskow-
ski, 580 N.W.2d 8, 10-11 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
102. 3 CoRBIN, supra note 100, § 576, at 382.
103. See id. § 573, at358-60.
104. See id. § 577, at 386-87 ("At all events, no one doubts that the execu-
tion of a written contract has to be proved. Some parol testimony is required to
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therefore, that some parol evidence is required in order to exclude
other parol evidence."' 0 5
Second and related, common law courts allowed the use of con-
textual evidence to demonstrate that the contract in question was the
result of fraud or legal mistake. Even an agreement which contained
an express statement declaring that it was a complete and accurate
integration did "not prevent proof of fraudulent representations by a
party to the contract, or of illegality, accident, or mistake."' 6
Third and most importantly, application of the plain meaning
doctrine and the bar against extrinsic evidence required common law
courts to look beyond the "four comers" of the written document.
Clearly the circumstances surrounding the formation and perform-
ance of a contract "must be known before the meaning of the words
can be plain and clear; and proof of the circumstances may make a
meaning plain and clear when in the absence of such proof some
other meaning may also have seemed plain and clear."' 0 7 Conse-
quently, although courts often recited rules stating that the plain
meaning of words would be strictly followed, as Professor Corbin
notes, "this [was] always limited by adding some such clause as the
following: 'in the absence of relevant evidence indicating that the
words were used with a different meaning." 0 8
prove the 'execution' of the document-the genuineness of the signature, the
delivery as a true offer or acceptance or both, the expression of assent by each
party. These cannot be proved by mere inspection of the document, although
much corroborative evidence can be obtained by careful inspection and com-
mon sense interpretation.") (citation omitted).
105. Id. § 588, at 522; see also WILLiAM L. CLARK, JR., HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 219, at 542-43 (4th ed. 1931) (discussing the reasons
for admitting parol evidence).
106. 3 CoRB JN, supra note 100, § 578, at 405-06 (footnotes omitted); see
also id. § 573, at 366 ("The 'parol evidence rule' has never been asserted to
exclude evidence of mistake; but the question of what constitutes such a mis-
take is not an easy one to answer."); id. § 580, at 431 (discussing the use of
extrinsic evidence for these purposes in greater detail).
107. Id. § 542, at 101-03 (citations omitted).
108. Id. § 542, at 106-07; see also id. § 543, at 147-49 (observing that courts
allow the introduction of extrinsic evidence to eliminate ambiguity, but that
frequently ambiguity is not evident "until the attempt is made to apply the
words to existing facts by the use of parol evidence") (citation omitted); id. §
579, at 414-20 (observing that, even in cases in which the court requires no as-
sistance in discussing the plain and clear meaning of contract terms, the court
still "has had the aid of parol evidence of the surrounding circumstances. The
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Similarly, although courts excluded extrinsic evidence offered
for the purpose of varying or contradicting the terms of an integrated
agreement, they allowed such evidence when offered as an aid to the
interpretation of those terms.'0 9 It is, however, clear that "[t]he terms
of any contract must be given a meaning by interpretation before it
can be determined whether an attempt is being made to 'vary or con-
tradict' them."110 Thus, in accord with the logic of interpretation,
that is, the interplay between text and context, many common law
courts made use of extrinsic evidence in explaining the meaning of
contract terms."'
Courts also admitted extrinsic evidence in order to determine
initially whether or not the contract in question was an integrated
agreement. Some courts assumed that the contract was a complete
and accurate integration based on a cursory examination of its struc-
ture and form. Others, however, saw the fallacy of this approach.
Despite appearances, "[t]he writing cannot prove its own complete-
ness and accuracy. Even though it contains an express statement to
that effect, the assent of the parties thereto must still be proved."
'" 2
These courts admitted extrinsic evidence in order to resolve the
question of integration.
The rules regarding the primacy of the written agreement and
the actual practices of courts regarding extrinsic evidence were thus
paradoxically at odds. "The very testimony that the 'parol evidence
rule' [was] supposed to exclude [was] frequently, if not always, nec-
essary before the court [could] determine that the parties [had]
agreed upon the writing as a complete and accurate statement of
terms. '  In spite of the strict disdain for extrinsic evidence re-
flected in the many variations of the parol evidence rule, "the courts
frequently avoid[ed] their actual application of the rules to the facts
before them.""14
meaning to be discovered and applied is that which each party had reason to
know would be given to the words by the other party") (citations omitted).
109. See CLARK, supra note 105, § 221, at 546-47.
110. 3 CORBIN, supra note 100, § 543, at 130-31.
111. See CLARK, supra note 105, § 221, at 549-51.
112. 3 CoRBIN, supra note 100, § 582, at 448-49.
113. Id. at450.
114. Id. § 542, at 128-29.
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In sum, the common law rules restricting the use of extrinsic
evidence in contract construction were a source of great uncertainty
and risk. They were, in Llewellyn's terminology, mere "paper
rules.""' 5 That is, courts frequently recited the "well-settled" rules
strictly limiting the use of parol evidence only to then make liberal
use of that evidence in a variety of ways. No matter how authorita-
tive and oft-repeated the recitation, judicial actions spoke louder than
judicial words. In Llewellyn's view "non-law" could not convinc-
ingly be made to "look like law.""16 Thus, when given the opportu-
nity as part of the Code project, Llewellyn attempted to draft real
rules that would provide guidance to courts and predictability to
practicing attorneys."
7
B. Extrinsic Evidence Under the Uniform Sales Act
The Uniform Sales Act ("Sales Act") was promulgated by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1906."' By 1941 the Sales Act had been adopted by a total of thirty-
four states." 9 Drafted by Professor Samuel Williston of the Harvard
115. See infra Part lI.B.
116. K.N. Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of Contract, 47
YALE L.J. 1243, 1269 (1938) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Rule of Law] (describing
Langdell and Williston's view of contract law as being "at clear variance with
both the decisions and with sense, on too many points for comfort" and de-
scribing Williston's treatise as "a desperate, though often skillful, effort to
make non-law look like law"); see also Karl N. Llewellyn, Statement to the
Law Revision Commission [hereinafter Statement], in 1 N.Y. REPORT 1954,
supra note 24, at 34 ("The existing law is doubtful or empty throughout almost
the whole area discussed by the Code's opponents.").
117. See K.N. Llewellyn, On The Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U.
CHI. L. REv. 224, 261 (1942) [hereinafter Llewellyn, On the Good] ("I stand
on the proposition that the new Sales Act has as its job not only to make its
sense and purposes far clearer to the non-specialist and to the interested lay-
man than does the older phrasing of the rules, but that it must also give to
counsel and to court a sharper and a more predictable guidance."). The Code's
drafting history is replete with statements which assert that added predictability
is one of the goals behind the statute. See, e.g., 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, at
8-19, 25-27; infra note 299, 3 60-372 and accompanying text.
118. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1958 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH
COMMENTS 2 (1959) [hereinafter 1958 OFFICIAL TEXT], reprinted in 20
U.C.C. DRAFTS, supra note 21, at 298; see also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 9, § 1 at 2-3; Schnader, supra note 27, at 2.
119. See Braucher, supra note 27, at 799.
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Law School, the statute was largely based on the English Sale of
Goods Act.
20
Under the Sales Act, Williston acknowledged the value of con-
textual evidence. Section 71 of the Act provides:
Where any right, duty or liability would arise under a con-
tract to sell or a sale by implication of law, it may be nega-
tived or varied by express agreement or by the course of
dealing between the parties, or by custom, if the custom be
such as to bind both parties to the contract or the sale.1
2 '
The terms "contract to sell or a sale" are defined elsewhere in the
Sales Act to mean agreements that involve the transfer of ownership
in goods from the seller to the buyer, either at the time of formation
or at some time in the future.' 2 2 Although the statute does not strictly
require such contracts to be in writing in order to be enforceable,
2 3
the statute of frauds contained within the Sales Act clearly contem-
plated the use of some writing in the vast majority of cases. 1
24
Section 71 reflects this background. It recognizes the priority of
written contract terms because it is these terms that give rise to the
parties' rights, duties, and liabilities "by implication of law."'1
2
Nevertheless, the statute clearly provides that these terms can be
voided ("negatived") or changed ("varied") by three means: express
agreement, course of dealing between the parties, and custom.
126
That section 71 allowed the parties to alter their contractual ob-
ligations by express agreement should be unobjectionable to even the
most ardent textualist. In this respect, section 71 simply embodies
120. See TWINING, supra note 6, at 277; Llewellyn, Federal Sales Act, supra
note 85, at 558; Wiseman, supra note 10, at 473-74 n.31.
121. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 71, 1 U.L.A. 410 (1950).
122. See id. § 1, 1 U.L.A. 2.
123. Section 3 of the Sales Act provides that "a contract to sell or a sale may
be made in writing... or by word of mouth, or partly in writing and partly by
word of mouth, or may be inferred from the conduct of the parties." Id. § 3, 1
U.L.A. 66.
124. See id. § 4(1), 1 U.L.A. 71 (referring to "some note or memorandum in
writing of the contract or sale... signed by the party to be charged or his
agent'); see also 2 SAMUEL WILLISTON & GEORGE J. THOMPSON, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 505-538, at 1474-1565 (2d ed. 1936).
125. Alaska Pac. Salmon Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 163 F.2d 643, 656 (2d
Cir. 1947).
126. See UNIFORM SALESACT § 71, 1 U.L.A. 410.
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the principle of "freedom of contract." Within the wide parameters
of what "public policy" allows, the parties are masters of their own
bargain. Accordingly, under section 71 courts have allowed the
written terms of an agreement to negate implied warranties of quality
created under the statute.1
27
127. See, e.g., Alaska Pac. Salmon, 163 F.2d at 656; Fairbanks, Morse & Co.
v. Consolidated Fisheries Co., 94 F. Supp. 311 (D. Del. 1950), rev'd on other
grounds 190 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1951); Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v.
Hocking, 209 N.W. 996 (N.D. 1926); Marks v. Kucich, 42 P.2d 16, 18 (Wash.
1935); Valley Refrigeration Co. v. Lange Co., 8 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Wis. 1943).
The UCC itself, like many other modem statutes, allows the parties to
"contract out" of the effects of various provisions. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3)
(1995). The question of how far the principal of freedom of contract should
extend in allowing individuals to avoid the effects of the statute was hotly de-
bated in the UCC drafting process. See AN ACT RELATING TO SALES OF
PERSONAL PROPERTY AND TO CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE THEREOF, AND TO
RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, AND REMEDIES ARISING OUT OF SUCH SALES OR
CONTRACTS AND IN CONNECTION WITH FINANCING OR OTHER TRANSACTIONS
COMMONLY ASSOCIATED THEREWITH, AND TO MAKE UNIFORM THE LAW OF
SUCH MATTERS (1941), reprinted in 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
CONFIDENTIAL DRAFTS 24, 42-43, 75, 100 (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly & Ann
Puckett eds., 1995) (commenting on §§ 1-C, 8, 17, and 23).
It might be suggested that section 71 does more than simply allow the
parties to alter by express agreement the legal effect that legislation or other
laws would have on the contract It is possible to read section 71 as permitting
the parties to void or vary the contract terms themselves by express agreement.
The UCC contains just such a provision. See U.C.C. § 2-209 (1995). If in fact
section 71 does address the issue of contract modification, then it leaves a
number of questions unanswered. It does not indicate whether the effective-
ness of an express agreement modifying the contract terms will turn on
whether the agreement is oral or written or whether the express agreement was
made before or after the time of formation. Although section 71 appears to
raise these questions, it does not attempt to resolve them. Instead, courts
turned to the common law for answers.
If, on the one hand, the parties entered into an express agreement prior to
executing the final written contract then such an agreement whether written or
oral, would likely be barred under the parol evidence rule. In his treatise, Wil-
liston insists that "[a]ll courts agree that if the parties have integrated their
agreement into a single written memorial, all prior negotiations and agreements
in regard to the same subject matter are excluded from consideration whether
they were oral or written." 3 WILLISTON, supra note 124, § 632, at 1817
(footnote omitted); see also id. § 646, at 1865; 3 CORBIN, supra note 100, §
576, at 382. As noted above, the critical issue in this analysis was whether or
not the contract in question was "integrated," that is, a final expression of the
parties' agreement designed to supercede prior agreements on the same subject
matter. See 3 CORBIN, supra note 100, § 633; FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, §
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Section 71 also provides that the legal rights and obligations
arising under the contract could be voided or modified "by the course
of dealing between the parties" and "by custom, if the custom be
such asto bind both parties.' ', 28 Each of these two distinct forms of
contextual evidence is concerned with the parties' expectations as
they relate to the meaning and legal effect of contract language. In-
deed, American courts often referred to "custom' and the parties'
"usage" interchangeably. 2 9 Although the two concepts share a
common principle, they do not enjoy the same history at common
law, nor are they subject to the same standard of proof. The princi-
ple underlying each "is that an agreement is to be read in the light of
a common practice or method of dealing."' 30  The idea of trade us-
age, however, did not appear in the English common law until the
eighteenth century, whereas the first appearance of custom is clearly
medieval.'
7.3, at 451-52; see also supra notes 101, 109-12 and accompanying text.
it on the other hand, the parties entered into an express agreement after
executing the final written contract, such an agreement might well be effective.
The parol evidence rule does not apply to post-contractual negotiations. "Any
contract, however made or evidenced, can be discharged or modified by subse-
quent agreement of the parties." 3 CORBIN, supra note 100, § 574, at 371; see
also id. § 577, at 401 (remarking that if an oral agreement was made "subse-
quent in time" to a written contract, "the parol evidence rules does not purport
to exclude proof of if'); 3 WILLISTON, supra note 124, § 632, at 1817 ("All
courts agree also that subsequent agreements may be shown, and are not ren-
dered ineffective by the prior writing."). Indeed, the freedom to modify an
existing contract by a subsequent, written agreement appears to be exactly
what section 71 contemplated. In this way courts construed section 71 to be
merely declaratory of the common law. Depending on the nature of the con-
tract, however, at common law a subsequent express agreement memorialized
in writing might not be effective. If the original contract as modified by a sub-
sequent oral agreement fell within the statute of frauds, courts frequently re-
fused to enforce the agreement by invoking the statute. See FARNSWORTH, su-
pra note 27, § 6.2, at 399-400; 2 WILLISTON, supra note 124, § 593, at 1705.
128. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 71, 1 U.L.A. 410 (1950).
129. See CLARK, supra note 105, § 221, at 551-55; 3 WILLISTON, supra note
124, § 649, at 1872.
130. FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, § 7.13, at 529; see also 3 CORBIN, supra
note 100, § 556, at 243 ("The usage or custom of men is one of those circum-
stances, so well known to one of the parties that he thinks it unnecessary to re-
fer to it in words-a fact that the other party also knows or has reason to
know.").
131. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, § 7.13, at 529 (remarking that the
term"usage of trade" which appears in the UCC is "relatively new and favored
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At common law, "custom" was understood as a social practice
which, by its longevity and uniformity, had "become the law of the
matter to which it relates."' 132 That is, custom was thought of as "an
independent source of authority, a kind of lesser law used to supple-
ment the common law.' ' 133  According to Williston, usage differs
from custom in that it is "a fact and not opinion or rule of law."'
34
He defined usage as a "habitual or customary practice among a cer-
tain class of people, or in a trade, a neighborhood or a large geo-
graphical area.' 135 For Williston, usage "derives its efficacy from
the assent thereto of parties to the transaction.' ', 36 Custom, by con-
trast, "derives its efficacy from its adoption into the law, and when
once established is binding irrespective of any manifestation of as-
sent by the parties concerned."'137 Because custom could itself carry
the authority of law,138 the medieval common law courts developed a
by the Code over the more traditional and narrower term custom"); 3
WILLISTON, supra note 124, § 649, at 1873 (asserting that the "earliest deci-
sion of importance recognizing the validity of usage... was decided in the
latter half of the eighteenth century by Lord Mansfield," but that custom "has
from early times been recognized as a source of law"); Joseph H. Levie, Trade
Usage and Custom Under the Common Law and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1101, 1102-04 (1965) (crediting Lord Mansfield with
introducing the concept of "trade usage").
132. 3 WILLISTON, supra note 124, § 649, at 1873 (citing cases).
133. Levie, supra note 131, at 1102.
134. 3 WILLISTON, supra note 124, § 649, at 1872.
135. Id. at 1872-73.
136. Id. at 1873.
137. Id.
138. To say that custom carried the authority of law independent of any ac-
tion by the law-making authority is to somewhat misstate the issue. As Levie
astutely remarks: "The distinction between custom and law is not easy to draw
when a rule of law grows out of custom. Once custom is established by litiga-
tion, judicial notice will be taken of its existence, and the difficulty is com-
pounded." Levie, supra note 131, at 1102 n.8. Levie further notes that one
way out of this conceptual puzzle is simply "to declare, together with a school
of jurisprudence of which the most famous member is Ehrlich, that custom is
law." Id. at 1103 n.8. Llewellyn was clearly sympathetic to such a sociologi-
cal view of law. As he remarked in his early socio-historical "sketch" of con-
tract law, "it is vital to remember that law in its beginning is almost undiffer-
entiated from other forms of social pressure." Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price
Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 711 (1931) [hereinaf-
ter Llewellyn, What Price]; see also Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurispru-
dence-The Next Step, 30 COLuM. L. REv. 431 (1930) [hereinafter Llewellyn,
Realistic] (remarking that "the clearer visualization of the problems involved
300
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number of demanding criteria concerning proof of custom. A cus-
tomary practice had to satisfy each of these criteria before it could be
recognized as a legally enforceable norm. If it failed to satisfy any
one of them, then, according to the language of section 71, the cus-
tom would not "be such as to bind both parties to the contract or the
sale.'
139
In applying section 71 of the Uniform Sales Act, courts held that
the statute simply recognized the standards for custom already well-
established at common law.140 The common law required that, in or-
der to be enforceable, a custom had to be reasonable, legal, certain,
universal, notorious, and ancient.' 41 Briefly put, these criteria de-
manded respectively: that a custom not be unconscionable; that it
not contradict the positive law; that it be definitive and thus capable
of ready application; that it be uniformly followed by all subject to it;
and that it be well-known and well-established over time.142 Fur-
thermore, the relative absence of custom as an independent source of
law in the United States and the basic similarity between custom and
usage led many American courts to apply the same rigorous stan-
dards of proof to matters of usage.143
moves toward ever-decreasing emphasis on words, and ever-increasing empha-
sis on observable behavior"); Karl N. Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal,
and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic Method, 49 YALE L.J. 1355 (1939-
40) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Law Jobs]; KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON
HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941) (observing the law-ways and juristic
method of the Cheyenne).
139. UNIFORM SALESACT § 71, 1 U.L.A. 410 (1950).
140. See, e.g., Alex J. Mandl, Inc. v. San Roman, 170 F.2d 839 (7th Cir.
1948); Joannes Bros. Co. v. Czarnikow-Rionda Co., 201 N.Y.S. 409 (Sup. Ct
1923); Albus v. Toomey, 116 A. 917 (Pa. 1922).
141. See Levie, supra note 131, at 1103-06.
142. See CLARK, supra note 105, § 221, at 551-55 (referring to custom and
usage interchangeably and citing numerous cases); Levie, supra note 131, at
1103-06 (citing numerous cases).
143. See 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, intro. cmt. to §§ 59-59-D, at 253 (ob-
serving that the law "has laid down such stringent tests before 'a usage is such
as to bind both parties' that few of the existing usages daily relied on in com-
merce could satisfy the test"); Levie, supra note 131, at 1103 (remarking that
because the law of trade usage was never fully explicated, courts tended "to
refer to the stringent tests for custom in difficult cases falling into the interme-
diate zone"); see also 3 WILLISTON, supra note 124, § 649, at 1873-74 (noting
that the method of developing and changing law based on custom is of less im-
portance in the United States); id. §§ 657-661, at 1896-1905 (observing that
the similarities between custom and usage often result in confusion). Williston
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C. Contextual Evidence Under the Uniform Commercial Code
As should be apparent from this brief survey of contract law
prior to the Code, Karl Llewellyn did not invent the use of contextual
evidence. Instead Llewellyn's contributions to this area were largely
a matter of emphasis and clarification. The Uniform Sales Act and
the common law clearly recognized the relevance of custom and us-
age in the process of contract interpretation. There were in fact
"numberless well-considered cases" in which contextual evidence
was used "to establish a meaning that the written words of the con-
tract would never have been given in the absence of such proof'1
44
Nevertheless, prior to the advent of the Code, the use of contextual
evidence was hardly uniform. Many courts strictly applied the strin-
gent tests for proof of custom, usage, and course of dealing, while
others were more lenient. Indeed, because the case law "was incon-
sistent [and] the governing principles unclear.., the fate of a litigant
who relied on such evidence [was] uncertain."'
145
suggested that courts have not and should not always apply each of the re-
quirements for proof of custom in determining the existence and application of
a purported usage. See id. In this it is likely that Williston's reading of the law
was colored by his desire to keep custom and usage relatively distinct For ex-
ample, he remarks that because the efficacy of usage turns upon the assent of
the parties, "the law should impose no more stringent requirement of reason-
ableness than it does where express terms of a contract are in question" but that
"there seems no-doubt that a more rigorous test is in fact imposed." Id. § 659,
at 1898. Likewise, he asserts that the requirement that custom "must have ex-
isted for a considerable length of time" does not apply to proof of usage. In-
stead, the critical issue is that at the time of contracting, the usage was "so no-
torious as to justify belief that the parties contracted with reference to it" Id. §
661, at 1903. He concludes, however, that "[t]he degree of proof that is neces-
sary to satisfy a court that a particular usage existed, and that the contract must
be interpreted with reference to it, may indeed vary according to the generality
of the usage and the length of time which it has been in existence." Id.
144. 3 CORBIN, supra note 100, § 555, at 232 (citing numerous cases); see
also 3 WILLISTON, supra note 124, § 650, at 1874 (noting that "there are now
numerous decisions (not all of them of recent date) where words with a clear
normal meaning have been shown by usage to bear a meaning which nothing
in the context would suggest') (citing cases). Williston's statement would
have been more precise if he had not distinguished context and usage but had
instead seen the latter as constituting part of the former.
145. Kirst, supra note 14, at 812.
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1. The need for reform
This uncertainty troubled Llewellyn and was a major impetus
behind his revised approach to contextual evidence in the UCC. "We
hear of 'the course of dealing' as an aid to 'interpreting the con-
tract,"' he remarked in his famous article on the law of warranty,
"[b]ut we never know when we shall hear of it; nor to what ex-
tent."'146 According to Llewellyn, the failure of the Uniform Sales
Act to settle the question of proof of custom, usage, and course of
dealing was an "embarrassing matter" in need of attention.147 "[I]f
usage can be determined with some reasonable reliability," he be-
lieved, then "the only sound policy" would be to grant it "as fall a
scope as reason will permit. ' 148 For Llewellyn, the relevance of
contextual evidence to the interpretive process was never in question.
Indeed, by his reckoning, no "sane Court ha[d] for half-a-century
doubted the wisdom of fully incorporating the relevant usage of trade
into the agreement and into the decision on adequacy of perform-
ance."'149 The problem instead was the absence of "any reliable way
of determining what the usage of the trade really was"'150 and the lack
of a clear understanding of "the relation of usage to particular [con-
tract] language."' 5' Although the procedural innovations that
146. K.N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II, 37 COLUM. L.
REv. 341, 375 (1937) [hereinafter Llewellyn, On Warranty Part I1].
147. Id. at 392 ("The Act leaves wholly untouched that most embarrassing
matter: the proof of custom, or of usage, or even of course of dealing. It wel-
comes all three of these, in terms, and repeatedly; but no one who has watched
the process of 'proof and 'rebuttal' before a jury can feel that the Welcome on
the doormat much helps the litigant.") (footnote omitted); see also Llewellyn,
Realistic, supra note 138, at 441 ("The rule that certain oral and essential terms
of an agreement are without force, if the balance of the agreement has been
committed to writing, and looks on its face to be complete, raises considerable
doubts as to its furtherance of security of transactions-sufficiently so as to
have made our rules on the subject rather intricate and uncertain, and our judi-
cial practices at times highly uncertain."); 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, intro.
cmt. to §§ 59-59-D, at 253 ("It is to be further noted that the law about the ef-
fect of 'business custom' is quite as uncertain as are the jury-verdicts.").
148. 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, § 1-D cmt., at 55. In this same passage
Llewellyn remarks that this policy favoring the wide use of usage was in fact
"the policy of the Original Act." Id.
149. Id. intro. cmt. to §§ 59-59-D, at 253.
150. Id.
151. Id. § 1-D cmt., at55.
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Llewellyn sought to introduce did not survive the drafting process,
152
the rules he proposed stressing the importance of contextual evidence
did survive, and have gone on to profoundly influence the manner in
which courts interpret contractual language. 1
53
2. Llewellyn's distrust of words and the priority of facts
The ideas embodied in those provisions of Article 2 that relate to
contextual evidence can be seen in Llewellyn's thought as it devel-
oped over the years. Although much of Llewellyn's work on these
matters can be found in unpublished manuscripts generated during
the years in which the UCC was drafted, 5 4 Llewellyn's sensitivity to
context as a source of meaning can be seen intermittently throughout
his many published articles and books. These materials show that
Llewellyn's sensitivity to context derived from two related sources:
the distrust Llewellyn had for words standing alone as a guide to ac-
tion, and the importance he ascribed to facts in all things legal. As
152. The "reliable procedure" that Llewellyn proposed for determining
usages of trade and other "questions of mercantile fact" was to submit such
questions to a special tribunal of "merchant experts" under the direction of a
court. See generally 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, §§ 59-59-D, at 254-57. Un-
der this scheme, each party would chose an equal number of tribunal members
who would then jointly select an additional member. See id. The 1941 Draft
also required that the merchant experts selected be disinterested. See id. The
proposed statute did not list the qualifications necessary for serving as a mer-
chant expert Instead, the statute assumed that the party selecting an expert
would choose someone properly qualified since "it is specialized knowledge
and competence which are needed." Id. intro. cmt. to §§ 59-59-D, at 253. The
merchant experts selected would then render a written unanimous verdict on
the issues submitted to them. See id. § 59-C, at 255. In order to avoid consti-
tutional invalidation, the statute further stated that the merchant tribunal's
findings would then be received into evidence and presented to the impaneled
lay jury. See id. § 59-D, at 256-57. The statute permitted the jury members to
disregard the merchant tribunal's findings only if they could do so "in con-
science." Id. Unlike Llewellyn's revision of the standards for contextual evi-
dence and his clarification of the importance of such evidence in the interpre-
tive process, these procedural innovations did not survive the drafting process.
For an excellent discussion of the special merchant rules drafted by Llewellyn,
including the provisions concerning merchant expert tribunals, see generally
Wiseman, supra note 10, at 512-15, 527-29.
153. See, e.g., George I. Wallach, The Declining "Sanctity" of Written Con-
tracts-Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Parol Evidence Rule,
44 Mo. L. REv. 651 (1979).
154. See infra Part ll.C.5.
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Llewellyn succinctly stated, he found "[o]verwhelming... the con-
viction that broad forms of words are chaos, that only in close study
of the facts salvation lies."'
l55
The distrust Llewellyn harbored for "mere words" and his keen
attention to facts derived from his study of common law rules. In his
reading of court opinions, Llewellyn observed a wide chasm between
the rules announced by courts and the actual practices of judges in
deciding cases. 156  The traditional approach to legal rules which
Llewellyn came to disdain was formulated "in terms of words; it
center[ed] on words; it ha[d] the utmost difficulty in getting beyond
words.' 57  Contrary to this prevailing formulation, Llewellyn and
his fellow legal realists doubted the efficacy of legal verbiage to
dictate results. 158 Instead, Llewellyn believed "that the use . . . of
words.., as the center of reference in thinking about law, is a block
to clear thinking about matters legal."' 59 He insisted "on treating
words as mere tools in attempting to deal with things more tangi-
ble."'160 He wanted "law to deal . . . with things, with people,
155. Llewellyn, What Price, supra note 138, at 751.
156. This led Llewellyn to develop the distinction between what he called
"real rules" and "paper rules." See infra notes 336-345 and accompanying
text
157. Llewellyn, Realistic, supra note 138, at 443.
158. See Karl N. Llewellyn, My Philosophy of Law, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS 183, 192 (1941) [hereinafter
Llewellyn, My Philosophy] ("The health of work in law, on the part of the de-
termining or acting official, does not lie, and never will lie, in our civilization,
in regularity of practice, in the sense of conformity merely to an external pat-
tern, whether the pattern be one of words or of any other kind."); Llewellyn,
On the Good, supra note 117, at 260 (faulting lawyers for often acting and
speaking "as if fixed rules of law were all of law, as if all rules were a single
kidney, as if, finally, the reason, explicitly and accountably stated for guidance
and for explanation, were not the heart of all sound work in things of law");
Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound,
44 HARv. L. REv. 1222, 1237 (1931) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Some Realism]
(describing one of the legal realists' common points of departure as "a distrust
of the theory that traditional prescriptive rule-formulations are the heavily op-
erative factor in producing court decisions").
159. Llewellyn, Realistic, supra note 138, at 442.
160. K.N. Llewellyn, On Philosophy in American Law, 82 U. PA. L. REv.
205, 212 (1934) [hereinafter Llewellyn, On Philosophy].
January 2000]
306 LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 33:263
with tangibles, with definite tangibles, and observable relations
between definite tangibles-not with words alone."'
6'
Thus for Llewellyn, facts enjoyed a certain priority over lan-
guage.' 62 Whether in adjudication or in legislation, facts give rise to
rules, not the other way around. 163 Whether written in broad gener-
alizations or narrow categories, a rule cannot "justify itself, except in
terms of fact and need.' 6 4 In order to be meaningful, Llewellyn in-
sisted that a rule "must state clearly how to deal with cases on the
raw facts as they arise."' 65 No matter how precise a legal formula
may be with respect to the legal consequences which are to follow
from its application, if it is not "guided to the facts which may
emerge, the supposed rule can acquire no meaning in life (as dis-
tinct from, say, a meaning in logic).' 166  Accordingly, Llewellyn
161. Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 158, at 1223.
162. See id. at 1222 ("Before rules, were facts; in the beginning was not a
Word, but a Doing."); K.N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society,
36 COLUM. L. REv. 699, 722-23 (1936) [hereinafter Llewellyn, On Warranty
Part 1] ("[M]en get to thinking of Rules as Things, and forget the tremendous
extent to which the operation of any form of words depends upon some per-
son s classification of the facts in cases, and the tremendous extent to which
any shift in tendency to classi Jfjacts is likely to be accompanied by a parallel
(though delayed) tendency to change the words, or scope, or nature, of the
'Rules' concerned.") (footnote omitted).
163. Cf Kirst, supra note 14, at 813 ("The goal of the drafters was to create
a Code responsive to business reality .... "); Patterson, supra note 99, at 171
("Llewellyn thought that contract doctrine should respond to commercial real-
ity and not, as the classical theorists imagined, the other way around.") (foot-
notes omitted).
164. K.N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U.
L.Q. REv. 159, 190 (1938) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Through Title]; see also
Llewellyn, Current Recapture, supra note 82, at 225-26 ("Today a distinction
without a reason expressly given is rare; and almost always the reason given
goes to reason of fact, which is reason of life, as seen by the court."). For a
discussion of what Llewellyn meant by "need," see infra note 173 and accom-
panying text
165. K.N. Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract Offer and Acceptance,
1, 48 YALE L.J. 1, 12 (1938) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Offer and Acceptance Part
1].
166. Id. at 14; see also id. at 28 ("Any rule which merely defines a term of
art in terms of legal consequence (rather than in terms of operative fact) will,
be it repeated, remain without significance in life until it is accompanied and
supplemented by other rules which root it in the soil of fact"). Meaningless
rules, by contrast, "evidence doctrine which has either failed to study the fact
situation or has lost touch with it." Id. at 17; see also Llewellyn, Realistic, su-
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concluded that if legal rules are to have meaning in life, they cannot
consist of abstract legal formulae. 167 Instead, they must have some
descriptive content. They must be "root[ed] . . . in the soil of
fact."
168
Moreover, the generality of the language used and the facts to
which they refer must be limited. Life, as Llewellyn might have
said, is lived in the particular. 169 Thus, judges and other lawmakers
should avoid "verbally simple rules-which so often cover dissimilar
and non-simple fact situations" and should instead group "cases and
legal situations into narrower categories than has been the practice in
the past.,,170 This approach would, Llewellyn believed, make "the
study of law a study in [the] first instance of particularized situations
and what happens in or can be done about them."'
17 1
3. The need for congruence between life and rules
The importance Llewellyn attached to tangible facts in the com-
position of legal formulae went beyond mere word choice. Facts
should also influence the formation of the policies contained within
pra note 138, at 454 (observing "the tendency of the crystallized legal concept
to persist after the fact model from which the concept was once derived has
disappeared or changed out of recognition").
167. See Patterson, supra note 99, at 210 (concluding that "Llewellyn sub-
stituted an emphasis on the primacy of the particular for classicism's preoccu-
pation with abstraction"); Wiseman, supra note 10, at 514 (describing by con-
trast Williston's approach to legal problems as being the use of "unitary
abstract principles whose application did not turn on an understanding of the
facts and circumstances of a particular case"); id. at 538 (concluding that
courts, lawyers, and commercial actors have "all benefit[ed] from the realist
commitment to resolving legal problems by reference to their factual circum-
stances rather than to abstract legal categories").
168. Llewellyn, Offer and Acceptance Part 1, supra note 165, at 28.
169. Cf Llewellyn, On Warranty Part 1, supra note 162, at 715 ("History...
involves ... time, place, background, present circumstance, and particular
men. A respectable study of even a single doctrine, and even with artificial
elimination of the 'man' element, amounts to a minor monograph.") (footnote
omitted).
170. Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 158, at 1237.
171. Llewellyn, Realistic, supra note 138, at 460 (footnote omitted); see also
Llewellyn, Offer and Acceptance Part 1, supra note 165, at 26 (providing an
example of how a single term, such as "bills of lading," often addresses "di-
vergent situations-in-life," but that careful thought can discover "a criterion for
significant subdivision of what had broadly and blindly been regarded as a sin-
gle unit-type").
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legal rules. 172 That is, Llewellyn believed that our choice of the legal
rules themselves should reflect the actual practices of those they
were designed to regulate.
73
172. See Mooney, supra note 10, at 231 (describing one of Llewellyn's pri-
mary points as being that a "modem commercial law of business contracts
must be rooted in the actual fact patterns of our modern, credit-oriented, on-
going transactional economic system'); Wiseman, supra note 10, at 493 ("As a
realist, Llewellyn viewed law as a means to social ends and reorganized the
need to reexamine the law constantly to ensure that it fit the society it claimed
to serve. As a scholar and draftsman of sales law, he advocated that the law
conform to a normative vision of merchant reality.").
173. Llewellyn drafted the UCC with this principle of derivation firmly in
mind. See Statement, supra note 116, in 1 N.Y. REPORT 1954, supra note 24,
at 34 ("What the Code says fits with modem business and finance."); Walter
D. Malcolm, Report, The Proposed Commercial Code, 6 Bus. LAW. 113, 125-
26 (1951) (describing two principles that appear "repeatedly throughout the
Code" as being, first, "that the practices of businessmen and business houses
are important factors in construing their contracts and actions and in deter-mining their rights and liabilities" and, second, "that many of the changes ef-
fected by the Code are designed to adapt rules of law to the way that business
is actually carried on"). The standards of commercial reasonableness and us-
age imbue virtually every provision in Article 2. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-
103(l)(b) (defining "good faith"), 2-105(6) (defining "commercial unit"), 2-
201(2) (discussing merchant exception to statute of frauds), 2-302 (defining
unconscionability), 2-305 (discussing open price terms), 2-503 (defining tender
of delivery), 2-504 (discussing shipment of goods by seller), 2-508 (discussing
cure by seller), 2-513 (discussing the right to inspection), 2-602 (discussing
buyer's rightful rejection), 2-603 (discussing merchant duties as to rejected
goods), 2-605 (discussing waiver of buyer's objections), 2-607(3) (discussing
notification of breach), 2-608 (discussing revocation of acceptance), 2-609
(discussing right to adequate assurances), 2-614 (discussing substituted per-
formance), 2-615 (discussing failure of presupposed conditions), 2-704 (dis-
cussing completion of goods or salvage sale), 2-706 (discussing resale of the
contract goods), 2-712 (discussing purchase of cover); see also David Mel-
linkoff, The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J. 185,
185-86 (1967) (remarking that "[t]he word reasonable, effective in small
doses, has been administered by the bucket" in the Code).
Some commentators have argued that in treating the business practices of
merchants as normative, Llewellyn abdicated any role courts might have in
imposing a moral standard on commercial transactions independent of the cur-
rent morals of the marketplace. Professor Richard Danzig has argued that
Llewellyn believed "that the law ought to be developed and assessed against a
backdrop of the everyday world in which it operates." Richard Danzig, A
Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 621, 624 (1975). According to Danzig "Llewellyn saw law as an articu-
lation and regularization of unconsciously evolved mores-as a crystallization
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of a generally recognized and almost indisputably right rule (a 'singing rea-
son'), inherent in, but very possibly obscured by, existing patterns of relation-
ships." Id. (footnote omitted). For Danzig, Article 2 does not set forth defini-
tive standards by which courts are to judge merchant conduct It simply
encourages courts to look for the standards inherent in merchant practices.
Thus, for Danzig, Article 2 "is not, in the main, an example of lawmaking, it is
a guide to law-finding. It does not tell judges the law, it tells them how to find
the law." Id. at 626. Because the Code defers to the mores of the marketplace
Danzig says one may rightly ask "to what extent and in what manner a sense of
moral imperative is reflected in [its] provisions." Id. at 628. Danzig concludes
that while the absence of any stated moral imperative in the Code does consti-
tute "a renunciation of legislative power and responsibility," id. at 622, it sug-
gests an abdication of ethical judgment only in a round-about way. Llewellyn
was neither a moral relativist nor an agnostic, unwilling to stake out a moral
ground on which to stand. For Danzig, Llewellyn was instead a natural lawyer
who believed "that values have an objectively ascertainable existence and a
near universal acceptance and thus can be judicially discovered." Id. at 629;
see also infra note 372-377.
Danzig finds fault in this approach. First, insofar as discovery works as a
method "it tends to confine the impact of the law to a reaffirmation of the pre-
dominant morals of the marketplace. Practices well below the market's moral
median may be constrained but since the median is the standard, by definition
it will be unaffected." Id. at 629. Accordingly, under the Code, law will tend
to follow the lead of business rather than set the pace. Under this model of
deference, the law could never launch a ship like The TJ. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737
(2d Cir. 1932). Second, Danzig contends that questions of value are in reality
matters of political choice to be decided, not questions of fact to be discovered.
Under the Code, judges will impose their own values on the cases before them
and then justify their results in terms of objective discovery. The Code thus
"masks critical choices as technical assessments and allocates them to deci-
sionmakers (judges) of low visibility and low responsibility from the stand-
point of the public." Danzig, supra, at 630. Thus, the abdication of ethical
judgment effected by the Code is an abdication in favor of courts. See also
John A. Sebert, Jr., Remedies Under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial
Code: An Agenda for Review, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 360, 362 (1981). For Dan-
zig, this is an abdication which readily follows from the failure, the unreality of
natural law.
Professor Zipporah Wiseman, by contrast, believes that Llewellyn has
been unfairly treated. She contends that he is not guilty of the charge of
wholly deferring to the marketplace as a source of legal norms used to govern
commerce. See Wiseman, supra note 10, at 492 (arguing that "[i]n advocating
merchant reality as a standard, Llewellyn was arguing for an approach that ac-
cepted the marketplace norms of speed and efficiency" but that Llewellyn's
"vision also encompassed a normative belief that the law should encourage the
better practices and control the worst abuses of the market"). Wiseman force-
fully argues that "Llewellyn's willingness to incorporate the realities of the
market in the law did not extend to a total abdication of judicial control to the
expediencies of the market" Id. at 494. She insists that Llewellyn "did not
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believe 'merchant reality' was a justification for legalizing practices that he
considered oppressive or sharp-dealing." Id. In support of her thesis, Wise-
man distinguishes three categories of provisions and proposed provisions under
the UCC which relate to this point. First she cites to a number of Code provi-
sions which simply "codify the common practices and understandings of the
marketplace." Id. at 505. These include the provisions on usage of trade and
firm offers. See id. at 505-06. Second, Wiseman discusses several provisions
which guarded against the work of sharp dealers by establishing "some outer
bounds of unfairness between merchants in their dealings." Id. at 506. These
include, among others, the merchant exception to the statute of frauds. See id.
Third, Wiseman discusses those few rules drafted by Llewellyn which "im-
posed substantial new obligations on merchants for the benefit not only of
other merchants but also of the consumers who bought or simply used their
goods." Id. at 507. The provision she has in mind here is the rule extending
liability to manufacturers for injury "in person or property" incurred by anyone
"in the ordinary course of use or consumption by reason of the defect" in the
goods. See 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, § 16-B(1), at 122. A much less radi-
cal version of this provision ultimately became U.C.C. § 2-318. Although
Llewellyn's original version of the rule failed to gain acceptance, Wiseman
cites this as an example of Llewellyn's willingness to draft rules embodying
moral standards independent from the standards of the marketplace. See
Wiseman, supra note 10, at 495 (Llewellyn sought "to impose his own 'better'
rules in the interest of fostering a better reality").
Llewellyn's own writings add some support to Wiseman's thesis. He in-
sisted that "a realist's interest in fact and in the meaning of people to law and
of law to people, in no measure impairs interest on his part for better law."
Llewellyn, Through Title, supra note 164, at 162 (footnote omitted). Instead,
he believed that only a close "examination of the fact-situations to which the
concepts [of sales law] are applied and of the results of the application" will
yield "an effective attack on the problem of better law." Id. at 161, 163; see
also id. at 175 n.25 ("I do not regard the dominance of bargain in our economy
as even remotely justifying passive acceptance by court or other tribunal of the
letter of an 'agreement' merely because a 'writing' turns up under that label..
This means need for control, lest old rules based on Adam Smithian postu-
lates be made tools of outrage."). He cautioned that his "plea for merchants'
law to be recognized" should not be misconstrued as a blind acceptance of
merchant practices. K.N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52
HARV. L. REV. 873, 903 (1939) [hereinafter Llewellyn, First Struggle].
Llewellyn made clear that the application of merchant rules in the law of sales
requires both "firm court understanding" as well as "firm court control." Id. at
903-04.
On balance, Llewellyn's own words and Wiseman's forceful arguments
appear to relieve Llewellyn personally of the charge that Llewellyn "sold-out,"
as it were, to the marketplace. Wiseman rightly criticizes Danzig for failing to
consider Llewellyn's early drafts of Article 2 in Danzig's brief review of the
Code's legislative history. See Wiseman, supra note 10, at 468-69 n.13. As
Wiseman acknowledges, however, many of the more progressive rules pro-
posed by Llewellyn were either diluted or ultimately rejected in the course of
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As a general matter, the purpose of any legal norm is to control
or guide the behavior of those subject to it.174  As Llewellyn ob-
served, however, "[g]uidance for a particular society must plant its
feet in that society. And guidance for a positive legal scheme must
rub elbows with that scheme, or grow chimerical."' 175 The law, in
other words, must coincide with the real tangibles of life on a fun-
damental level. If this basic congruence is lacking, then the law will
suffer a fatal impotence. "'Law' without effect approaches zero in
its meaning."' 176 If lawmakers fail to consider the "present and prob-
able behavior of the persons sought to be affected," then the desired
results they obtain 'will be an accident.' 77 No legal doctrine "which
too much misfits life can hope to fit the cases.' 178  Instead, both
"policy and principle must fit the facts, and must be rebuilt to fit the
the drafting process. Thus, Danzig's criticism of the Code itself remains, I be-
lieve, largely valid. The method employed by Llewellyn in the Code does not
itself establish a standard of conduct which commercial actors are to follow.
The judgment as to what is right, the identification of conduct that is moral and
furthers the common good, is the most contentious judgment in all of law. The
UCC slyly avoids making this judgment By employing the standard of
"commercial reasonableness," the Code converts a paradigmatic question of
law into a question of fact. Merchants, lawyers and judges must look out into
the marketplace in order to discover the propriety of merchant conduct. Be-
cause the standard of "commercial reasonableness" is a floating standard, how-
ever, it rises or falls like a buoy with the tide of moral practice in a given trade.
Such practices are real; thus the standard employed by the Code is not vacuous
but deeply meaningful. Cf id. (accusing Danzig of contending that standards
of commercial reasonableness are "vacuous"). What is regarded as proper at
one point in time may not, however, remain so forever. If the official stan-
dards of merchants were to regress, the Code does not (aside from the general
language of section 1-103) provide courts with any means of resisting such
change. Finally, contrary to Danzig's assertions, assessments of commercial
reasonableness will not "vary unpredictably from judge to judge." Danzig, su-
pra, at 630. So long as the merchants who embrace such standards still con-
stitute a relatively cohesive group and the larger society finds such standards
generally acceptable, the law applying the standards of commercial reason-
ableness should remain fairly certain and consistent.
174. See Llewellyn, Realistic, supra note 138, at 458.
175. Karl N. Llewellyn, One "Realist's " View of Natural Law for Judges, 15
NOTRE DAME LAW. 3, 6 (1939) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Natural Law].
176. Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 158, at 1249.
177. Llewellyn, Realistic, supra note 138, at 459.
178. Llewellyn, Offer and Acceptance Part I, supra note 165, at 31 (criti-
cizing the dichotomy between bilateral and unilateral contract in the orthodox
doctrine of offer and acceptance).
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changing facts.' 79 Only by fitting the real circumstances of life can
law hope to be reasonable and effective. Only then can law hope to
be (in Llewellyn's words) "law-in-action."' 180
Llewellyn's deep appreciation for facts also accounts for his
pedagogical emphasis on "real life" business transactions. 18
Llewellyn questioned the usefulness of the fanciful scenarios and
outrageous hypotheticals popular in the law school classrooms of his
day. He seriously doubted that "safe conclusions as to business
cases" could be gleaned from "the idiosyncratic desires of one A to
see one B climb a fifty-foot greased flagpole or push a peanut across
the Brooklyn Bridge."'182 Accordingly, Llewellyn believed that legal
179. Llewellyn, On Warranty Part I, supra note 146, at 409; cf Llewellyn,
On Philosophy, supra note 160, at 212 (concluding that the legal realists'
"lines of thinking are so much closer than any others to the actual behavior of
the better bar, and that their judgments of policy come backed by facts").
180. Llewellyn, Realistic, supra note 138, at 435 n.3 (attributing to Roscoe
Pound the distinction between "law-in-books" and "law-in-action," ROSCOE
POUND, THE SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE (1912));
see id. at 447 n.12 (describing "case-law wisdom-in-action" as where the judge
"visualize[s] in advance the effects of the decision" and "sees his problem not
as the mere making of an abstract paper formula, but as the devising of a way
of working in court which will in due course affect people") (emphasis omit-
ted); K.N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 40 HARV. L. REv. 142, 144 (1926) (re-
viewing MORTON C. CAMPBELL, CASES ON MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY
(1926) (asserting that the study of law needs to focus on "law-in-action," by
which he means "what the courts and all quasi-judicial bodies actually do" and
"the actual ordering of men's actions"); cf Llewellyn, On Philosophy, supra
note 160, at 205 ("But life-in-action a theory can gain only when it serves
men's needs."); Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 158, at 1237 (describing
one of the legal realists' common points of departure as "[a]n insistence on
evaluation of any part of law in terms of its effects, and an insistence on the
worthwhileness of trying to find these effects").
181. See Llewellyn, Offer and Acceptance Part I, supra note 165, at 36
(concluding that the unilateral contract "is not an important type on which an
innocent law student's teeth should be cut to the eternal misshaping of his view
of Contract, but belongs in the freak-tent as an interesting and often instructive
curiosity"); Llewellyn, Through Title, supra note 164, at 163 (remarking that
his work on "title" concerns the mercantile aspects of sales and has "no appli-
cation to a farmer's horse trade, and almost none to the purchase by Mrs.
Sweeney of a fountain pen or of a new oil burner ... [nor any application]
when a boardinghouse keeper turns her furniture over to her landlord for back
rent just before the sheriff arrives with an attachment for the coal bill").
182. K.N. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, 11,
48 YALE L.J. 779, 785 (1939) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Offer and Acceptance
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education should stress factual analysis and the influence of true-to-
life facts on the development of legal doctrine.'83 This emphasis was
part of his struggle to "unhorse" the law of sales, 84 to update it, to
bring it forward from the face-to-face bargains struck with cash in
hand over a cracker barrel at the general store, to the faceless, imper-
sonal, credit-driven, transcontinental, industrial transactions of mod-
em day. The common law of sales may have been suitable for the
"horse trading" of medieval England or the American frontier. "The
trouble lies in trying to fit cases built on such a foundation into non-
horse trade.' ' 185  The contemporary circumstances under which
agreements are made should, Llewellyn thought, influence the legal
Part II]; see also id. at 789 (concluding that "the classical dichotomy in Offer
and Acceptance has little relation to the living fact of the business contracting
which it divides"); id. at 813 (demonstrating that genuine unilateral contracts
do not ever actually occur in business); Llewellyn, Offer and Acceptance Part
I, supra note 165, at 36 (comparing the basic division of contracts into catego-
ries of unilateral and bilateral to the division of the population into categories
of bearded ladies and non-bearded ladies and thus doubting the usefulness of
the dichotomy as "training material" in a "crowded curriculum"); Mooney, su-
pra note 10, at 218 (praising Llewellyn for emphasizing "that business ar-
rangements, not family transactions, are a more reasonable foundation upon
which theories of contract should be based").
183. In the introduction to his famous casebook, Llewellyn self-consciously
set forth "the aims and method of the book, and the theoretical base on which it
rests." KARL N. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES
ix (1930) [hereinafter LLEWELLYN, CASEBOOK]. There he summarized his
goal as being "to do full justice to doctrine, but to illuminate its growth and
meaning by stressing the facts of cases, and the policy considerations." Id. at
xvi. A broad exposure to a wide variety of factual settings was, he believed,
the only way to adequately prepare new lawyers.
We are training men for the practice of law, not for the classroom.
Moreover, I know of no way for the student to see which of a group of
facts are vital, except by seeing more states of fact and holdings than
the printing of opinions in extenso will allow.
Id. at xvii; see also id. at xiii-xiv ("The emphasis of the book is on the meaning
of the law in situations of fact, especially as they appear before the lawyer in
his office.").
184. See generally K.N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 I{ARv. L.
REv. 725 (1939) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Across Sales]; Llewellyn, First Strug-
gle, supra note 173. Professor Wiseman believes that Llewellyn obtained the
image of the horse-trader (the antithesis of the modem industrial seller) from
Professor Nathan Isaacs. See Wiseman, supra note 10, at 477 n.43.
185. Llewellyn, On Warranty Part I1, supra note 146, at 382 n.103 (empha-
sis omitted).
January 2000]
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLWREVIEW [Vol. 33:263
obligations imposed on the parties involved. 186 The significant dif-
ferences between distinct kinds of sales and distinct kinds of buyers
and sellers-retailers, consumers, manufacturers, distributors-led
Llewellyn to favor rules more narrowly tailored to specific con-
texts.
187
4. Llewellyn's appreciation of context in general
More importantly for present purposes, Llewellyn also came to
see that the specific contexts in which agreements are made greatly
influence the meaning of the words as used by the parties. Just as
Llewellyn doubted the efficacy of legal rules composed of abstract
language divorced from purpose, 188 so he believed that in the case
of contracts, mere words standing alone were insufficient to convey
the understanding of the parties to one another or to the world.
186. See Llewellyn, On Warranty Part I, supra note 162, at 713 ("If your
notion of commerce is the wandering peddler, the horse-trader, the side-show
at the fair, then you think well of arm's-length bargaining, single-occasion
deals, and devil take the fool. If, on the other hand, you think of trade in terms
of goodwill and future business, you will find no hardship in imposing on a
seller various obligations resting in first essence on good faith, and then on
contract: what did he agree to deliver?"); see also id. at 720-21 (presenting
two conceptions of the market, one based on the present sale "horse-trader,"
the other on the seller who engages in repeat orders and future deliveries);
Llewellyn, Through Title, supra note 164, at 167-68 (criticizing the "lump-
title" approach taken under the Uniform Sales Act as fitting reality "only in
that rare case in which our economy resembles that of three hundred years ago:
where the whole transaction can be accomplished at one stroke, shifting pos-
session along with title, no strings being left-behind-as in cash purchase of an
overcoat worn home"); see also Wiseman, supra note 10, at 505 ("Llewellyn's
decision to restrict the application of the merchant rules to mercantile situa-
tions, rather than apply them to all buyers and sellers, was explicitly premised
on the unfairness of imposing burdens and obligations on nonmerchant buyers
and sellers with different needs and different knowledge.").
187. See Wiseman, supra note 10, at 470, 538 (describing Llewellyn's ap-
proach as doing away with "verbally simple rules" and grouping "legal situa-
tions into narrower categories" than has been the practice in the past) (quoting
Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 158, at 1237); cf Llewellyn, Through
Title, supra note 164, at 169-70 (remarking that, with respect to the concept of
title, there are "too many kinds of seller in contract with too many kinds of
buyer in too many kinds of transaction," for a completely unitary approach, but
expressing confidence that "we can isolate types, either of transaction, or of
party, or of issue, and get light on how to better deal with those types").
188. See infra Part ll.C.2.
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Likewise, just as Llewellyn believed that the facts of commercial re-
ality should in part determine the applicable legal rules, so he also
believed that the commercial context should influence the interpreta-
tion of business contracts. The parties naturally have recourse to the
context of their bargain. In order to grasp the parties' true under-
standing, Llewellyn believed that courts should have access to this
same contextual evidence. 189
Well before he began work on the Uniform Commercial Code,
Llewellyn's scholarly writing reflected the importance he attached to
context in the interpretation of language in general and of contract
language in particular. 90 Llewellyn believed that language was not
simply words, but "words used against the slowly moving back-
ground and context of a given culture."'191 Thus, for Llewellyn, lan-
guage cannot itself establish its own meaning. Instead, meaning is a
matter of the use of language by someone within a particular context.
As Arthur Corbin, Llewellyn's teacher and mentor, would later write,
"words in themselves have no meaning," rather "it is men who give
meanings to words.' 92
Because meaning depends upon context and usage, the nature of
language includes the possibility of error, of misunderstanding. The
reader who is aware of the background out of which the author writes
is more likely to understand the author's meaning, while the reader
who ignores or misapprehends this background and substitutes an-
other is more likely to fail to grasp this meaning. The text will still
189. See Kirst, supra note 14, at 812 (describing the Code project as "an at-
tempt by the drafters first to understand the commercial context of business
transactions and then to provide a statutory framework responsive to that con-
text"); Patterson, supra note 99, at 188-89 ("In Llewellyn's view, context was
the single most important determinant to the meaning of contract language.")
(footnote omitted).
190. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, CASEBOOK, supra note 183, at xi (describing the
approach taken in his casebook as gaining "an understanding of the business
situation" as "a means [of] making the legal job intelligible"). In his casebook,
Llewellyn included a number of cases dealing with issues of custom and trade
usage. See id. at 1044-45.
191. KarlN. Llewellyn, Law and Language (May 1961) (unpublished manu-
script), in KLP, supra note 29, at B.IV.9, at 1.
192. Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence
Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 164 (1965); see also id. at 165 n.7 ("Meaning of a
word always depends on context.").
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have a meaning for the reader, but it may not be the meaning the
author intended to convey.
Perhaps the most striking illustration of Llewellyn's apprecia-
tion for the role of context in understanding (and misunderstanding)
a given text appears in his famous exchange with Dean Pound. In
March of 1931, Pound published The Call for a Realist Jurispru-
dence, 193 an essay in which he purported to describe the new school
of jurisprudence popular among "our younger teachers of law."'
194
Although not polemic in nature, Pound's piece was certainly critical
"of a number of ideas that he attributed to juristic realism."'195
Working with his fellow legal realist, Jerome Frank, Llewellyn de-
cided to publish a response to Pound's attack.196 In Some Realism
About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, Llewellyn ably demon-
strated that Pound's claims regarding the legal realists were largely
unfounded or overstated. Acknowledging the importance of context
and usage in interpretation, Llewellyn began his critique of Pound's
essay with a caveat: "We have done our best to reach and state
[Pound's] meaning. But we may misinterpret."'197 In a footnote,
Llewellyn explained that he sought to avoid any misinterpretation by
offering to submit a draft of his response to Pound for review, but
that Pound declined. 198  Accordingly, because of the critical role
context plays in the process of interpretation, Llewellyn concluded
that some misunderstanding on the part of the reader was "inevita-
ble."'199 "Words are read against the reader's background," Llewel-
lyn observed, "and distorted accordingly."' 00
193. See Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L.
REv. 697 (1931).
194. Id. at 697, 700-09.
195. TwiNiNcr, supra note 6, at 72 (footnote omitted). In his book, Twining
also analyzes the exchange between Pound and Llewellyn and situates it within
a wider historical context. See id. at 70-83.
196. See id. at 72-73. In the asterisked footnote on the first page of the arti-
cle, Llewellyn acknowledges that Jerome Frank did not "sign his name as joint
author" because "it was [Llewellyn's] fist which pushed the pen" but that "the
paper could not have been written without [Frank's] help." Llewellyn, Some
Realism, supra note 158, at 1222.
197. Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 158, at 1228.
198. See id. at 1228-29 n.19.
199. Id. at 1229 n.19.
200. Id.
LESSONS OF LLEWELLYN
In the case of business agreements, Llewellyn believed that
judges and lawyers could avoid such distortion if they had recourse
to the commercial context out of which such agreements emerged.20'
Llewellyn knew that understanding the interplay of text and context
was not an easy task. "It is true that 'business understanding' of
what an agreement means, and indeed of whether an agreement ex-
ists, is by no means unambiguous" in part because the "ways and
norms of business practice" are often "hazy at the edge." 202 Without
attempting to grasp the commercial background of agreements, how-
ever, Llewellyn believed that courts would retreat into the familiar
but inaccurate formalism of the day and "work from that bias. ' 203 In
contrast to this formalism, Llewellyn believed that attention to the
actual business relation between the parties would reap dividends
since it is "vibrant with legal implication., 20 4 So much of what con-
stitutes the parties' relationship is not formalized. So much of what
constitutes the parties' obligations is not articulated in the written
contract but is a matter of "tacit agreement" 205 and the "common un-
derstanding in fact" shared by the parties.20 a
The play of personality, the unrecorded adjustment from
day to day, further factual agreement from time to time, in-
formed by usage, and by initiative and acquiescence which
201. See generally Llewellyn, What Price, supra note 138.
202. Id. at 722.
203. Id. at 724.
204. Llewellyn, On Warranty Part II, supra note 146, at 375; see also id. at
376-78 (faulting courts for failing to appreciate the "standing relation" between
contract parties with respect to the supposed separateness of multiple occasions
for performance and the adequacy of the performance tendered); id. at 395-96
(observing that merchant buyers and sellers frequently resolve quality and war-
ranty issues by reference to trade practice or to the parties' actual dealings).
205. See Llewellyn, What Price, supra note 138, at 745 ("If the parties did
not actually think thus, they at least had generalized and hardly mistakable at-
titudes which needed but the pointing of attention and the sharpening of wits to
reach these same results."); see also Llewellyn, On Warranty Part II, supra
note 146, at 386 (stating that a court may imply an obligation by "read[ing] the
parties' intention when the parties have not spoken").
206. Llewellyn, On Warranty Part I, supra note 162, at 722 (also noting that
"the obligation implicit, because tacit, tends ever to be followed by the obliga-
tion imposed by force and arms, but in the guise of tacit understanding") (foot-
note omitted).
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do not even call for conscious agreeing--these are what fill
the contract frame-work with a living content .... o7
Llewellyn firmly believed that courts should consider this in-
formal but living content. He insisted that courts should "acquire a
willingness to take in commercial understanding" and that if they did
not, contract interpretation would remain riddled with serious prob-
lems.
20 8
5. The role of context under the UCC
The foregoing review of Llewellyn's earlier published writings
clearly indicates that he considered context to be important in the
interpretation of texts in general and of business contracts in par-
ticular. It was not until Llewellyn began work on the Code, how-
ever, that he wrote extensively about the importance of contextual
evidence. The most important aspect of this work can be found in
the successive drafts of what became UCC sections 1-201(3) (defin-
ing "agreement"), 1-205 (defining "course of dealing" and "usage of
trade"), 2-202 (parol evidence rule), and 2-208 (defining "course of
performance"). In addition, Llewellyn wrote lengthy unpublished
commentaries on these provisions which he used as law school
course materials and which he may have circulated among other
Code drafters.20 9 Finally, the importance of contextual evidence in
207. Llewellyn, What Price, supra note 138, at 731.
208. Id. at 745. Reference to the commercial context in the process of con-
tract interpretation was, for Llewellyn, uncontroversial. He believed that the
more difficult issue was "where doubt arises as to whether the common read-
ing prescribed by commercial sense... has not been overridden by deliberate
negation of the parties." Id.; see also id. at 722-23 n.45 (describing his ap-
proach for discerning the parties' social ("non-legal") obligation to perform as
deriving from a "double-barreled objective interpretation of words and acts"
including a "reading of the whole situation to get the base-line" and a "reading
of words and acts for trace of a variant" from the baseline). Under the UCC,
Llewellyn resolved this difficult issue by assuming the applicability of trade
usage and prior dealings "[u]nless carefully negated" by the parties. U.C.C. §
2-202 cmt. 2. (1995). An even stronger statement of Llewellyn's solution to
this problem appears in Selected Comments, supra note 84, in KLP, supra note
29, at J.X.2.h, at 21 ("But when course of dealing, usage, or circumstances are
to be negated by language, then the language should go, knowing the back-
ground, into clear negation of that background.").
209. See Kirst, supra note 14, at 827 (remarking that such commentary
makes for "weak legislative history" as nothing indicates that the Code spon-
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the interpretation of agreements under Article 2 can also be found in
the critical commentary that accompanied the promulgation of the
Code,2 1 0 in particular the work of the New York Law Revision
Commission. 21' These diverse sources reflect the significant changes
in contract law effected by the Code and the central role Llewellyn
attributed to contextual evidence in contract interpretation.
a. Llewellyn 's concept of agreement
Perhaps the most radical innovation introduced by the UCC is
its definition of "agreement." The Code effected a fundamental
change by replacing the classical conception of contract as "promise"
with the idea of contract as "agreement-in-fact." 212 This new con-
ception "presupposes that the meaning of the agreement of the par-
ties does not depend exclusively or even primarily on the written
terms of one or another document. 21 3 Instead it reflects Llewellyn's
preference for concrete facts over legal verbiage as well as his deep
appreciation for context.
The definition of "agreement" ultimately adopted in the Code
states that the term
sors or legislators actually read these materials); Patterson, supra note 99, at
194. But see infra note 235 and accompanying text
210. See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 5, at 824 (approving of the Code's incor-
poration of merchant custom and usage); Ernst Rabel, The Sales Law in the
Proposed Commercial Code, 17 U. CHI. L. REv. 427 (1950); Samuel Willis-
ton, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARv.
L. REv. 561 (1950).
211. See TWINING, supra note 6, at 293-98; supra note 24.
212. Mooney, supra note 10, at 224 (arguing that Llewellyn "built the Code
so as to embody a commercial contract construct substantially different from
the orthodox contract construct by statutorily substituting obligation-based-on-
transaction for obligation-based-on-promise").
213. Patterson, supra note 99, at 175; see also Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, The Limits ofExpanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between
Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 274 (1985) (re-
marking that the Code "effectively reverses the common law presumption that
the parties' writing and the official law of contract are the definitive elements
of the agreement'); Kirst, supra note 14, at 811-12 (stating that the Code "rep-
resents a fundamental change in the law of contracts" in that it "reduced the
emphasis on the written agreement, and required attention to the bargain of the
parties in fact, as found not only in the language of the parties, but also in
course of dealing, usage of trade, or course of performance") (footnotes omit-
ted).
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means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their
language or by implication from other circumstances in-
cluding course of dealing or usage of trade or course of per-
formance as provided in this Act. (Sections 1-205, and 2-
208, and 2A-207). Whether an agreement has legal conse-
quences is determined by the provisions of this Act, if ap-
plicable; otherwise by the law of contracts. (Section 1-103).
(Compare "Contract").
21 4
This definition is purely descriptive in nature. It does not purport to
establish the legal-normative consequences which may attach to the
facts it describes. For this, it refers the reader to the Code's defini-
tion of "contract." 215 In separating fact from the legal significance of
fact, Llewellyn was avoiding what he considered to be a major flaw
in the then current legal system. For Llewellyn, a rule "which
merely defines a term of art in terms of legal consequence (rather
than in terms of operative fact) will.., remain without significance
in life until it is accompanied and supplemented by other rules which
root it in the soil of fact., 2 16 If a rule does not have some descriptive
component that "signal[s] and sharpen[s] the real issue," then
the rule is "meaningless" for the judge if not for the linguist.
21 7
214. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1995). Obviously, Llewellyn was not involved in
any way in drafting Article 2A, but the drafters of that Article built upon his
foundational work with respect to the importance of contextual evidence.
215. The Code defines "contract" to mean "the total legal obligation which
results from the parties' agreement as affected by this Act and any other appli-
cable rules of law." Id. § 1-201(11).
216. Llewellyn, Offer and Acceptance Part 1, supra note 165, at 28 (empha-
sis omitted); cf Mooney, supra note 10, at 224 (criticizing the classical con-
ception of contract because "it cannot be defined in concrete terms because
[promise] signifies a mixture of fact and law") (footnote omitted).
217. Llewellyn, Offer and Acceptance Part 1, supra note 165, at 28. Antici-
pating the distinction between "agreement" and "contract" he would later make
in drafting the Code, in the same law review article Llewellyn asserted "that
our thinking, teaching, deciding and especially opinion-writing would gain
much in clarity and simplicity if it were our practice to use one pure fact-word
for the problematical fact set-up and a different word for the category-in-issue
which is charged with legal consequence." Id. at 29; see also id. at 30-31
(rules that are pigeonholes, that set forth a system of classification, a "vocabu-
lary about legal consequence" can still possess "utility" so long as they indi-
cate which "facts fit which of the rival pigeonholes, and why").
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The descriptive component of "agreement" is the fact of the
parties' bargain, the "reality of consent'211 to an arrangement in
which one party's performance is given in exchange for the other's.
Although the concept of agreement as bargain-in-fact first appeared
in the April 1944 Draft of the Uniform Revised Sales Act,219 the idea
was part of Llewellyn's thinking well before this time.22 0 Indeed,
Llewellyn insisted that, as an historical matter, agreement preceded
promise as the basis of contractual obligation.22' He maintained that
a hundred years earlier "the operative facts" of contract were "facts
of agreement.,222 It was only later, in response to the legal mind's
218. Cf Llewellyn, What Price, supra note 138, at 728 n.49 (concluding that
"agreement" is truly "an elusive concept").
219. The 1944 Draft defined "agreement" to mean "the bargain in fact as
found in the language of the parties or in course of dealing, usage of trade or
course of performance or by implication from other circumstances." UNIFORM
REVISED SALES ACT (SALES CHAPTER OF PROPOSED COMMERCIAL CODE)
PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT No. 1, § 9(2) (1944) [hereinafter 1944 DRAFT], re-
printed in 2 U.C.C. DRAFTS, supra note 21, at 17. The same section defined
"contract" as "the total obligation in law which results from the parties'
agreement as affected by this Act and any other applicable rules of law." Id.
Except for a slight change in word order the same definitions for these terms
appear in the current UCC. Arguably, some version of these definitions ap-
peared earlier in the drafting process. The 1941 Draft defined "contract" as
"the fall legal obligation of the parties, whether that obligation arises from
particularized terms or by operation of law or otherwise as by usage of trade,
or course of dealing." 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, § 1. The 1941 Draft had
no definition for "agreement" however, the 1940 Draft defined "sale" to "in-
clude a bargain and sale as well as a sale and delivery." DRAFT FOR A
"UNIFORM SALES ACT, 1940" APPENDED TO AND PART OF A REPORT ON THE
UNIFORM SALES ACT TO THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAwS 12 (1940) [hereinafter 1940 DRAFT], reprinted in 1
U.C.C. DRAFTS, supra note 21, at 179.
220. See, e.g., Llewellyn, What Price, supra note 138, at 708 (referring to
"agreements-in-fact" as distinguished from "promises" and remarking that the
"law of contract takes its beginning ... in the notion that legal officials should
enforce, or should at least draw into reckoning, certain of men's bargains or
promises") (footnote omitted).
221. See Llewellyn, Offer and Acceptance Part 11, supra note 182, at 796
(arguing that "the traditional base-line of a century back" was "that the essen-
tial basis of contracting is Agreemenf'); see also Llewellyn, Across Sales, su-
pra note 184, at 728 (concluding that the law of contract became part of the
law of sales "when Contract was conceived not as a matter of obligation, ex-
clusively, but as a matter in first instance of agreement").
222. Llewellyn, Offer and Acceptance Part H, supra note 182, at 796.
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desire for certainty, that overt expression became a requirement.
Then the "doctrinal emphasis shifted from agreement to promise as
being the essential subject-matter of Contract. 223  Despite this
change, Llewellyn still saw agreement as a "relation in fact" between
two parties.224 In drafting the UCC, Llewellyn sought to restore
agreement as the "proper basis and ground for the relation in law we
call contractual obligation.,
225
In displacing contract-as-promise with contract-as-agreement,
the Code effected a significant change.226 Equally significant, how-
ever, is the way in which the definition prominently features con-
textual evidence among the operative facts of agreement. Section 1-
201(3) provides that the parties' bargain-in-fact can be found "by
implication" in the circumstances of their interaction, including
course of dealing, usage of trade, and course of performance. In-
deed, the official comment which accompanies this section states that
the definition was intended to give "full recognition" to these back-
ground sources as "effective parts" of the parties' agreement.227
Thus, the effect of Llewellyn's conceptualization of agreement as
factual relation is to bring what had been background into relief.
In defining "agreement" as such, some critics charged that
Llewellyn "seem[ed] to ignore" the distinction between interpreting
contract terms and supplying them, and that this move was "open to
223. Id. at 809. Although Llewellyn understood this tendency, he believed
that the focus on promise "obscured" the real basis of contract, namely, active
agreement See id. In truth, however, "[w]hen minds have really and unmis-
takably not only met but joined up, neither a precise process nor a precise in-
slant has importance. But we pick a mile-stone.... Upon this plays the fact
that, in life, expressed agreement does operate as a commitment. It just does."
Id. at 804.
224. See Llewellyn, Offer and Acceptance Part I1, supra note 182, at 807;
see also Llewellyn, Offer and Acceptance Part I, supra note 165, at 36 (setting
forth his hypothesis that "mutual assent" is "a fact" which commonly leads to
contractual obligation).
225. Llewellyn, Offer and Acceptance Part H, supra note 182, at 807. If
Llewellyn's claim that contract was first based on agreement, not promise, is
correct, then the radicality of Llewellyn's definition of agreement is ironic in
that it is a return to the past-back to the future as it were.
226. The parties may, of course, conclude an "agreement" under the Code by
an exchange of promises. The definition provides that the parties' bargain-in-
fact can be "found in their language." U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1995).
227. Id. § 1-201(3) cmt 3.
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question. ' ,228 The distinction, however, was not lost on Llewellyn.
Rather, it was plain to him
that in the matter of reading agreements in the light of trade
usage, course of dealing or the circumstances of the case,
the problems of formation (i.e., of incorporating terms and
conditions into the agreement) and of construction (i.e., de-
termining the meaning of the words used) overlap and even
coincide.229
Consequently, the inclusion of contextual evidence within the defi-
nition of agreement was not due to any confusion on Llewellyn's
part. Instead, it reflected both his understanding of the way in which
language operates as well as the manner in which business people
conclude deals. Under the Code's definition of "agreement," the text
of the parties' bargain is still of great importance, but it must be situ-
ated within its proper context. Beyond this, however, Llewellyn's
definition of "agreement" recognizes the background sources which
make-up this context as a constituent part of the parties' agreement.
b. usage of trade, course of dealing, and course ofperformance
The importance Llewellyn attached to the different categories of
contextual evidence is readily apparent from a review of the Code
text, comments, and earlier drafts. Section 1-205(1) of the UCC de-
fines a "course of dealing" as "a sequence of previous conduct be-
tween the parties" which may be "fairly... regarded as establishing
a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions
and other conduct. 2 30 Similarly, section 1-205(2) defines "usage of
trade" as "any practice or method of dealing having such regularity
of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expecta-
tion that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in ques-
tion.' 231 Likewise, section 2-208 states that a "course of perform-
ance" may be "relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement"
228. 2 N.Y. REPORT 1955, supra note 24, at 210-13 (analysis of section 1-
201(3) by Professor Edwin W. Patterson).
229. Selected Comments, supra note 84, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.X.2.h, at
21 (emphasis omitted); see also Karl N. Llewellyn, Introductory Comment to
Parts 1I and III Formation and Construction (1944) [hereinafter Introductory
Comment], in KLP, supra note 29, at J.VI.2.h, at 10.
230. U.C.C. § 1-205(1) (1995).
231. Id. § 1-205(2).
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where the agreement "involves repeated occasions for performance
by either party.,232 Section 2-208(1) provides that a "course of per-
formance" may be shown where either party had the opportunity to
object to the performance rendered but "accepted or acquiesced in
[it] without objection.,
2 33
Each of these three terms emphasizes what the parties knew and
expected based on their understanding of the trade and their famili-
arity with one another. It is ,after all, "[t]he parties themselves [who]
know best what they have meant by their words of agreement.
2 34
These provisions recognize, however, that the parties' use of lan-
guage does not occur in a vacuum but takes place within and draws
meaning from their particular historical and social context. Accord-
ingly, the Code prescribes that "the meaning of the agreement of the
parties is to be determined by the language used by them and by their
action, read and interpreted in the light of commercial practices and
other surrounding circumstances., 235 The contextual sources which
232. Id. § 2-208(1).
233. Id. The comment that follows section 2-208 makes clear that a "single
occasion of conduct does not fall within the language of this section.... ." Id.
cmt. 4.
234. Id. cmt. 1.
235. Id. § 1-205 cmt. 1. An earlier version of this remark can be found at
Selected Comments, supra note 84, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.X.2.h, at 44.
See also Introductory Comment, supra note 229, in KLP, supra note 29, at
J.VI.2.h, at 1 ("This Act rests on the principle that commercial agreements are
to be given in law the same reasonable and commercial meaning which they
have in the circumstances of commercial men, and that action under them
which is commercially reasonable is to be given recognition and protection.").
Professor Kirst has argued that those portions of the unpublished Karl Llewel-
lyn Papers that demonstrate the importance Llewellyn attached to contextual
evidence "may be excellent evidence of Llewellyn's intent" but constitute"weak legislative history because nothing indicates that the sponsors of the
Code or legislators ... read [them]." Kirst supra note 14, at 827. Clearly,
however, some individuals other than Llewellyn had access to some version of
these materials. A careful reading of Llewellyn's Selected Comments, and his
General Comment on Parts I and IV, Formation and Construction (1948)
[hereinafter General Comment], in KLP, supra note 29, at J.X.2.k, show that
these materials were the basis for at least some of the official comments to Ar-
ticle 2. (Note that although the document identified as J.X.2.l. does not appear
in the catalogue prepared by Ellingwood and Twining, supra note 29, it does
appear in the collection identified as such.) The similarity in much of the lan-
guage is simply too striking to be mere coincidence. Compare KLP, supra
note 29, at J.X.2.h, at 42-49, and J.X.2.k, at 25-3 8, with U.C.C. §§ 2-207 cmt.,
324
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comprise these circumstances are of such vital importance in the pro-
cess of interpretation that they "may explain and supplement even
the language of a formal or final writing. ' 23 6  They "furnish the
background and give particular meaning to the language used, and
are the [parties'] framework of common understanding., 237 The par-
ties may acknowledge this background "either by explicit provisions
of the agreement or by tacit recognition.', 238 In either case, however,
they plainly constitute "[p]art of the agreement of the parties. 239
It is of course possible that different aspects of this context will,
as it were, point in different hermeneutical directions. The applica-
ble course of dealing, usage of trade, and course of performance may
suggest different meanings for the same written terms or may imply
different terms altogether. To obviate such possible conflict, the
Code employs two mediating rules. First, it requires that "[t]he ex-
press terms of the agreement and any such course of performance, as
well as any course of dealing and usage of trade, shall be construed
whenever reasonable as consistent with each other., 240 When it is
1-205 cmt., and 2-320 cmt. Much earlier versions of these comments can be
found in the 1940 DRAFT, supra note 219, the 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, and
the 1944 DRAFT, supra note 219. See also TwINING, supra note 6, at 328.
236. U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 1.
237. Id. cmt. 4.
238. Id. cnt. 3.
239. Id. cmt. 4. Trade usage, course of dealing and course of performance
were recognized as sources of contractual obligation and aids to interpretation
in the earliest drafts of the Code. See, e.g., 1940 DRAFT, supra note 219, §§
12, at 16 (stating that a contract "may be inferred from the conduct of the par-
ties"), 18, at 21 (stating that course of dealing and trade usage may have "the
same effect as express agreement"); 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, § l-D, at 54-
55. In this early recognition, however, the Code did not equate these sources
with custom and usage as they had developed under English and American
common law. See 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, § 1-D cmt., at 55 (remarking
that courts have been confused "because the cases have presented in disordered
sequence 'usages' which seemed to be such and 'usages' which looked ex-
tremely doubtful or unreasonable"). Section 1-205 requires that a trade usage
enjoy a "regularity of observance" and that a course of dealing establishes a
"common basis of understanding," but the accompanying comment makes
clear that the common law tests for custom "are abandoned." See U.C.C. § 1-
205 cmt. 5; Selected Comments, supra note 84, in KLP, supra note 29, at
J.X.2.h, at 47-48; see also 2 N.Y. REPORT 1955, supra note 24, at 323 (con-
tending that section 1-205 does not distinguish usage from custom); supra Part
II.A-B.
240. U.C.C. § 2-208(2) (1995); see also id. at § 1-205(4).
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not reasonable to construe these various sources as consistent, the
Code specifies a hierarchical ordering among them. In this hierar-
chy, priority is given to what is typically thought to be the most spe-
cific evidence of the parties' intent.241 Accordingly, the Code pro-
vides that "express terms shall control course of performance and
course of performance shall control both course of dealing and usage
of trade"242 and that "course of dealing controls usage of trade.,
243
The presence of this hierarchy does not mean that express terms
will necessarily dominate ostensibly contrary contextual evidence.
First, the context of the agreement and its terms must be read to-
gether charitably and sympathetically. Where reasonable, the Code
requires the reader to interpret contextual evidence and the express
terms of the agreement as "consistent with each other.",244 Under this
interpretive norm a trade usage or course of dealing which initially
appears to be at odds with the written agreement may upon closer
examination seem more congenial. In fulfilling this obligation, the
reader must ask "What does the explicit language, read commer-
cially, mean?" 245 Where the express terms are read in such a com-
mercially sensible manner, the apparent conflict with contextual
sources will often disappear.2 46
241. See WilliamD. Hawkland, Sales Contract Terms Under the U.C.C., 17
UCC L.J. 195, 197 (1985) (explaining that "[t]hese priorities reflect the rela-
tive ability of the various concepts to determine the parties' actual intent").
Comment 2 to section 2-202 explains that the Code allows the use of contex-
tual evidence "in order that the true understanding of the parties as to the
agreement may be reached." U.C.C. § 2-202 cnt. 2. But see Eyal Zamir, The
Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97
COLUM. L. REv. 1710 (1997) (arguing that there is to some extent a hierarchy
among the sources but that the more general sources such as trade usages are
of greater importance than the more specific sources).
242. U.C.C. § 2-208(2). Because it is the most specific and the most con-
crete, "the course of actual performance by the parties is considered the best
indication of what they intended the writing to mean." Id. § 2-202 cmt. 2; see
also id. § 2-208 cut. 1 ("The parties themselves know best what they have
meant by their words of agreement and their action under that agreement is the
best indication of what that meaning was.").
243. Id. § 1-205(4).
244. Id. §§ 1-205(4), 2-208(2).
245. Selected Comments, supra note 84, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.X.2.h, at
21.
246. See Lancaster Glass Corp. v. Philips ECG, Inc., 835 F.2d 652, 659-60
(6th Cir. 1987); Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772,
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Second, where conflict between the written terms of the agree-
ment and the unwritten context cannot be avoided, the written terms
may not control. Rather, the Code seeks to enforce the intent of the
parties which may or may not be expressed in the formal agreement.
Properly understood "the rule of the Code ... is not that express
terms dominate, but that the intent of the parties, however expressed,
is to control., 247 Llewellyn believed that even contract terms which
appear "explicit in form" are often "shown by the parties' conduct
not to be meant as written., 248 Consequently, although a trade usage
"may incorporate a meaning seemingly contradictory to the language
used," frequently no genuine contradiction will exist because the
parties did not intend the ordinary meaning of the express terms to
apply.249  Thus, section 1-205(3) provides that course of dealing
and trade usage may "supplement or qualify [the] terms of an
agreement. '250  Likewise, section 2-208(3) provides that evi-
dence of course of performance may be used "to show a waiver or
790-94 (9th Cir. 1981); Foxco Indus. v. Fabric World, Inc., 595 F.2d 976, 984-
85 (5th Cir. 1979); Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 8-11
(4th Cir. 1971); Carter Baron Drilling v. Badger Oil Corp., 581 F. Supp. 592,
594-98 (D. Colo. 1984); Luedtke Eng'g Co. v. Indiana Limestone Co., 592
F.Supp. 75, 81-83 (S.D. Ind. 1983), aff'd 740 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1984); Hegg-
blade-Marguleas-Tenneco, Inc. v. Sunshine Biscuit, Inc., 59 Cal. App. 3d 948,
953-57, 131 Cal. Rptr. 183, 187-89 (1976); Campbell Farms v. Wald, 578
N.W.2d 96, 100-01 (N.D. 1998).
247. Kirst, supra note 14, at 825; see also infra notes 253-302 and accompa-
nying text.
248. Selected Comments, supra note 84, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.X.2.h, at
15.
249. Id. at J.X.2.h, at 16 (citing Dixon, Irmaos & Cia, Ltd. v. Chase Nat'l
Bank, 144 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1944)). The Dixon case is significant in that its
holding embodied the theory behind the rules in UCC sections 1-205, 2-208.
For a more detailed discussion of Dixon and its place in the drafting history of
the Code, see Kirst, supra note 14, at 828-32; Patterson, supra note 99, at 196-
99; see also LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 83, at
328-30, 348.
250. U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (1995) (emphasis added); see also Selected Com-
ments, supra note 84, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.X.2.h, at 20 (arguing that
"[tjhe background of circumstances against which the agreement is entered
into and performed may supply terms not explicitly agreed upon" and that
"[t]he circumstances may qualify the meaning of an explicit termd');
FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, § 7.13, at 528 (arguing that this provision
"makes it clear that conduct may have an effect beyond mere interpretation of
the [contract] terms").
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modification of any term inconsistent with such course of perform-
ance."
25 '
From this it is obvious that under the Code, express contract
terms do not enjoy the same primacy given to them at common law.
Embracing a naive formalism, the common law often supposed that
prior to interpretation express terms possessed a meaning that was
plain and clear. Accordingly, the common law did not permit the use
of extrinsic evidence to "contradict" or "vary" the express language
of an agreement.252 The Code, by contrast, recognizes that express
terms can be "contradicted" or "varied" only when they have already
been interpreted and assigned a specific meaning. The process of
interpretation necessarily involves the use of context. The Code's
use of trade usage, course of dealing, and course of performance
does not alter the "innate" meaning of express contract terms because
no word or sentence innately means anything. Instead, language has
meaning only when it is purposefully used by someone within a
given context. In order to grasp the meaning intended by the parties
to an agreement, the express terms must be read against the back-
ground that the parties had in mind.
Sections 1-205 and 2-208 mandate the use of this background in
the interpretive process. In so doing, the Code has effected a re-
markable change. Evidence that the common law considered extrin-
sic to the contract, outside the "four comers" of the written docu-
ment, the Code regards as intrinsic to the agreement itself. Under
sections 1-205 and 2-208, contextual evidence may limit or other-
wise qualify a written term. It may even suspend the effect of a term
by waiver. In doing this the written document is truly respected be-
cause the genuine intentions of the parties are given force.
c. theparol evidence rule
UCC sections 1-201(3), 1-205, and 2-208 powerfully illustrate
Llewellyn's whole-hearted embrace of context in the interpretive
251. U.C.C. § 2-208(3); see also id. cmt. 3; Selected Comments, supra note
84, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.X.2.h, at 14 (remarking that "it is frequently
impossible to say whether a course of conduct under a written agreement inter-
prets the parties' original meaning or represents a subsequent standing waiver
of some term or terms of the agreemenf').
252. See supra notes 101, 109-111 and accompanying text.
LESSONS OF LLEWELL YN
process. To fully appreciate, however, the gravity of the change
brought about by the Code, these provisions must be read in con-
junction with section 2-202, Articles 2's version of the parol evi-
dence rule. This provision allows for the generous use of various
sources of meaning not expressly contained within the final written
contract itself.
Like its common law predecessors, the UCC's version of the pa-
rol evidence rule is not a rule of evidence. It is instead a substantive
rule of law that establishes the outer limits of what material consti-
tutes the operative contract between the parties.2 3 At common law,
the rule served an exclusionary function by "affirm[ing] the primacy
of a subsequent agreement over prior negotiations and even prior
agreements.,
254
The Code's version of the parol evidence rule is decidedly less
exclusionary than its common law cousins. Indeed, the rule's rela-
tive openness to sources outside the formal written contract reflects
the same broadened understanding of what constitutes the parties'
agreement also present in UCC sections 1-205 and 2-208. Section 2-
202 provides as follows:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda
of the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a
writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their
agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein
may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement
or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be ex-
plained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-
205) or by course of performance (Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless
the court finds the writing to have been intended also
253. See, e.g., 3 CORBI, supra note 100, § 573, at 357-70; FARNSWORTH,
supra note 27, § 7.2, at 450; 3 WILLISTON, supra note 124, § 631, at 1813.
254. FARNSWORTH supra note 27, § 7.2, at 451; see also 3 CORBIN, supra
note 100, § 574 (illustrating the supremacy of subsequent agreements over
prior negotiations and prior agreements); cf 1 N.Y. REPORT 1955, supra note
24, at 598 ("The parol evidence 'rule' in its broadest sense is a set of judge-
made rules excluding any and all proof of extrinsic aids to vary or contradict or
supplement the terms of an apparently complete written contractual docu-
ment.") (analysis of Professor Edwin Patterson).
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as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of
the agreement.255
The rule does not presume that the formal written document in ques-
tion is "integrated," that it is the final expression of the terms it con-
tains. Instead, integration is a contention that must be proved to the
court.256 Under section 2-202, the party making this contention must
show that the writing was "intended by the parties as a final expres-
sion of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included
therein.
257
Even though a document is the final expression of the parties
with respect to the items it contains, it may not be the complete and
exclusive expression of the parties' agreement. Finality is a quality
that is distinct from the qualities of completeness and exclusivity.
258
255. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1995). The original Uniform Sales Act did not contain
any version of the parol evidence rule though clearly Williston supported the
rule at common law. At an early stage Llewellyn began to think about the
problems raised by formal writings and oral agreements governing the same
matter. See Llewellyn, What Price, supra note 138, at 713, 747-48. The first
version of the parol evidence rule to appear in the drafting history of the Code
was section 15 of the 1944 Draft. See 1944 DRAFT, supra note 219, § 15. Ex-
cept for a slight change in word order in subsection (6), section 15 of the 1944
Draft is virtually identical to UCC § 2-202.
256. The exact role of the court under section 2-202 is itself a point of con-
tention. Some courts have held that determining whether a writing is the final
expression of the parties is a question of fact for the jury. See, e.g., Campbell
v. Regal Typewriter Co., 341 So. 2d 120 (Ala. 1976); Anderson & Nafziger v.
G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 595 P.2d 709 (Idaho 1979). Others have held that it is a
question of law for judges to decide. See, e.g., Compania Sud-Americana de
Vapores v. IBJ Schroder Bank & Trust Co., 785 F. Supp. 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
Apple Valley Red-E-Mix, Inc. v. Mills-Winfield Eng'g Sales, Inc., 436
N.W.2d 121 (Minn. App. 1989); see also WITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, §
2-9, at 97 (arguing that because the question of "completeness and exclusivity"
is for the judge the question of finality should also be for the judge since "the
greater ordinarily includes the lesser").
257. U.C.C. § 2-202.
258. See 2 RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202:21, at 146 (1982) ("[F]inality means merely that
the writing is final as far as it goes. It cannot be contradicted but there is no
bar to the proof of additional consistent terms. Exclusive means that the writ-
ing was intended as the memorial of the total agreement As the writing states
'everything' it necessarily follows that a term not included in the writing can-
not be proved by parol evidence, without regard to whether the term could be
considered consistent with the writing.") (footnote omitted). Although Ander-
son correctly describes the distinction between finality and exclusivity, as shall
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The comment to section 2-202 states that the section "definitely re-
jects... [a]ny assumption that because a writing has been worked
out which is final on some matters, it is to be taken as including all
the matters agreed upon., 259 Accordingly, even if the court finds that
the written agreement is the final expression between the parties with
respect to the terms it contains, section 2-202 still allows for proof of
"consistent additional terms. 26 ° These additional terms may take the
form of collateral agreements which relate to the subject matter of
the contract26' or prior drafts of the contract itself which reveal the
understanding of the parties. 6 In any case, the statute allows for
proof of such terms insofar as they "explain" or "supplement" the fi-
nal agreement and do not "contradict" it.263 The court264 may, how-
ever, exclude proof of consistent additional terms if it "finds the
writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive
be made clear below, he overstates the effect these qualities have on the admis-
sibility of extrinsic evidence.
259. U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. l(a).
260. Id. § 2-202 cmt. 3.
261. See Wilson v. Marquette Electronics, Inc., 630 F.2d 575 (8th Cir.
1980); In re W.T. Grant Co., 1 B.R. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Rockdale Cable
T.V. Co. v. Spadora, 423 N.E.2d 555 (Ill. App. Ct 1981); Security Mut Fin.
Corp. v. Willis, 439 So. 2d 1278 (Miss. 1983); Norwest Bank Billings v.
Murnion, 684 P.2d 1067 (Mont 1984); Mill Printing & Lithographing Corp. v.
Solid Waste Management Sys., Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d 257 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978);
Red River Commodities, Inc. v. Eidsness, 459 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1990);
Sundlun v. Shoemaker, 617 A.2d 1330 (Pa. Super. Ct 1992); In re Estate of
Upchurch, 466 S.W.2d 886 (Tenn. Ct App. 1970).
262. See Embryo Progeny Assocs. v. Lovana Farms, Inc., 416 S.E.2d 833
(Ga. Ct App. 1992); Security Mut Fin. Corp. v. Willis, 439 So. 2d 1278
(Miss. 1983).
263. See 1 N.Y. REPORT 1955, supra note 24, at 601 (expressing doubt as to
the durability of this distinction in practice and fear that the failure will "impair
the policy of protecting the effectiveness of a written instrument") (analysis of
Professor Edwin Patterson).
264. The majority of courts and commentators agree that the judge, not the
jury, makes the determination regarding completeness and exclusivity. This
judgment is based on reference to "the court" in UCC § 2-202(b) and comment
3. See U.C.C. § 2-202 cm. 3 ("Under paragraph (b) consistent additional
terms, not reduced to writing, may be proved unless the court finds the writing
was intended by both parties as a complete and exclusive statement of all the
terms."); see also Huntsville Hosp. v. Mortara Instrument 57 F.3d 1043, 1046
(1 lth Cir. 1995) (finding that the written agreement was not final and therefore
the court could consider consistent additional terms).
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statement of the terms of the agreement. 2 65 Although exclusion of
consistent additional terms is still possible, the effect of section 2-
202 is "to 'loosen up' the parol evidence rule by abolishing the pre-
sumption that a writing (apparently complete) is a total integra-
tion.
266
Another effect of section 2-202 is to bolster the Code's already
emphatic commitment to the use of contextual evidence in the inter-
pretive process. 267 The introduction of this evidence does not turn on
whether or not the contract is fully integrated. That is, even if the
court finds that the written contract is "a complete and exclusive
statement" of the parties' agreement, the court may still consider
evidence of course of dealing, usage of trade, and course of perform-
ance. A seemingly complete contract is in fact incomplete-and will
be misconstrued-if divorced from its proper context. Thus, even a
fully integrated contract must "be read on the assumption that the
course of prior dealings between the parties and the usages of trade
were taken for granted when the document was phrased., 268 "Unless
carefully negated," this background has "become an element of the
meaning of the words used.5
2 69
Further, the use of this background in the interpretive process
does not depend upon a finding of ambiguity. Section 2-202 "defi-
nitely rejects" the claim that such a finding is "a condition precedent
to the admissibility of [contextual evidence]., 270 In so doing, the
Code sides with modem literary theory in recognizing that ambiguity
is not a property that language possesses. 271 A document "is neither
265. U.C.C. § 2-202 (b).
266. 1 N.Y. REPORT 1955, supra note 24, at 598 (analysis of Professor Ed-
win Patterson).
267. See Kirst, supra note 14, at 833 (arguing that section 2-202(a) "is pri-
marily an internal cross-reference to emphasize that section 1-205 provides the
rule governing usage of trade and course of dealing").
268. U.C.C. § 2-202 cnn. 2.
269. Id.
270. Id. cmt. 1(c); see also Tigg Corp. v. Dow Coming Corp., 822 F.2d 358,
363 (3d Cir. 1987) ("A finding that the language admits of more than one in-
terpretation is not a prerequisite to the admission of extrinsic evidence relating
to usage of trade, course of dealing or course of performance."); Michigan
Bean Co. v. Senn, 287 N.W.2d 257, 260-61 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979); Herman
Oil, Inc. v. Peterman, 518 N.W.2d 184, 189-90 (N.D. 1994).
271. See STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY
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ambiguous nor unambiguous in and of itself. The document isn't
anything in and of itself, but acquires a shape and a significance only
within the assumed background circumstances of its possible use...
. 272 Accordingly, "when there is a disagreement about the shape or
meaning of a sentence, it is a disagreement between persons who are
reading or hearing (and therefore constituting) it according to the as-
sumptions of different circumstances., 271 Making proof of context
contingent on a showing of ambiguity as the common law did defies
the logic of interpretation because it is the supposition of different
contexts that make a text appear clear or ambiguous in the first place.
The Code attempts to avert interpretive disputes over business con-
tracts by giving interpretive priority to the background circumstances
and beliefs that make up the "commercial context."
274
OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 281 (1980) ("I am as willing to say that all
sentences are straightforward as I am to say that all sentences are ambiguous.
What I am not willing to do is to say that any sentence is by right either one or
the other. That is, I wish to deny that ambiguity is a property of some sen-
tences and not of others."); Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1325,
1335 (1984) [hereinafter Fish, Fish v. Fiss] (stating that the qualities of ambi-
guity and straightforwardness "are not linguistic, but contextual or institu-
tionar).
272. Stanley Fish, Don 't Know Much About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law
and Literature, 97 YALE L.J. 777, 784 (1988) [hereinafter Fish, Middle Ages].
Professor Fish elsewhere makes clear that it is neither the language of the text
itself nor its specific context which determine textual meaning but "the cultural
assumptions within which both texts and contexts take shape for situated
agents." Id. at 783; see also Corbin, supra note 192, at 164 (asserting that
"when a judge refuses to consider relevant extrinsic evidence on the ground
that the meaning of written words is to him plain and clear, his decision is
formed by and wholly based upon the completely extrinsic evidence of his own
personal education and experience").
273. Fish, Fish v. Fiss, supra note 271, at 1335; see also FISH, supra note
271, at 277 ("If we expect a text to be ambiguous, we will in the act of reading
it imagine situations in which it means first one thing and then another.., and
those plural meanings will in the context of that situation, be that text's literal
meaning.").
274. Comment l(b) to § 2-202 clearly expresses the Code's preference for
the commercial context over the context provided by abstract legal rules which
have no connection to the transaction itself. It provides that § 2-202 "defi-
nitely rejects ... [t]he premise that the language used has the meaning attribut-
able to such language by rules of construction existing in the law rather than
the meaning which arises out of the commercial context in which it was used."
U.C.C. § 2-202 cnt. l(b) (1995).
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Furthermore, proof of this context is not subject to the require-
ment that it explain or supplement and not contradict 275 the written
terms of the agreement.2 7 6 A large number of courts misconstrued
275. Section 2-202 speaks in terms of both consistency and non-
contradiction. It provides that a final expression of the parties' agreement
"may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contem-
poraneous oral agreement." Id. § 2-202. It also provides that evidence of
"consistent additional terms" may be introduced except where the writing is "a
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement." Id. Courts
have generally found that the concepts of contradiction and inconsistency are
closely related and frequently overlap. See, e.g., Mac Gregor v. McReki, Inc.,
494 P.2d 1297, 1298 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Whirlpool Corp. v. Regis Leasing
Corp., 288 N.Y.S.2d 337, 339-40 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968); Hunt Foods & In-
dus., Inc. v. Doliner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937, 940 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966). More re-
cently some courts have defined inconsistency as the "absence of reasonable
harmony." This definition goes beyond mere contradiction to address those
cases in which a parol term is offered that "if agreed upon... would certainly
have been included in the document." U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt 3; see Binks Mfg.
Co. v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 1109, 1115-16 (7th Cir. 1983);
American Research Bureau Inc. v. E-Systems, Inc., 663 F.2d 189, 199-200
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Alaska N. Dev., Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 666 P.2d
33, 40 (Alaska 1983); Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Assoc., Inc., 380 A.2d
618, 623 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977).
276. This essentially is the gist of Professor Kirst's article. See Kirst; supra
note 14, at 832-39. In a criticism that was both ironic and prescient Professor
Edwin Patterson, writing in 1955, questioned whether "rules as to interpreta-
tion by usage, prior dealings or course of performance should be included in a
section on the parol evidence rule." 1 N.Y. REPORT 1955, supra note 24, at
601. He concluded that "[i]t would seem less confusing to state clearly the
rules as to exclusion or admission of other utterances of the parties, and to
leave to other sections the rules as to usage and prior dealings (§ 1-205) and
course of performance (§ 2-208)." Id. Although the New York Law Revision
Commission incorporated Patterson's suggestion into its recommendation con-
cerning § 2-202, N.Y. REPORT 1956, supra note 24, at 368, the reference to
contextual evidence remained in the statute. Patterson's criticism of § 2-202
was prescient because courts have been confused by the language of the provi-
sion. His criticism was ironic because, had it been followed, it may have
avoided the misinterpretation that followed. Properly understood the statute
allows for the introduction of contextual evidence even when that evidence ap-
pears to conflict with the express terms of an agreement Patterson, however,
believed in the primacy of written terms. See, e.g., 1 N.Y. REPORT 1955, su-
pra note 24, at 601 (referring to "the policy of protecting the effectiveness of a
written instrumenf'); id. at 638 (supporting the "plain meaning" test as "work-
able" in support of "the protection of the reliability of written contracts"); 3
N.Y. REPORT 1955, supra note 24, at 325 (referring to "the dominance of ex-
press terms" under New York law); see also Edwin W. Patterson, The Inter-
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the statute and held that evidence of course of dealing, course of per-
formance, and usage of trade that contradicts the express terms of the
agreement may not be admitted.277 The language and structure of the
Code itself, however, do not support this reading.
First, the definition of agreement under section 1-201(3) makes
evidence of usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of perform-
ance necessarily relevant and presumptively admissible. Because
these sources of contextual evidence are "effective parts" of the
agreement itse, 278 they cannot be excluded by other evidence of the
same agreement. Instead, if an apparent conflict exists between the
contextual evidence presented and the written terms of the agree-
ment, then the question to be resolved is "a question of determining
[the parties'] intent from oral and written evidence. ',279  Clearly
"both the evidence of the writing and the evidence of the usage of
trade or course of dealing must be admitted for the factfinder to de-
termine which intent is controlling.
280
Second, nothing in the provisions which define usage of trade,
course of dealing, and course of performance requires that such evi-
dence be consistent with the express terms of the agreement.28'
pretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 833, 851 (1964)
("An alleged usage which contradicts express terms of the contract is to be re-
jected.").
277. See, e.g., Trailways Fin. & Acceptance Corp. v. Euro-Flo Tours, Inc.,
572 F. Supp. 1227, 1231 (D.N.J. 1983); Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins
Music Corp., 534 F. Supp. 57, 63-64 (S.D.N.Y 1981); Lipschutz v. Gordon
Jewelry Corp., 373 F. Supp. 375, 387-88 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Gianelli Distrib.
Co. v. Beck & Co., 172 Cal. App. 3d 1020, 1040-41, 219 Cal. Rptr. 203, 212-
13 (1985); Santandrea v. Siltec Corp., 56 Cal. App. 3d 525, 528, 128 Cal. Rptr.
629, 631 (1976); BIB Audio-Video Prods. v. Herold Mktg. Assocs., 517
N.W.2d 68, 72-73 (Minn. Ct App. 1994); SAB Hannon Indus., Inc. v. All
State Bldg. Sys., Inc., 733 S.W.2d 476, 486 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Division of
the Triple T Serv., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 304 N.Y.S.2d 191, 202-03 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct 1969); North Unit Potato Co. v. Spada Distrib. Co., 490 P.2d 995,
998-99 (Or. 1971); Printing Ctr. of Tex., Inc. v. Supermind Publ'g. Co., 669
S.W.2d 779, 784 (Tex. App. 1984). Fortunately, some courts have held that
contextual evidence need not satisfy the requirement of non-contradiction in
order to be admitted. See, e.g., State ex rel. Nichols v. Safeco Ins. Co. of
Amer., 671 P.2d 1151, 1155 (N.M. Ct App. 1983); Morgan v. Stokely-Van
Camp, Inc., 663 P.2d 1384, 1389 (Wash. Ct App. 1983).
278. See U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 3.
279. Kirst, supra note 14, at 835.
280. Id.
281. Professor Kirst adds that while § 1-205 "states a general rule applicable
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Sections 1-205(4) and 2-208(2) do state that the interpreter must con-
strue the express terms and other elements of the agreement as "con-
sistent" whenever "reasonable." Clearly, however, these provisions
contemplate instances in which a: consistent construction of the writ-
ten terms and the contextual evidence presented will be patently un-
reasonable. In such an instance the Code does not demand the exclu-
sion of contextual evidence from proof Instead, sections 1-205(4)
and 2-208(2) plainly allow for the introduction of this evidence but
also that it will be ranked behind- the agreement's express terms in
the hierarchy of interpretive sources.
As noted above 2 2 this hierarchy does not necessarily mean that
the express terms control. Section 1-205(3) expressly provides that
course of dealing and usage of trade may "qualify" the meaning of
the express terms used. Nullification may rightly be described as the
most severe form of qualification. That is, the written terms may be
qualified in such a way that they no longer have any effect. Further,
sections 1-205(4) and 2-208(2) demand that contextual evidence and
written terms "be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with
each other.2 s3 It may, however, be reasonable to construe the ex-
press terms as having no effect. It may be reasonable to conclude
that the parties did not intend for the unnegotiated terms of their
written form contract to govern their relationship.25 4
to the entire Code," § 2-202 "applies only to transactions in goods." Id. at 833
(footnote omitted). "Consequently, an interpretation of section 2-202 that dif-
fers from the interpretation of section 1-205 would result in one rule for trans-
actions in goods and another rule for all other commercial transactions." Id.
He rightly concludes that nothing in the Code drafting history suggests that
such a dual approach was ever intended. See id.
282. See supra note 244-252 and accompanying text.
283. Section 1-205(4) says "wherever reasonable" while § 2-208(2) says
"whenever reasonable." U.C.C. §§ 1-205(4), 2-208(2).
284. See Kirst, supra note 14, at 824.
Because the stock printed forms cannot always reflect the changing
methods of business, members of the trade may do business with a
standard clause in the forms that they ignore in practice. If the trade
consistently ignores obsolete clauses at variance with actual trade
practices, a litigant can maintain that it is reasonable that the courts
also ignore the clauses.... [Likewise,] if the trade regards an express
term and a trade usage as consistent because the usage is not a com-
plete contradiction but only an occasional but definite exception to a
written term, the courts should interpret the contract according to the
usage.
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While this treatment of express terms may seem unusual, in fact
it may more closely approximate the actual intent of the parties. The
American model of legal contract is founded on notions of individual
autonomy and shared intent.285 Llewellyn, however, believed that
the parties to a contract actually assent to very little. In the case of a
standard-form contract, the inquiry for Llewellyn was not whether
the parties had given their assent to the boiler-plate language con-
tained within the document. "What has in fact been assented to, spe-
cifically, are the few dickered terms, and the broad type of transac-
tion .... 5286 Consequently, other than the few specifically
negotiated terms, the express language of a standard-form contract
should not be regarded as the primary embodiment of the parties'
intent. Instead, Llewellyn believed that the parties' intent is primar-
ily reflected in the background out of which the formal document
emerges. Accordingly, to ask, "Does the offered contextual evidence
contradict the express language of the contract?" is to frame the issue
backwards. For Llewellyn the issue was "[H]ow far does the lan-
guage, read commercially, even purport to negate or modify an oth-
erwise clear course of dealing or usage of trade?" 287 The parties may
vary from the background of past practice and usage by adopting ex-
press terms that are at odds with this background. "But when course
of dealing, usage, or circumstances are to be negated by language,
then the language should go, knowing the background, into clear
Id. ("[I]n some cases a usage may exist, the parties may have intended to be
bound by it, and the express terms of a writing will not make the evidence ir-
relevant In such litigation the court must admit the evidence and allow the
factfinder to make the determination required by section 1-205(4).").
285. This admittedly very general description of the basis of contract does
nevertheless provide some common ground for those disparate liberal and
communitarian theorists who see contract variously as a personal and private
basis of obligation and as a product of state action and means of social control.
Compare Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv.
269 (1986), with Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The
Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 697 (1990).
286. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 83, at 370.
Llewellyn also believed that the parties assent to the non-dickered terms of the
form contract but only insofar as they are not "unreasonable or indecent" and
"do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms." Id.
287. Selected Comments, supra note 84, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.X.2.h, at
21.
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negation. ' '288 Requiring the parties to "carefully negate" the com-
mercial context helps to ensure that variation from this presumed
background is specifically intended. 5 9
6. The parties' intent: a matter of convention
The purpose of contract interpretation in general is to ascertain
the intent of the parties to the agreement.290 Likewise, the central
goal of contract interpretation under Article 2 is to discern the intent
of the parties. Indeed, this goal both explains Llewellyn's sensitivity
to context and justifies the clear and direct access to contextual evi-
dence provided by various Code provisions.29 ' As comment 2 to
section 2-202 explains, the Code makes evidence of trade usage,
course of dealing, and course of performance available "in order that
the true understanding of the parties as to the agreement may be
reached.,292 It is "[t]he parties themselves [who] know best what
they have meant by their words of agreement, 2 93 but their use of
words takes place within a given context. Evidence of this context is
"the best indication of what [the parties] intended the writing to
mean. 294 Unless a contrary intent is clearly manifested, 95 the Code
288. Id. (emphasis in original).
289. See U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 2 (1995) (asserting that "[u]nless carefully ne-
gated" trade usage and prior dealings are "an element of the meaning of the
words used").
290. See CLARK, supra note 105, §§ 173-175, at 448 ("The cardinal or fun-
damental rule in the construction of contracts is that a contract should receive
that construction which will best effectuate the intention of the parties.") (foot-
note omitted); see also Corbin, supra note 192, at 162 (observing that "[t]he
cardinal rule with which all interpretation begins is that its purpose is to ascer-
tain the intention of the parties" but that the parol evidence rule then in place
"if actually applied, excludes proof of their actual intention"). Corbin goes on
to argue for expanded use of extrinsic evidence in contract construction. For a
recent article critical of Corbin's view see Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence
Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpreta-
tion, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 533, 568-73 (1998).
291. See, e.g., Levie, supra note 131, at 1106-07 ("The Code views trade us-
age as a way of determining the parties' probable intent").
292. U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 2.
293. Id. § 2-208 cmt 1.
294. Id. § 2-202 crnt. 2. This portion of the comments refers specifically to
evidence of "the course of actual performance by the parties." Id.; see also id.
§ 2-208 cmt. 1 (referring to the parties' "action under that agreement" as "the
best indication of what that meaning was").
338
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assumes that the meanings associated with this context "were taken
for granted [by the parties] when the document was phrased.
296
Plainly the "intent" which the UCC rules of contract construc-
tion seek to ascertain is not the private and unexpressed intent of ei-
ther party.297 As Llewellyn once half-jokingly remarked "[n]o man
295. See id. § 2-202 cmt. 2 (stating that the meaning derived from the com-
mercial context must be "carefully negated"). Additional language throughout
the Code comments indicate that the purpose behind the Code's wide use of
contextual evidence is to ascertain the parties intent See, e.g., id. § 1-205(1)
(describing course of dealing as creating a "common basis of understanding').
296. Id. § 2-202 cmt. 2.
297. Professor Dennis Patterson somewhat overstates the matter in attempt-
ing to distance Llewellyn's position from that of his "father-in-law" Arthur
Corbin. However, as Professor Kirst correctly notes, everyone involved in the
debate over the proper role of contextual evidence, including both judges and
law professors-such as "Williston, Corbin, and Llewellyn-agreed that the
object of the search was some notion of the intent of the parties." Kirst, supra
note 14, at 823. They did, however, differ "on how to determine intent or
whether every intent should be given controlling effect." Id. Of the several
methods available for ascertaining intent, Williston and Learned Hand favored
an objectivist approach. See, e.g., FARNsWORTH, supra note 27, §§ 3.6, 7.9.
Under such an approach, the subjective unexpressed intentions of the parties
are of little consequence. The words used do not necessarily mean what the
parties had in mind, rather they mean what a reasonable person would under-
stand them to mean. This approach has the disadvantage of regarding the ac-
tual intentions of the parties as being irrelevant, even if the intention of both
parties fully coincides with the standard use of such language. By contrast,
under a subjectivist approach to contract, the actual intentions of the parties
determines whether or not the parties have actually formed a binding contract
through a "meeting of the minds." No matter how unusual or original their use
of words, the terms mean what the parties jointly intended. See also E. Allan
Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 942-47
(1967) (detailing the evolution of the requirement that there be a "meeting of
the minds").
Professor Patterson argues that Llewellyn believed that "context was the
single most important determinant to the meaning of contract language." Pat-
terson, supra note 99, at 188-89. In so doing, Patterson argues, Llewellyn dif-
fered from both Williston and Corbin. According to Patterson, Williston "nar-
rowly focused on and objectified the language of the parties" whereas Corbin
"evinced an appreciation for context" but nevertheless believed that "the in-
tentions of the parties provided the fundamental source of meaning." Id. at
189. He concludes that "Llewellyn rejected both intent, as identified by
Corbin, and semantic import, as identified by Williston" and instead realized
"that the meaning of contract language derived from its commercial context,
from the fusion of the intentions of individual actors with the background of
evolving commercial practices." Id. at 190.
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is safe when language is to be read in the teeth of its intent. ' '29' To
give contract terms the idiosyncratic meanings that one party in-
tended but did not share with his or her counterpart would undermine
the goals of certainty and predictability so vital to the law of con-
tracts.299 It is, however, equally plain that the Code does not cham-
pion an objective theory of meaning. The Code does not ignore the
actual intent of the parties or employ the proverbial reasonable man
and his ordinary dictionary in order to discern the "normal" mean-
ings of the words used.300
This account of Llewellyn's approach is accurate in that it stresses the
importance Llewellyn attributed to context. It errs, however, in trying to dis-
tance Corbin's views from Llewellyn's. The two are substantially the same.
Corbin, like Llewellyn, believed that the meaning of a text derived from the
parties' intentions that were operating within a given context. See, e.g.,
Corbin, supra note 192, at 162 (asserting that it is "impossible" for a court to
learn the parties' meaning "without being informed by extrinsic evidence of
the circumstances surrounding the making of the contracf'). A careful reading
of the passage from Corbin's treatise quoted by Patterson reveals as much. See
3 CORBIN, supra note 100, § 538. Second, contrary to Patterson, Llewellyn did
not contend that "the meaning of contract terms was not a function of intent,
mercantile or otherwise." Patterson, supra note 99, at 189. Nor did Llewellyn
"divorce[ ] the meaning of contractual language from the mental states of the
parties." Id. These strongly worded remarks contradict to some extent Patter-
son's conclusion that Llewellyn believed that the meaning of contract terms
"derived... from the fusion of the intentions of individual actors with the
background of evolving commercial practices." Id. at 190. Further, in making
these remarks Patterson does not attempt to account for the manifold refer-
ences to intent throughout the Code text and comments. Clearly, Llewellyn,
like Corbin, believed that the intent of the parties was a critical factor in deter-
mining the meaning of the words used. Additionally, in stressing the impor-
tance Llewellyn attached to context in the interpretive process, Patterson al-
most seems to anthropomorphize context. Fundamentally, however, meaning
is neither a matter of words nor the background in which those words appear.
Instead, meaning is a matter of consciousness. See E.D. HIRSCH, JR.,
VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION 4 (1967). Llewellyn understood that context is
a factor in that it influences interpreters. It is they who derive meaning from
the interaction of text and context as perceived through their own beliefs and
experiences. Context in and of itself, absent some active consciousness, has no
meaning. See id.
298. Llewellyn, What Price, supra note 138, at 732.
299. See id. Ensuring certainty and predictability in the law was one of
Llewellyn's greatest concerns in preparing the UCC. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102
(1995); see also Statement, supra note 116, in 1 N.Y. REPORT 1954, supra note
24, at 23-36.
300. See U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 1 (stating that the Code "rejects both the 'lay-
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Between these two extremes the Code plots a middle course.
Unlike the objectivist approach, the Code regards the actual intent of
the parties as real and relevant to the meaning of the agreement. In-
deed, the "true understanding of the parties" is the stated goal of
contract interpretation under Article 2.301 Nevertheless, these inten-
tions are often difficult to discover and sometimes unfair to apply.
302
Accordingly, the Code regards the parties' intentions as a matter of
convention. The rules set forth in UCC sections 1-205 and 2-208
delineate sources of evidence from which the parties' probable intent
may be inferred.
The conventional understanding of the parties' intent contained
in these rules has both normative and descriptive components. For
example, the provisions on course of dealing and course of perform-
ance suggest that the parties' intent may be found in their actual con-
duct. The description of this conduct in sections 1-205(1) and 2-
208(1) is not, however, purely factual. These provisions are also
surely normative in that they reflect a choice of one kind of conduct
over another. The Code drafters, for example, could have decided
that only a signature, or payment, or documents delivered under seal,
would, as a matter of law, constitute proof of intent. That the draft-
ers allowed for proof of intent by other means reflects a normative
judgment. These provisions are also normative in how they define
each category of conduct. Comment 4 to section 2-208 expressly
states that "a single occasion of conduct does not fall within the lan-
guage of this section. '30 3 The drafters could have decided otherwise.
They could have decided as a matter of policy that one occasion of
dictionary' and the 'conveyancer's' reading of a commercial agreement").
301. See id. § 2-202 cmt. 2.
302. Professor Farnsworth explains the unfairness of treating the parties'
subjective intentions as dispositive as follows: If the parties attach disparate
meanings to the same contract language, there has been no "meeting of the
minds," only a misunderstanding by one party of what the other actually in-
tended. Accordingly, if the law truly required a "meeting of the minds," then
frequently "there would be no contract." FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, § 7.9,
at 506. Moreover, a finding of no contract would continue to be the result
whenever the parties intended different meanings for the same contract terms
unless some basis were found "to tip the scales in favor of one meaning or the
other." Id. The Code regards the parties' intentions as relevant but "tips the
scales" in favor of the intention supported by objective criteria, such as the
conduct of the parties or the prevailing trade usage.
303. U.C.C. § 2-208 cmt. 4.
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such conduct would be satisfactory or that a minimum of three occa-
sions would be required. Clearly the frequency of the conduct
described reflects a normative judgment as to what is sufficient to
support the inference that such conduct embodies the parties' intent.
In a like manner the provision which defines usage of trade re-
fers to regular practices and methods of dealing in an industry that
"justify an expectation" that they will be followed in a given case.
Section 1-205(2) leaves no doubt that "[t]he existence and scope of
such ... usage[s] are to be proved as facts. 304 Clearly trade usage
under the Code has a descriptive, empirical basis. Nevertheless, the
decision to recognize such usages of trade as well as the requirement
that they enjoy a "regularity of observance" embodies a set of nor-
mative judgments as to what facts are likely to evidence the parties'
common intentions. Likewise, the presumption that such usages
were "taken for granted when the document was phrased" and so
"have become an element of the meaning of the words used" unless
"carefully negated 305 is a normative judgment that such usage is a
good "indication of what [the parties] intended the writing to
mean.5
306
Again, these rules do not purport to reveal the actual intent of
the parties, only a conventional understanding of that intent. Indeed,
section 1-205(3) makes clear that a party may be bound by a trade
usage or course of performance "of which they are or should be
aware." 307 That the parties were aware of the practice does not prove
as a factual matter that they intended to be bound by it. Quite the
opposite could be true. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the parties
intended to be bound by any practice of which they were not aware
even if they should have been knowledgeable of it. Even though the
facts may suggest otherwise, as a normative matter the Code pre-
sumes that such practices best approximate the intent of the parties.
To overcome this presumption it must be shown that the parties spe-
cifically intended to exclude such practices from the terms of the
agreement.30 8
304. Id. § 1-205(2).
305. Id. § 2-202 cmt. 2.
306. Id.
307. Id. § 1-205(3).
308. This also accounts for the priority rules in sections 1-205(4) and 2-
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.That the Code treats the intent of the parties to a contract as a
matter of inference, approximation, and convention, is not to be re-
gretted since it could not be otherwise. One can never know with ab-
solute certainty the author's intent in any written text because the
sources of evidence for this intent are themselves often incomplete
and are always open to interpretation. 0 9 Thus, intent is not "a simple
fact awaiting discovery" but is instead "an intellectual construct de-
veloped through a process of interpretation" that includes both nor-
mative and descriptive elements.310 This point is significant because,
as I shall argue in detail below,3 the same may be said regarding
legislative intent. Before turning to these matters, however, we must
first examine Llewellyn's strictly textualist approach to statutory
meaning in detail.
III. LLEWELLYN, CONTEXTUAL EVIDENCE, AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
Llewellyn was the consummate common lawyer, having learned
a deep appreciation for the nuance of fact from his teacher and friend
Arthur Corbin. He was enamored with the evolutionary process of
reasoned elaboration that defines the case-law method. Thus, in
some ways it is odd that Llewellyn is best remembered as the princi-
pal draftsman for one of the nation's most important statutes.3 13 It
was Llewellyn's study of the common law, however, that informed
208(2), and the remark in comment 2 to section 2-202 about "carefully
negat[ing]" contextual evidence. See supra notes 267-269, 282-289 and ac-
companying text
309. See Gerald Graff, "Keep off the Grass, " "Drop Dead, " and Other In-
determinacies: A Response to Sanford Levinson, 60 TEX. L. REv. 405, 408
(1982) (noting that "the degree to which we can be confident about our infer-
ences [about the author's intent] depends on the amount of evidence available,
evidence which itself is open to criticism and may well be fallible").
310. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1212-13 (1987).
311. See infra Part IV.C.2.
312. See TWINING, supra note 6, at 96; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, A
NATION UNDER LAWYERS 177-98 (1994); Arthur L. Corbin, A Tribute to Karl
Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 805 (1962).
313. Cf Gilmore, supra note 5, at 814 (noting that there is "an element of
paradox" in contending that Llewellyn "dislike[d] system-building" and pre-
ferred "the particular over the general" because for many years "his energies
were devoted to the drafting of statutes").
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his basic thinking about the nature of legal rules and their applica-
tion.314 He attempted to put much of this thought into practice in
drafting the Uniform Commercial Code. Indeed, most of what we
know about Llewellyn's views concerning statutes in general is de-
rived from his work on the UCC. Because Llewellyn did not write
extensively about statutory interpretation per se, what we understand
of his views is an amalgam of his study of common law rules, his
work as Chief Reporter of the UCC, and a few miscellaneous writ-
ings.
A. Purposivism and Formalism in Statutory Construction
In many respects, Llewellyn's views on statutory interpretation
are similar to those of his fellow legal realists and to those propo-
nents of dynamic interpretation writing today.315 Llewellyn believed
that the interpretation of legal rules was primarily the search for pur-
pose and the application of that purpose to the facts at hand. 316 He
held this view from an early point in his career.31 7 For Llewellyn,
"[a] piece of legislation, like any other rule of law is... meaningless
without reason and purpose."31 s Indeed, "[i]f a statute is to make
sense it must be read in the light of some assumed purpose. A
statute merely declaring a rule, with no purpose or objective, is non-
sense." 319  Llewellyn insisted that statutory construction and
314. See generally Llewellyn, Rule of Law, supra note 116.
315. See William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in
Form and Substance, 6 CARDozo L. REv. 799, 826-28 (1985); see also infra
Part V.C.1-2.
316. See Llewellyn, Current Recapture, supra note 82, at 217 ("[I]n working
with statutes it is the normal business of the court not only to read the statute
but also to implement that statute in accordance with purpose and reason.").
317. See Llewellyn, Realistic, supra note 138, at 451 (noting that a rule is
formulated "always with a purpose").
318. Llewellyn, Current Recapture, supra note 82, at 228.
319. Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 86, at 400. Llewellyn also believed
that the reading of case-law must likewise look to the purpose or policy behind
decisions. See Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 158, at 1253 ("And only
policy considerations and the facing of policy considerations can justify 'inter-
preting' (making, shaping, drawing conclusions from) the relevant body of
precedent in one way or in another."). Indeed, Llewellyn was so confident and
forthright about the importance he attached to purpose that he began his
ground breaking casebook thus: "A casebook is built for a purpose."
LLEWELLYN, CASEBOOK, supra note 183, at ix.
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application "are intellectually impossible except with reference to
some reason and theory of purpose and organization., 320 For a legal
rule to apply in a definitive manner, and "to expand, intelligently and
intelligibly, the core of purpose must be clear-and must be just to
the situation., 321 That is, a legal rule must be animated by a know-
able purpose in order to function as a rule of law.322
In Llewellyn's view, judges often failed to grasp the purpose
behind legal rules because of the dominant influence of verbal for-
malism. Indeed, courts often had "the utmost difficulty in getting
beyond words. 323 As noted above, this encouraged Llewellyn to
harbor a great distrust for words alone viewed as a source and de-
positary of law.324
Courts, of course, often found creative ways of avoiding the
unjust effects of this formalism. Llewellyn was keenly aware of the
widespread judicial practice of ritually reciting a rule and purporting
to apply it,325 while in fact discarding the rule and replacing it with
320. Plans, supra note 83, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.VI.l.e, at 5.
321. Llewellyn, Offer and Acceptance Part I, supra note 165, at 31.
322. See Llewellyn, On the Good, supra note 117, at 248 (asserting that
"purpose is yet an inherent part of any functioning structure; and so, that what-
ever expresses purpose, expresses also an inherent part of function'). In
Llewellyn's aesthetics of law, functionality was the primary test for legal
beauty. See id. at 229, 247. It is worth noting that there are many similarities
between Llewellyn's purposivism and the legal process approach to statutes
championed by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks. See HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tentative ed. 1958). For various descriptions of
the legal process approach, see Aleinikoff, supra note 37, at 34-37; Blatt, su-
pra note 315, at 832-33; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 47, at 332-34; Redish
& Chung, supra note 38, at 815-16. For a comparison of Llewellyn's work on
statutes with that of Hart and Sacks, see Danzig, supra note 173.
323. Llewellyn, Realistic, supra note 138, at 443.
324. See, e.g., Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 158, at 1223 (com-
menting that legal realists "want law to deal ... with things, with people, with
tangibles, with definite tangibles, and observable relations between definite
tangibles-not with words alone; when law deals with words, they want the
words to represent tangibles which can be got at beneath the words, and ob-
servable relations between those tangibles"); see also supra Part II.C.2.
325. Llewellyn expressly employed the imagery of ritual, magic and super-
stition in order to capture the powerful influence which verbal formulations of
legal rules have over courts. See Llewellyn, Offer and Acceptance Part 1, su-
pra note 165, at 13 ("[A] formula once accepted as 'the rle' . . . of our
authoritative law claims and gets repetition, whether it prove meaningful or
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another. Courts would often "seek the wise decision, but hide the
seeking under words. 326 In this effort, courts had a wide range of
accepted practices at their disposal for the construction and applica-
tion of legal rules. Llewellyn observed that the court could narrow
or expand the rule in question, mechanically apply it, or pay homage
to its authority, but then ignore the rule by distinguishing the opera-
tive facts of the case.327 Llewellyn believed that courts had the
not in actual use. For there is in law as in magic such a thing as 'obligatory'
ritual. And in law, as in magic, power is attributed to repetition of proper
words, without inquiry into their meaning.") (footnote omitted); Llewellyn,
Realistic, supra note 138, at 445 (referring to the phrase "security of transac-
tions" and "questioning how much is accomplished, for any given specific
problem, by resting merely on the magic of those words"); Llewellyn, Rule of
Law, supra note 116, at 1258 ("If the accepted and 'well-settled' rule varies
from the course of actual decision, i.e., is superstition, then the best the super-
stition will accomplish in the near future is to unsettle a bit the relatively con-
sistent course of decision, and continue to obscure the picture.") (footnote
omitted); id. at 1269 (describing his scholarly agenda in a series of papers as
being an effort "to present rules of law instead of formulae of superstition
about law"); id. at 1270 ("In [c]ontracts, superstition is rampant. Rampant su-
perstition is unfortunate, because it has results--sometimes.").
326. Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 158, at 1252.
327. See Llewellyn, Realistic, supra note 138, at 450 (expressing his hope
"to determine when [a rule] is stated, but ignored; when it is stated and fol-
lowed; when and why it is expressly narrowed or extended or modified, so that
a new paper rule is created" and distinguishing "silent application or modifica-
tion or escape, in the 'interpretation' of the facts of a case, in contrast to that
other and quite distinct level of express wrestling with the language of the pa-
per rule"); Llewellyn, Rule of Law, supra note 116, at 1244-46 (describing
seven distinct relations between cases and the rule at issue); id. at 1246 (noting
that in the American case law system "the relation between the rule and the
cases may move all the way from copying any words printed by anybody in a
'law' book to meticulous re-examination of precise facts, issues and holdings,
in total disregard of any prior language whatsoever") (footnote omitted); id. at
1258 (remarking that "we have evolved and established a large number of dis-
crepant relations between a rule and its prior cases, resulting in discrepant
techniques in working from the cases to the rule" but that "[a]ll of these tech-
niques and relations are 'correct,' because they are all part of the case-law go-
ing scheme"); see also Llewellyn, Offer and Acceptance Part I, supra note
165, at 8-9 (remarking that American courts have a "notably common aptitude
for strongarming a needed result 'out of rules which do not contain it; a veri-
table gift for pertinent logical fallacy--and a notably common and often baf-
fling failure to make explicit when strongarming or fallacy will be used, and
when not") (footnote omitted); Llewellyn, Offer & Acceptance, Part II, supra
note 182, at 797-98 (recounting how one may alternately twist the facts to fit
an agreement within the conceptual framework of contract as "promise" or
346
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capacity to construe written legal rules in a variety of ways, not only
in the case of common law rules created by judges, but also in the
case of statutes and rules generated by administrative agencies.328 As
Llewellyn wrote in the introduction to his innovative casebook:
"The court can always, and it does often, 'save the rule' by 'con-
struing' the facts into a pattern that bears no relation to reality; and
the facts brought out in dissenting opinions leave no doubt that this is
often and deliberately done in the interest of the court's view of jus-
tice in the particular case.
3 29
This practice led Llewellyn to conclude that the real work of le-
gal analysis is to understand "what courts do instead of what courts
say.",330 Thus, the '.first objective" of legal commentary should be "to
give genuine agreements no legal effect because their verbal expression is not
one of "promise"); Llewellyn, Realistic, supra note 138, at 449 (remarking that
in response to authoritative rules officials can "either pay no heed at all.., or
listen with all care"); Llewellyn, Through Title, supra note 164, at 172 (ob-
serving that the rules in sales law regarding the passage of title are either "ap-
plied blindly to situations in which a different implication is concerned, with
regrettable consequence" or "slight-of-handed into inconsistent use in the new
situation, to achieve a consequence deemed desirable") (footnote omitted).
328. See LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 83, at
521-35 (containing a list of how courts may construe legal rules); Llewellyn,
My Philosophy, supra note 158, at 189 (remarking that the American legal tra-
dition is "equipped with a whole set of janus-faced techniques for handling
rules to keep them out of the way of justice" which include "emasculating a
silly statute by treating it as in 'derogation,' or of expanding a wise but ill-
drawn statute as 'remedial'); Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 86, at 401-06
(detailing by antipodal canons of construction the "technical framework for
maneuver" in statutory interpretation).
329. LLEWELLYN, CASEBOOK, supra note 183, at x.
330. Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 158, at 1249 (remarking that we
must also learn "what difference it makes to anybody that they do if'); see also
Llewellyn, Realistic, supra note 138, at 446 (distinguishing "the actual doings
of the judges and the actual effects of their doings" from the "judges' say-
ings"). The distinction between judicial action and the mere recitation of
"well-settled" rules was a dominant theme of Llewellyn's thought. In de-
scribing the approach to legal analysis taken in his innovative casebook,
Llewellyn explained that he sought
to keep a number of lines of inquiry distinct First, what did the courts
say? What rules did they lay down as ratio decidendi? What is the
doctrine, the accepted formula of words upon the subject? Second,
what did the court really do? Exactly what difference did the doctrine
or the rule laid down make to the parties in the case? Exactly what
difference will it make in other cases? Third, what is the background
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state accurately and neatly what the courts have been doing."331 By
contrast, traditional legal analysis, had been conducted "[i]n terms of
words, and not in terms of conduct; in terms of what apparently is
understandable without checking up in life., 332 For Llewellyn, judi-
cial conduct provided a certain "check" against which the legal effi-
cacy of stated rules could be measured. 3 He insisted that no matter
how clear, well-settled, or emphatically stated a rule is "where doc-
trine does not square with case-results, that doctrine is not law, in a
of the case in practice, and what is the meaning of the case in practice?
LLEWELLYN, CASEBOOK, supra note 183, at xi; see also Llewellyn, Offer and
Acceptance Part , supra note 165, at 17 (remarking that although courts try to
formulate rules of decision, "in the main they do more wisely than they ration-
alize"); Llewellyn, Rule of Law, supra note 116, at 1258 (distinguishing "judi-
cial practice-in-fact" from "the announced rule 'governing' the cases" and
"present day notions of rightness"); id. at 1249 n.15 ("Wherever the doing and
the saying of our case-law fail to square, each of these modes of saying ob-
scures the problem. I find our doing and our saying in the case-law fields I
study to be noticeably and importantly at odds, in places where it matters.");
Llewellyn, Through Title, supra note 164, at 191-95 (emphasizing what
"judges typically do" in "vault[ing] over" the theoretical difficulties created by
Williston's conceptual apparatus based on the passing of title where seller's
shipment is nonconforming); Llewellyn, What Price, supra note 138, at 742
(observing that in a variety of cases "courts strain by one dodge or another to-
ward enforcement" of an agreement that would be void under the doctrine of
consideration).
331. Llewellyn, Rule of Law, supra note 116, at 1269. In his famous re-
sponse to Roscoe Pound, Llewellyn described two of the "common points of
departure" among legal realists as a "[d]istrust of traditional legal rules and
concepts insofar as they purport to describe what either courts or people are
actually doing" and "a distrust of the theory that traditional prescriptive rule-
formulations are the heavily operative factor in producing court decisions."
Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 158, at 1235, 1237. Later in the same
article Llewellyn wrote that, among the lines of inquiry in need of further ex-
ploration by legal realists, "[t]here is first the question of what lower courts
and especially trial courts are doing, and what relation their doing has to the
sayings and doings of upper courts and legislatures." Id. at 1247 (emphasis
omitted).
332. Llewellyn, Realistic, supra note 138, at 440.
333. See id. at 464 (concluding that the "clearer visualization of the problems
involved" in law calls for an "ever-decreasing emphasis on words, and ever-
increasing emphasis on observable behavior"); see also id. at 442-43 (arguing
that "rights and rules should be removed from their present position at the focal
point of legal discussion, in favor of the area of contact between judicial (or
official) behavior and the behavior of laymen").
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case-law field., 334  Accordingly, throughout his career Llewellyn
sought "an understanding of actual judicial behavior, in that com-
parison of rule with practice. "
335
B. "Paper" Rules and Predictability
The dissonance between the rules publicly announced by courts
and the actual practices of judges led Llewellyn to distinguish "real
rules" from what he called "pseudo" or "paper rules. 336 By the lat-
ter term Llewellyn referred to those verbal formulations in law that
are prescriptive in nature. They are "what have been treated, tradi-
tionally, as rules of law: the accepted doctrine of the time and
place-what the books there say 'the law' is.''337 Although stated
with normative authority, such rules are mere "imposters" in the
"masquerade of case-law., 338 No matter how authoritative a rule
may sound, if it does not "get results, on cases, in decisions and with
some regularity," it remains only a "pseudo" rule, merely paper, not
the genuine article.33 9 "Real rules," by contrast, are not prescriptive
in nature but are instead "predictions" and descriptions of the "prac-
tices of courts., 340 They are "statements of likelihood that in a given
situation a certain type of court action loom[s] in the offing."
341
334. Llewellyn, Rule of Law, supra note 116, at 1269; see also id. at 1260
(commenting that "curiously many of the currently accepted rules of Contract
are not, and never have been a reflection of, or a guide to, the case-law of con-
tractual relations at large").
335. Llewellyn, Realistic, supra note 138, at 450 (emphasis omitted). For
Llewellyn, actions always spoke louder than words. Indeed, the Code's em-
phasis on conduct in the formation and interpretation of contracts reflects the
communicative value Llewellyn saw in conduct See supra Part II.C.
336. Llewellyn, Realistic, supra note 138, at 448.
337. Id.
338. Llewellyn, Rule of Law, supra note 116, at 1263.
339. Id. In a similar vein, in the oft-quoted introduction to his article re-
sponding to Dean Pound, Llewellyn writes: "Beyond rules lie effects-but do
they? Are some rules mere paper? And if effects, what effects? Hearsay, un-
buttressed guess, assumption or assertion unchecked by test-can such be
trusted on this matter of what law is doing?" Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra
note 158, at 1222.
340. Llewellyn, Realistic, supra note 138, at 448.
341. Id. (describing "real rules" as "convenient short hand symbols, for the
remedies, the actions of the courts"). In describing "real rules" in this fashion,
Llewellyn acknowledged his debt to Holmes. See id.; see also Llewellyn, Of-
fer and Acceptance Part I, supra note 165, at 13 (stating that "a 'rule' ... as a
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The ability to predict the legal consequences of one's actions is
of course a primary benefit of the rule of law. Without the greater
freedom that predictability brings, citizens cannot plan with confi-
dence for the future. They "may simply be unable to carry out com-
plex social arrangements that are dependent on legal sanctions being
predictable in their application. ' 342 As Llewellyn succinctly stated,
"inadequate legal theory makes for uncertainty in the results of legal
cases. In transaction-law at least, this is a heavy debit item.
343
The vice of "pseudo rules," then, was both the masquerade of
authority and the absence of genuine predictability. Prescriptive
formulae offer no guidance where judges "pay no heed at al" or pay
only lip-service "while practice runs another course. 3 44 This leaves
the practicing lawyer in a precarious spot. The lawyer must
"gambl[e] on what [he or she thinks] will appeal to whatever court
may get the case ... ,345 A roll of the dice is not the rule of law.
Courts' fixation on words--viewed as the authoritative source of
law-had led to an intolerable situation.
predictive formula, is under no less pressure to be meaningful as applied to
emergent raw fact, or else be useless"). For Holmes' account of the law as a
matter of prediction see OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE PATH OF THE
LAw 167 (1920) ("The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of
the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts.").
See also id. at 173 ("The prophecies of what the court will do in fact, and
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."). Llewellyn made the
distinction between "real" and "paper" rules relatively early in his career.
Later he would further refine his notion of "real rule" as something more than
the prediction of a legal outcome in a judicial process. See Llewellyn, Offer
and Acceptance Part I, supra note 165, at 9-14, 28-31 (describing the charac-
teristics of an ideal rule of law); Llewellyn, Rule of Law, supra note 116, at
1252-59 (describing the characteristics of an ideal rule of law).
342. Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL.
L. REv. 277, 316 (1985) [hereinafter Moore, Natural Law]. See generally LON
L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-94 (rev. ed. 1969).
343. Llewellyn, Through Title, supra note 164, at 201 n.82.
344. Llewellyn, Realistic, supra note 138, at 449; cf Llewellyn, Rule of Law,
supra note 116, at 1258 (remarking that "[t]he test of the relative worth of
competing rule formulations lies in first instance in their accurate guidance to
prediction of the outcome of future cases"). For a further discussion of
Llewellyn's views on certainty and unpredictability in case law, see Llewellyn,
Rule of Law, supra note 116, at 1253 n.31, 1270-71 (expressing the opinion
that some uncertainty in case-law is inevitable but that rules in a case-law sys-
tem are not wholly indeterminate).
345. Llewellyn, Rule ofLaw, supra note 116, at 1257.
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C. Judicial Decision-Making in the "Grand Style"
Llewellyn believed that the cure for verbal formalism, both in
the creation of common law rules and in the interpretation of statutes,
could be found in the method of decision-making he termed the
"Grand Style" or "Manner of Reason." The heart of the Grand Style
is a "conscious and overt concern about policy."346 According to this
method3 47 a judge should not only "read the statute but also... im-
plement [it] in accordance with purpose and reason. 3 4 8 With respect
to case law, the Grand Style calls for the "open, reasoned, extension,
restriction or reshaping of the relevant rules, done in terms not of the
equities or sense of the particular case or of the particular parties, but
instead ... in terms of the sense and reason of some significantly
seen type of life-situation.349 With respect to statutes, courts in the
Grand Style do not act like free-wheeling "independent agents" of
policy, but must instead cheerfully accept the "policy and basic
measure" of the legislature.350 Then, using their "inherited rule ma-
chinery" and sensibly facing the facts of each case, courts must go
about the business of implementing the legislature's purpose.3  That
is, in applying the "frozen text" of a statute, the court must attempt to
"satisfy the reason as well as the language., 352
346. Llewellyn, On the Good, supra note 117, at 243.
347. By "style" Llewellyn made clear he was "referring to a way of thought
and work, not to a way of writing" let alone a "literary quality or tone."
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 83, at 36-37; see also
Llewellyn, On the Good, supra note 117, at 230-31 (making clear that "style"
does not mean "an individual's manner of handling words or wor' but "the
period-style of a craff').
348. Llewellyn, Current Recapture, supra note 82, at 217. For an earlier
discussion of the Grand Style, when Llewellyn was first formulating it and be-
fore it was so named, see Llewellyn, Realistic, supra note 138, at 447 n.12,
453-54, and Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 158, at 1251 (describing the
realist response to "verbalism and deduction" as the "conscious seeking, within
the limits laid down by precedent and statute, for the wise decision") (emphasis
omitted).
349. Llewellyn, Current Recapture, supra note 82, at 219-20.
350. See id.
351. See id. at 227-28; see also Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 86, at 400
(stating that "if a statute is to be merged into a going system of law.., the
court must do the merging, and must in doing so take account of the policy of
the statute").
352. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 83, at 38.
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Llewellyn contrasted the Grand Style of decision-making with
what he called the "Formal Style. '353 According to Llewellyn, this
logical and authoritarian manner of deciding cases dominated the
American judicial landscape during the last decades of the nineteenth
century.354 During this Formal Period, courts tended to proclaim
their inability to change even common law rules, and "[o]pinions
r[a]n in deductive form with an air or expression of single-line in-
evitability." 355 "Authority was authority; logic was logic; certainty
was certainty; heart had no place in legal work; esthetics drove in the
direction of cold clarity.5
356
Although they claimed to be largely powerless, courts during
this Formal Period exercised power quite broadly. They fiercely re-
sented "the intrusion" of legislatures into the realm of policymaking.
According to Llewellyn, they refused to accept the legislature's "es-
sential declarations of policy, and its outlines of measure. 3 57 Thus,
statutes "tended to be limited or even eviscerated by wooden and lit-
eral reading" 358 or pared down "via unconstitutionality.
' 359
1. Predictability and the mannner of reason
Above all, Llewellyn believed that the Formal Style of judging
lacked predictability and the capacity to adapt legal rules to a
353. See Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 86, at 396.
354. See Llewellyn, On the Good, supra note 117, at 238; Llewellyn, Re-
marks, supra note 86, at 396.
355. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 83, at 38.
356. Llewellyn, On the Good, supra note 117, at 239; see also Llewellyn,
Remarks, supra note 86, at 396 (contrasting the Grand Period, during which
precedent guided but principle controlled, with the Formal Period, when
precedent controlled and principle was tested "by whether it made for order in
the law, not by whether it made wisdom-in-result").
357. Llewellyn, Current Recapture, supra note 82, at 228.
358. Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 86, at 400; see also Llewellyn, Current
Recapture, supra note 82, at 218 ("Statutes, moreover, tended to be read unfa-
vorably, and even when seen favorably, they tended to be limited to the let-
ter."); cf 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, at 25 (remarking that "the one-time hos-
tility of the courts to statutes has all but disappeared").
359. Llewellyn, Current Recapture, supra note 82, at 227 (stating that courts"walled off' the reach of statutes by "literalistic construction"); see also id. at
228 (stating that Formal Style courts would use their self-declared absence of
power to enforce the statute in question in order to "whittle it down to frustra-
tion").
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continuously changing world. To act "'as if fixed rules of law' were
all of law, as if all rules were of a single kidney, as if, finally, the
reason, explicitly and accountably stated for guidance and for expla-
nation, were not the heart of all sound work in things of law" would
be disastrous.360 Any manner of judging that ignores the purpose be-
hind legal rules "is foredoomed, sooner or later, to become a bad
style, and lawyers will have to groan under fiction, spurious inter-
pretation, and their progeny at once of confusion and of discretion
which escapes accountability., 36 1 That is, a legal system founded on
verbal formalism is by its very nature bound to lead to uncertainty
and obsolescence.
As noted above,362 Llewellyn concluded that legal uncertainty
and lack of predictability were due to the multifarious ways in which
courts had come to regard law as mere verbal formula. For example,
a court could "blindly apply" a rule "with regrettable consequence"
or through legal "sleight-of-hand[]" achieve "a consequence deemed
desirable., 36 3 Second, Llewellyn saw legal obsolescence as the re-
sult of life moving forward and courts clinging to the fixed language
of rules.3 4 No matter how carefully drafted, as a statute grows old
the specific terms it employs may cease to be relevant to the facts at
hand.36 5 Consequently, obsolescence cannot be avoided by addi-
tional or more clever verbiage. As Llewellyn remarked, waxing po-
etic, "[m]uch doctrine, however sweetly spun, serves chiefly to grow
grey with dust against the rafters., 366 If the law is not adapted to the
changing circumstances of life, it suffers a loss of relevance and so
forfeits its claim to command assent.
By contrast, and somewhat paradoxically, "Llewellyn believed
that judging in the 'Grand Style' was the surest route to law that was
360. Llewellyn, On the Good, supra note 117, at260.
361. Id. at247-48.
362. See supra Part l.C.1-2.
363. Llewellyn, Through Title, supra note 164, at 171-73 (lamenting how
these disparate approaches to the title concept under the Uniform Sales Act had
"throw[n] into confusion any lines ofpredictable presuming about Title").
364. See Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 86, at 400.
365. See id. (remarking that "increasingly as a statute gains in age--its lan-
guage is called upon to deal with circumstances utterly uncontemplated at the
time of its passage").
366. Llewellyn, WhatPrice, supra note 138, at 751.
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certain, predictable, and true to its underlying purposes. 3 67 He was
confident that under the Grand Style "with right Reason plainly
dominant, the outcome of a particular case at law [could] be moder-
ately certain in the bulk of instances, and [could] and [would] at the
same time give guidance in words, for the future, which [would be]
moderately clear., 368 Likewise, in crafting "the right kind of rule...
[one that] is clear, and plainly wise, and plainly applicable, a judge
can not only follow it, but it can be predicted that he will. '369 If rules
were crafted according to the Manner of Reason so as to encourage
decision-making in the Grand Style, courts would neither mechani-
cally apply the written law nor would they feel compelled to twist the
facts or legal language in order to reach the right result. Instead, the
right result would follow from the reasoned application of the rule.
In drafting the UCC, Llewellyn plainly sought to foster deci-
sion-making in the Grand Style.370 As Chief Reporter for the Code,
he tried to draft each provision of the statute so that it would "show
its reason on its face"371 and thereby encourage judges to join in the
tradition of the best common law courts. Thus, the technique
372
367. Wiseman, supra note 10, at 492; see also LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON
LAW TRADrrIoN, supra note 83, at 37-38 (asserting that "the Grand Style is the
best device ever invented by man for drying up that free-flowing spring of un-
certainty, conflict between the seeming commands of the authorities and the
felt demands ofjustice").
368. Llewellyn, On the Good, supra note 117, at 241.
369. Llewellyn, My Philosophy, supra note 158, at 191.
370. See Wiseman, supra note 10, at 495 (stating that Llewellyn sought "ju-
dicial decision-making guided by statements of reason and purpose written into
the Code, which would lead courts to explain what they were doing and why,
according to the principles of the Code"). But cf Danzig, supra note 173, at
632 n.39 (stating that although it might appear that Article 2 should "be ana-
lyzed as an attempt to coerce courts into deciding cases in the Grand Style," in
fact the "policies" embodied in the Code do not guide judicial decisions but are
a source ofjudicial law-making).
371. Plans, supra note 83, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.VI.l.e, at 5; see also
infra notes 392-399 and accompanying text
372. Llewellyn had great respect for craftsmen and often described the work
of lawyers in terms of "craft' and "technique." See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 83, at 212-35. See generally ANTHONY
T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 209-25 (1993). Likewise, Llewellyn steadfastly resisted labeling
legal realism as a school of thought or philosophy. He preferred instead to
think of it as a method or technique. See TWINING, supra note 6, at 96-97,
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Llewellyn employed in this regard was both a means of identifying
the operative facts at issue as well as a way of encouraging a certain
interpretive approach to the statute.
2. "Situation sense" and the formulation of legal rules
As noted above,373 facts were of great importance to Llewellyn
in the creation of legal norms. It was critical for him that "judgments
of policy come backed by facts." 374 The concept Llewellyn repeat-
edly used to capture this quality of being grounded in fact was "the
sense of the situation" or "situation sense. ' '3 75 Llewellyn's use of the
term is complex, however, in that it often appears to carry a norma-
tive connotation regarding the applicable legal principles or val-
ues.376 Indeed, at times Llewellyn's discussion of situation sense
199-202. This can be seen throughout Llewellyn's writings on the subject
See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 83, at 510
("Realism is not a philosophy, but a technology."); Llewellyn, On the Good,
supra note 117, at 246 n.25 ("The perception is slowly growing more general,
as the smoke of the fireworks blows away, that the so-called 'realistic' line of
work is in essence a new and sound drive into more effective legal engineering
techniques; not in any way a philosophy of law, but useful in the more ade-
quate service of any philosophy of law."); Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra
note 158, at 1256 ("A group philosophy or program, a group credo of social
welfare, these realists have not").
373. See supra Part lI.C.2-3.
374. Llewellyn, On Philosophy, supra note 160, at 212.
375. See generally TWINING, supra note 6, at 216-27 (discussing Llewellyn's
use of the term in THE COMMON LAW TRADITION).
376. For example, in an early discussion of situation sense with respect to
commercial transactions and the value of security for the parties involved,
Llewellyn suggested that "as facts become clear, [they] suggest one line of
policy." Llewellyn, Realistic, supra note 138, at 446. The application of this
policy must still "be illumined by the facts relevant to the situation in that in-
stant case. No elimination of the subjective value-judgment then; but an illu-
mination by objective data of the basis and bearings of a subjective value
judgment" Id. Likewise, in one of Llewellyn's last published works, he wrote
that in Grand Style judging,
Situation Sense will serve well enough to indicate the type-facts in
their context and at the same time in their pressure for a satisfying
working result, coupled with whatever the judge or court brings and
adds to the evidence, in the way of knowledge and experience and
values to see with, and to judge with.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 83, at 60; see also
Llewellyn, On the Good, supra note 117, at 241 (asserting that in Grand Style
judging, "[ilt is the felt reason of the situation which is stated").
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indicates an abandonment of the moral skepticism and relativism
popular among the legal realists and even suggests some sympathy
for natural law theory.377 The matter is further complicated by the
fact that Llewellyn sometimes uses the term to refer to a capacity for
empirical or normative comprehension on the part of judges. At
other times "'situation sense' seem[s] to be related to the situation
rather than the court[s] or the judges., 378  As one might expect,
377. For hints of Llewellyn's inclination toward natural law, see
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 83, at 121-28 (dis-
cussing an important passage from German legal scholar Levin Goldschmidt
on the "immanent law" dwelling within "the very circumstances of life").
While Professor Danzig believes that this passage strongly supports the view
of Llewellyn as a closet natural lawyer, others are less certain. Compare Dan-
zig, supra note 173, at 624-26, with Patterson, supra note 99, at 195-97 n.176,
and TWINING, supra note 6, at 185-88, 215-27. Llewellyn's writings contain
numerous favorable references to natural law. In addition, many passages in
his work are suggestive of natural law though they do not refer to it as such.
See, e.g., Llewellyn, Natural Law, supra note 175, at 8 (arguing that natural
law is akin to the evolving common law and concluding that "it is difficult...
to conceive of the ultimate ideals" of legal realists "in terms which do not re-
semble amazingly the type and even the content of the principles of a philoso-
pher's Natural Law"); Llewellyn, Realistic, supra note 138, at 461-62 (denying
any "Hegelian mysticism of the State," but asserting that in law, there is "the
recurrent emergence of some wholeness, some sense of responsibility which
outruns enlightened self-interest, and results in action apparently headed (often
purposefully) for the common good"). Thus, it seems fair to conclude that
Llewellyn had more than a simple "flirtation" with natural law. Cf TWINING,
supra note 6, at 220 (suggesting that Llewellyn's use of language indicates a
belief that with a six or seventh sense one can uncover an immanent law). In-
stead, it makes sense to acknowledge that Llewellyn may well have been a
natural lawyer. Unlike many of his fellow natural lawyers, Llewellyn was un-
certain as to the ultimate origin of this law. He was, however, confident that
the thoughtful, factually intensive method of the common law was the proper
means for discovering it. See Llewellyn, On the Good, supra note 117, at 255-
56, 264 (asserting that belief in the Good, of which Justice is an aspect, is a
matter of faith such that "you can persuade only another man who shares it"
and concluding that the substance of the Good is not clarified by deduction
from "broad ultimates" but by "that on-going process of check-up and correc-
tion.., which is the method and very life of case-law" wherein his faith lies).
Although this position may strike some as intellectually incoherent it is pre-
cisely the same cognitive posture scientists find themselves in when they are
investigating natural phenomena. See KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND
REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 136-53, 215-48
(1963).
378. TWINING, supra note 6, at 220. In this passage and in the accompany-
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commentators have interpreted this nebulous concept in a variety of
ways.
3 7 9
Although it is probably correct to understand situation sense as a
hybrid concept,5 ° the term surely has a factual component. This
factual component must deal in generalities. A rule cannot be so
specific in the facts it describes that it has a single, unique applica-
tion and no other.381 Llewellyn observed that "[o]ur fields of law,
our patterns of legal thinking, our legal concepts, have grown up
each one around some 'type' of occurrence or transaction, felt as a
typical something, seen in due course as a legally significant type,
and, as a type-picture, made a standard and a norm for judging.
' 382
In the process of categorizing facts, in describing a "background
picture of transactions 'of this type,"'' 383 the primary task "lies in
definition of the problem situation itself., 384 In the process of rule
formation, a court acting in the Grand Style is engaged in "the open
and conscious quest for the reasonable rule for the type-situation"
ing footnotes, Professor Twining conveniently collects several instances in
which Llewellyn uses the term in different ways in THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION.
379. See, e.g., Harold D. Lasswell, Book Review, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 940,
946 (1961); Patrick J. Rohan, The Common Law Tradition: Situation Sense,
Subjectivism or "Just-Result Jurisprudence?," 32 FORDIIAM L. REV. 51
(1963); Charles E. Clark & David M. Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge:
Restraint and Freedom in the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255
(1961). Professor Gedid forthrightly claims that Llewellyn "failed to define
'situation-sense."' John L. Gedid, U.C.C. Methodology: Taking A Realistic
Look at the Code, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 341,369 (1988).
380. See TWINING, supra note 6, at 222-23 (concluding that situation sense
involves both "the formulation of principles or policies and the classification of
the facts into a general type-fact-situation').
381. See Llewellyn, Law Jobs, supra note 138, at 1359 ("To see that some-
thing is right or that something is a right, is to generalize. There is no practical
way, in ordinary life, to get at the notion of rightness without having, some-
where in your mind, a general picture or pattern which the case in hand fits
into and fits under.").
382. Llewellyn, First Struggle, supra note 173, at 880.
383. Llewellyn, On Warranty Part I, supra note 162, at 723; see also id. at
720-21 (discussing two polar background pictures of sales).
384. Llewellyn, Offer and Acceptance Part I, supra note 165, at 24; see id. at
24-26 (stating that the question of whether a bill of lading was "merely
equivalent to the goods" or was a "quasi-negotiable documenf' actually in-
volves two "divergent situations in life").
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involved and not merely for the case at hand.385 That is, "[t]here is a
sense of the type of situation to be contrasted with the sense of a
particular controversy between particular litigants.'386 The court's
"method has to be to reach, first, for the significant type-situation.
Then, to diagnose a problem, and to prescribe an answer accompa-
nied by an explicit life-reason .... 387
Again, Llewellyn knew that this was not simply a matter of tran-
scribing empirical observations. In the formation of common law
rules "the court's conception of reasonableness-in-the-circumstances
goes far toward determining its views on proper rules, and especially
toward determining its reading offact.'3 88 Likewise, in drafting a
statute or other legal rule, articulating the facts is a creative act. "To
'see' a pattern is to make a pattern, and to make it a 'right' pattern is
to project it into the on-coming future. ' 389 The grouping and catego-
rization of facts is in part a matter of policy "which means the reason
of the situation."39o The court must give "not only a rule but also a
persuasive presentation of good life-reason in the light of the type
life situation."
391
385. Llewellyn, Current Recapture, supra note 82, at 218.
386. Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 86, at 398.
387. Llewellyn, Current Recapture, supra note 82, at 223. Llewellyn be-
lieved that the "grouping [of] cases and legal situations into narrower catego-
ries than has been the practice in the past' was one of the defining characteris-
tics of legal realism. Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 158, at 1237; see
also Llewellyn, Realistic, supra note 138, at 438 (noting that the realists
"moved... toward sizing up the law by situations, instead of under the catego-
ries of historically conditioned, often archaic remedy-law"). Llewellyn fol-
lowed this approach of narrow categorization in his own work. See
LLEWELLYN, CASEBOOK, supra note 183, at 1033-77 (providing an index of
the sales cases covered in the book, organized around the specific commodities
involved); Llewellyn, Through Title, supra note 164, at 169-70 ("[T]oday I
find too many kinds of seller in contact with too many kinds of buyer in too
many kinds of transaction. But what I am clear on is that we can isolate types,
either of transaction, or of party, or of issue, and get light on how better to deal
with those types."); see also Wiseman, supra note 10, at 470, 538 (discussing
Llewellyn's goal of narrow categorization).
388. Llewellyn, On Warranty Part I, supra note 162, at 722.
389. Llewellyn, Law Jobs, supra note 138, at 1359; see also id. at 1361
(stating that a rule "in its selection of life-stuff to work with and from, it is
creative in what it does with the selection").
390. Llewellyn, Current Recapture, supra note 82, at 217-18.
391. Id. at220.
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3. The theory of "patent reason"
Because the clear articulation of policy lies at the very heart of
judging in the Manner of Reason, a statute designed to inspire deci-
sion-making in this style must also make its reason and purpose
clear.392 Thus, in drafting the UCC Llewellyn sought to craft provi-
sions "which make sense on their face, and which can be understood
and reasonably well applied even by mediocre men. '3 9 3 In the Code
he sought to draft "that rightest and most beautiful type of legal rule,
the singing rule with purpose and with reason clear. 394 Llewellyn
called this approach to statutory drafting the "principle of patent rea-
son." 395 In drafting a statute according to this principle, "[e]very
provision should show its reason on its face. Every body of provi-
sions should display on their face their organizing principle.,
396
392. Even at an early stage in his career Llewellyn believed that statutory
language should not, once drafted, "merely bask in the sun upon the books."
Instead the drafter "must so shape [the statute] as to induce its application ...
or else ... his bow is spent in air." Llewellyn, Realistic, supra note 138, at
452 (footnote omitted).
393. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 83, at 38 (de-
scribing the Grand Style of judging in the common law); cf Llewellyn, First
Struggle, supra note 173, at 876 (remarking that "if the stock intellectual
equipment is apt, it takes extra ineptitude to get sad results"); Plans, supra note
83, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.VI.l.e, at 5 ("Reasonably uniform interpretation
by judges of different schooling, learning and skill is tremendously furthered if
the reason which guides application of the same language is the same reason in
all cases."). For an elaborate exposition of Llewellyn's use of the phrase
"stock equipment," see Amy H. Kastely, Stock Equipment for the Bargain in
Fact: Trade Usage, "Express Terms, " and Consistency Under Section 1-205
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 64N.C. L. REv. 777 (1986).
394. Llewellyn, On the Good, supra note 117, at 250; see also LLEWELLYN,
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 83, at 183 (referring to "the rule
with a singing reason"); id. at 513 (suggesting that a "singing reason" can re-
solve a particular problem "each time into a new, usefully guiding, forward-
looking felt standard-for-action or even rule-of-law").
395. See generally TWINING, supra note 6, at 321-26 (discussing statutory
drafting).
396. Plans, supra note 83, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.VI.l.e, at 5. In the
same December 1944 memorandum, Llewellyn acknowledged that this ap-
proach had "met with serious opposition" from "an old-fashioned craftsman"
who believed that "relying on anything but clear and adequate dispositive
words" was "inappropriate to statutes." Id. at 6. As a consequence, Llewellyn
had then eliminated "most open statements of reason or policy" from the Re-
vised Sales Act. He indicated that the objective of drafting with conspicuous
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More than a simple rule of composition, 397 however, Llewellyn saw
the principal of patent reason as a hermeneutic directive. The "basic
policy" behind statutes like the UCC drafted according to this princi-
ple is that "known purpose and reason should govern interpreta-
tion."39SStatutory language drafted in such a manner would not
reference to the purpose of a provision could still be accomplished by "the
authorizing reference to the Comments, the demand for construction to pro-
mote underlying reasons, purposes and policies, and the authorization, where
the circumstances and underlying reason so require, to disregard language of
limitation." Id. Further, for those Code articles other than the Sales Act,
Llewellyn believed that he could still make "the purpose of a provision appear
on its face by the choice of language and by the organization of the thought in
the light of the situation." Id.; see also Selected Comments, supra note 84, in
KLP, supra note 29, at J.X.2.h, at 2 (noting that "sustained effort has been
made to make the reasons and purposes of the Act apparent on the face of the
text whenever possible").
397. Cf LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 83, at 182
(remarking that "no explicit purpose clause or preamble is requisite [in a stat-
ute]-though one can be useful; it is enough that the phrasing of the rule re-
veals the reason").
398. U.C.C. § 2-401 cmt. 1 (1995). Although not as prominent as Llewellyn
might have preferred, the final version of the UCC clearly embodies at least
the interpretive component of the principle of patent reason. The comment that
accompanies section 1-102 provides that "the proper construction of the Act
requires that its interpretation and application be limited to its reason." Id. § 1-
102 cmt. 1. The same comment makes clear that the UCC "should be con-
strued in accordance with its underlying purposes and policies. The text of
each section should be read in the light of the purpose and policy of the rule or
principle in question as also of the Act as a whole." Id.
The UCC drafting history also clearly demonstrates that Llewellyn in-
tended to create a statute according to the theory of patent reason. For exam-
ple, Llewellyn described one of the "main features" of the 1941 Draft as fol-
lows: "Principles are made explicit wherever they underlie a series of
provisions, in order to guide application of the detail, or the handling of uncov-
ered cases." 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, at 21. Likewise, the comment to
section 1 of the 1944 Draft provides that the statute's
proper construction requires that the text be read in light of the reason
and purpose of each rule or principle and of the Act entire. Sustained
effort has been made to make the reason and purpose apparent either
on the face of the text or in the Comments, and the court is expressly
authorized to consult the Comments.
1944 DRAFT, supra note 219, at 72. As this remark suggests, Llewellyn had
intended the comments to play a major role in courts' interpretation of the
Code. Paradoxically, the use of the comments both undermined the theory of
patent reason and advanced the cause of purposive interpretation. See infra
Part IV.B.
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dictate specific results in specific cases. Instead, Llewellyn believed
that such language would "elicit" both "the court's best judgment, in
applying or in developing the principles stated" as well as the court's
reasons for reaching the particular case-holding. 99
a. a creative role for courts
The principle of patent reason plainly envisions a creative role
for courts in statutory construction. Such a judicial role is clearly at
odds with the Formal Style of judging that Llewellyn came to loathe.
Llewellyn recognized that judges who must conjoin the infinite vari-
ety and specificity of facts in the world and the blunt imperative of
general verbal directives must be free to exercise creative flexibility.
Llewellyn believed that "the rule and its application [should] shift..
• with any shift in reason. ' 400  Thus, the official comments to the
UCC provide that "the application of the [statutory] language should
be construed narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in conformity
with the purposes and policies involved.",40 1 For Llewellyn, it was
"not where the words leave off, but where the reason leaves off, that
the provision is to find its limit. ' 40 2 He summarized his ideas con-
cerning the purposive application of legislative texts in two adages:
"[W]here the reason stops, there stops even the enacted rule" and
"Whither the reason leads, thither goeth the rule, as well.
40 3
399. Llewellyn, Federal Sales Act, supra note 85, at 563-64.
400. Llewellyn, On the Good, supra note 117, at 241.
401. U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1.
402. 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, at 26.
403. Llewellyn, Current Recapture, supra note 82,, at 229; see also 1941
DRAFT, supra note 87, § 1-A cmt., at 47; 1944 DRAFT, supra note 219, at 72.
The earlier drafts of the Code especially emphasized the creative role of courts
in statutory interpretation. Through a series of five "illustrations," the Com-
ment on section 1 of the 1944 Draft encourages the creative application of the
statute. For example, the Comment urges courts to "fill a gap in the language
of the statute" with a "clear, though unexpressed, underlying principle." Id. at
73 (emphasis omitted). Restrictive statutory language "should be ... expanded
to fit the reason and principle of the situation" where "commercial sense" so
dictates. Id. at 74 (emphasis omitted). Although a principle can be "extended
where its reason and policy apply to a situation outside the explicit scope of the
[statute]," nevertheless, "[ain express provision should be... limited where its
reason does not apply." Id. at 75 (emphasis omitted). An express provision
may justify the inference of negative implication "but only when the reason of
the situation requires such inference." Id. at 76 (emphasis omitted).
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D. Semi-Permanent Legislation and the Fear of Obsolescence
For Llewellyn, the creative application of legislative purpose of-
fered more than simple aesthetic appeal. In his view it was necessary
to avoid the onset of statutory obsolescence. Like today's supporters
of dynamic interpretation he was fearful that the fixed text of a stat-
ute would quickly become antiquated in a rapidly changing world.40 4
He had, after all, seen how obsolescence had overtaken the Uniform
Sales Act in a relatively short period of time.405  He observed
that rules "cast into ... authoritative verbal form" possessed "a tre-
mendous power" for "rigidification over time. ' 40 6 A statute could
Over the course of the drafting process, the "principle of implementation
by purpose," Llewellyn, Current Recapture, supra note 82, at 229, was some-
what curtailed by the elimination of specific provisions. See, e.g., Wiseman,
supra note 10, at 508, 520-22 (discussing the ill-fated merchant expansion pro-
vision under which the court was permitted to apply merchant rules to non-
merchants if the reason "justified so doing"). In addition, changes in the tone
and context of the comments also diminished the role of creativity in Code in-
terpretation. For example, in the comments to the 1949 Draft the drafters ex-
pressly "adopt[ed] the trend of those cases which extend the principle of a stat-
ute either to fill a gap in the language or to apply to a situation outside of the
statute's explicit scope where reason and policy justify such extension."
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (ARTICLE 1: GENERAL PROVISIONS; ARTICLE
2: SALES; ARTICLE 3: COMMERCIAL PAPER) (1949) [hereinafter 1949 DRAFT]
§ 1402 cnt. 2, reprinted in 6 U.C.C. DRAFTS, supra note 21, at 22. The draft-
ers then cited Commercial National Bank of New Orleans v. Canal-Louisiana
Bank and Trust Co., 239 U.S. 520 (1916), as an example of precisely the style
of interpretation they had in mind. Id. By 1952 the citation to the Canal-
Louisiana Bank case remained, but the Code no longer expressly adopted this
interpretive approach. Instead the comment provided in understated fashion
that "[n]othing in this Act stands in the way of the continuance of such action
by the courts." 1952 OFFICIAL DRAFT, supra note 22, § 1-102 cmt. 1. This
bland endorsement of creativity in statutory construction remains in the current
version of the Code. See U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1.
404. See Llewellyn, On Warranty Part II, supra note 146, at 409 ("Today's
policy or principle will be outdated, doubtless, within a generation.").
405. See Llewellyn, Federal Sales Act, supra note 85, at 560 ("But an Act
drawn in 1906 is an Act whose drafting rested on experience now thirty-four
years old, an Act which did not contemplate any of such conditions as have
arisen or taken new shape in what make out almost two full generations since,
spanning a great war and a great depression."); Statement, supra note 116, in 1
N.Y. REPORT 1954, supra note 24, at 29 ("Much of the law, whether embodied
in the original Uniform Commercial Acts or not, has become outmoded as the
nature of business, of technology, and of financing has changed. Such law
needs to be brought up to date.").
406. Llewellyn, My Philosophy, supra note 158, at 188.
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"becom[e] rapidly 'dated' by reason of reliance on 'practical' 'mod-
em' patterns of thought and action which may then prove to be
passing ones. ' 40 7 Moreover, Llewellyn knew that "increasingly as a
statute gains in age-its language is called upon to deal with circum-
stances utterly uncontemplated at the time of its passage., 40 8
Plainly, he did not want the UCC to suffer the same fate as the
Uniform Sales Act.40 9 Instead, Llewellyn "intended to make it pos-
sible for the law embodied in [the Code] to be developed by the
courts in the light of unforeseen and new circumstances and prac-
tices., 410  This was an ambitious goal, especially given the fluid
407. 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, at 28; see also id. at 30 (explaining that in
drafting the statute he sought "to avoid the trammels of mercantile practice al-
ready outdated" and "to avoid any equivalent freezing of the Sales law of the
future upon the immediate past or the immediate present").
408. Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 86, at 400.
409. It may be fair to ask whether statutory obsolescence is something that
can truly be avoided, or only postponed. Writing in 1967, Professor Grant
Gilmore, one of the principal drafters of Article 9 of the UCC, was less than
sanguine about the possibility of avoiding obsolescence in legislation. To do
so, a statute would have to focus on the future, on what is to come. This, how-
ever, is never accomplished. "[T]he Code, as all statutes must, devotes most of
its wordage to a recreation of the past." Grant Gilmore, On Statutory Obsoles-
cence, 39 U. COLO. L. REV. 461, 473 (1967). For Gilmore, "[tihe true function
of a codifying statute is to reduce the past to order and certainty-and, thus, to
abolish it." Id. at 476. In spite of the simplification and certainty that a new
statute provides, "[t]he law will continue to evolve" such that "[t]he time will.
. come for another round of codification, in the course of which the recodifi-
ers will point out that the old statutes were obsolescent, if not obsolete, when
they were drafted. As indeed they were." Id. at 476-77. Such obsolescence is
inevitable, because the forward-looking dynamic of life always outstrips the
backward-looking reflection of law. Cf Moore, Natural Law, supra note 342,
at 293, 357 (noting that obsolescence is as inevitable as death). A healthy con-
stitution may help to postpone it, but cannot avoid it entirely.
410. U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1 (1995). One may well ask whether history has
shown that Llewellyn's ambitions in this regard were in fact unrealistic. That
is, since New York adopted the UCC in 1962, the Official Text has been sub-
stantially revised by the sponsoring bodies in several important respects.
These "updates" of the statute were not and could not have been undertaken by
courts. For example, the American Law Institute and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated revised versions of
Articles 3 and 4 in 1990. Likewise, Article 8 was updated in 1978. Article 9
was fully revised in 1972 and is currently under revision again as are Articles
2, 5 and 7. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 1, at 5; see also Fred H.
Miller, Realism Not Idealism in Uniform Laws-Observations from the U. C.C.,
39 TEX. L. REV. 707, 712-716 (1998) (discussing the process of revising the
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nature of commerce in a modem, industrialized economy. It was
even more ambitious in that Llewellyn expressly intended the Code
to become a more-or-less permanent fixture in the American legal
landscape. He repeatedly referred to the proposed UCC as a "per-
manent ' 41 or "semi-permanent piece of legislation. 4 12 Thus, for the
Code to maintain its currency over time, Llewellyn believed that
courts would have to implement the Code's purposes with creativity
and flexibility.
E. A Common Law Code
The kind of creativity Llewellyn had in mind was exemplified
by the common law tradition. Llewellyn believed that a common
law rule, properly understood, was more a matter of policy and pur-
pose than of words.413 Not confined by "fixed language, 414 a com-
mon law rule could "expand[] or shift[] direction according to the
reason which is its life."' 415 Thus, bearing in mind the sense of the
UCC).
411. See Llewellyn, Federal Sales Act, supra note 85, at 561 (arguing that a
national codification of sales law is not "ordinary legislation" but "is in a pe-
culiar sense permanent legislation" in that "it enters into the commercial
structure of the country").
412. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102 crnt. 1 (stating that the Code "is drawn to pro-
vide flexibility so that, since it is intended to be a semi-permanent piece of
legislation, it will provide its own machinery for expansion of commercial
practices"); 1949 DRAFT, supra note 403, § 1-102 cmt. 1 (providing the same
as the current version but adding that the statute's machinery allows not only
for "expansion" but also for "gradual alteration"); 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87,
at 22-30 (containing an extensive discussion of the Code as semi-permanent
legislation and the problem of obsolescence); Selected Comments, supra note
84, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.X.2.h, at 2 (containing an early version of
comment 1 to U.C.C. § 1-102, referring to the Code as "a semi-permanent
piece of legislation"); Karl N. Llewellyn, Memorandum to Executive Commit-
tee Re: Possible Uniform Commercial Code (Aug. 1940) [hereinafter Possible
Code], in KLP, supra note 29, at J.II.l.b, at 1 (asserting that commercial law
could "be put into shape to be flexibly permanent").
413. See, e.g., Llewellyn, Offer and Acceptance Part I, supra note 165, at 31
("But for a rule or concept to take more definite shape, or to expand, intelli-
gently and intelligibly, the core of purpose must be clear-and must be just to
the situation."); see also supra Parts H.C.3, II.A.
414. See LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 83, at 38
(referring to the "frozen text" of a law); see also Llewellyn, Remarks, supra
note 86, at 400 (referring to the "fixed language" of statutes).
415. 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, § 1-A cmt., at 47.
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situation, courts could adapt common law rules to meet the needs of
changed circumstances.
By contrast, Llewellyn observed that statutory rules were often
rigid and so lacked the capacity for ready adaptation. This rigidity
was due in part to the once prevalent Formal Style of statutory con-
struction. It was also due to the specificity of the rules themselves,
'"he heaping up of technical language and of qualifications."
416
Llewellyn believed that the added certainty obtained by restricting
the role of courts through detailed rulemaking would always prove to
be short-lived. 417 "Certainty [would] not [be] furthered by the man-
ner of decision, still less by the manner of drafting, which ignores the
fundamental role of the purpose and reason of a provision., 418 De-
tailed legislation might provide some guidance today, but "[o]nly the
rule which shows its reason on its face has ground to claim maxi-
mum chance of continuing effectiveness., 41 9 By combining "an un-
mistakable indication of the sense and purpose of the provisions" to-
gether with "accurate statutory language" he believed that
"uncertainty and doubt [would be] materially decreased." 420  Al-
though he knew that in a modem commercial code "[t]echnical lan-
guage and complex statement [could not] be wholly avoided,"
Llewellyn believed that it could "be reduced to a minimum."
42'
Thus, he argued that "[t]he task of law writing or legislation is to
416. Possible Code, supra note 412, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.Il.b, at 3
(lamenting this approach even in his own work on the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act).
417. See LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 83, at 183
("In a statutory rule intended as most statutes are-and as all rules of case law
are--for lasting service, such insurance comes cheap at the price of using a
zone rather than a surveyor's line to border the rule."); see also Possible Code,
supra note 412, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.Il.b, at 4 ("Language drawn in
distrust or anxiety about courts' understanding may accomplish its immediate
purpose, but it paves the way with stumbling blocks within a decade.");
Llewellyn, Offer and Acceptance Part I, supra note 165, at 31 ("[W]e shall do
well to recall that much useful charting of travel can be done by way of indi-
cating merely direction, across a country whose boundaries and even detailed
landscape may still be blind to us.").
418. 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, at 27.
419. Llewellyn, On the Good, supra note 117, at250.
420. 1944 DRAFT, supra note 219, at 70.
421. Id.
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produce broad generalizations which work out to satisfaction.'422
With statutory purpose clearly stated, courts could be trusted "to give
reasonable effect to reasonable intention of the language." 423 They
would, he hoped "work out the effect of the statute quite as much in
terms of its sense and purpose as in terms of its meticulously exam-
ined wording.
' 424
The method whereby courts "work out" the broadly stated prin-
ciples of rules over time is of course the method of the common law.
In preparing the UCC Llewellyn attempted to draft a "common law
code" that would in turn introduce common law creativity to statu-
tory construction.425 Although some might regard the notion of a
"common law code" as self-contradictory or nonsensical, 42 6 Llewel-
lyn believed that the common law manner of decision-making was
"utterly necessary to the on-going rejuvenation of a semi-permanent
body of written law, amid the inevitable changes of modem condi-
tions. '42 7 Accordingly, the 1941 Draft prepared by Llewellyn pro-
vided that the statute
shall be deemed to state the common law principles of sales
and of contracts to sell; and its provisions may be applied,
422. Llewellyn, Through Title, supra note 164, at 190; see also Llewellyn,
On Warranty Part II, supra note 146, at 381 (arguing that any uniform code of
a whole field "makes judicial development (not mere 'interpretation') a neces-
sit/,').
423. Possible Code, supra note 412, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.II.l.b, at 3.
424. 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, at 25.
425. See Danzig, supra note 173, at 632 (remarking "that the provisions of
Article II often take the form, not so much of legislation... as of a common
law decision"); Wiseman, supra note 10, at 488 (arguing that Llewellyn
wanted legislation to resemble common law rules); cf Mooney, supra note 10,
at 222 n.14 (referring to the UCC as a "common law code" because of its deri-
vation from Llewellyn's close factual reading of case law and his emphasis on
the actual conduct of courts).
426. See, e.g., National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, Consideration in Committee of the Whole of the Revised Uniform Sales
Act (Sept. 1941) [hereinafter 1941 Transcript], in KLP, supra note 29, at
J.I.2.c, at 21 ("Now with regard to the common law, of course, the courts can
develop that, but if we take the common law and put it into a statute,... and it
seems to me it has got to be construed like a statute from that time on and
cease to be construed like common law.") (comments of Mr. Bogert).
427. 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, at 25.
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developed or limited as in the application, development or
limitation of common law principles by judicial deci-
sions... 428
It was "in essence a fresh statement of common law principle, in-
tended not to cripple, but to fertilize decision.,,429 As such, if life
were to "unmistakably and persistently show the obsolescence of a
policy declared in the Act," then courts would be "free to move in
the common-law manner toward cure."430 Although this explicit in-
vitation to vary from the statutory text43' did not survive the drafting
process,432 it nevertheless manifests Llewellyn's hope that the Code
would emulate the common law and in so doing change with the
changing times. By "the laying down of rules to be developed by the
courts as common law rules are themselves developed by the courts,
and molded to the succession of unforeseen circumstances,
' 433
428. Id. § 1-A. Section 2 of the 1940 Draft contained a nearly identical pro-
vision. It stated that the statute "shall be construed as stating true common law
principles of sales and of contracts to sell" and that its provisions "may be ap-
plied or developed by analogy where such procedure would be judicially ap-
propriate in the application of common law principles stated in judicial deci-
sions in equivalent terms." 1940 DRAFT, supra note 219, § 2. Professor
Wiseman explains that the word "true," modifying the phrase "common law
principles," was deleted from the statute at the suggestion of Professor Max
Radin, who could not conceive of a "false" common law principle. See Wise-
man, supra note 10, at 498 n.150.
429. 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, § 1-A cmt., at 48; see also Llewellyn, Fed-
eral Sales Act, supra note 85, at 563 (describing the Code as "a freshly stated
take-off from explicit true common-law principle into the common-law type
of development of true common-law principle").
430. 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, at 29.
431. William Schnader, president of the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, described section 1-A of the 1941 Draft as a
"deliberate invitation to the courts ... to treat the rules of the Act in the same
manner as they treat common law statements of principle." 1941 DRAFT, su-
pra note 87, Foreword, at v.
432. This provision was succeeded by the much less radical section 1-102
which states that the Code "shall be liberally construed and applied to promote
its underlying purposes and policies." U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (1995). Although the
Official Comment to this section clearly encourages statutory interpretation in
the Grand Style, nothing in the current text of the UCC suggests that courts
may treat the statute like a malleable common-law principle. An early version
of the present section 1-102 can be found in the 1944 DRAFT, supra note 219,
§1.
433. Llewellyn, Federal Sales Act, supra note 85, at 562.
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Llewellyn sought to forestall as much as possible the gradual process
of obsolescence.434 By drafting "legislation in terms of lasting prin-
ciple, akin to case-law rules," he hoped to incorporate creative flexi-
bility into the statute itself.
435
F. The Role of the Official Comments in UCC Interpretation
Creating a commercial statute according to the theory of patent
reason would require the drafters "to work the principles involved
into simple, clear statement., 436  To further this goal, Llewellyn
sought from the beginning of the Code project to "buttress" the UCC
text with an authoritative interpretative aid, much as Samuel Willis-
ton had given an elaborate exposition of the Uniform Sales Act in his
treatise on the law of sales.437 Indeed, because he believed that an
official commentary was "an integral part of any thought about a
Code,"435 he predicted that the Code project "[would] stand or fall on
what it [got] in the way of buttressing from such an authoritative
textbook.,
439
Llewellyn believed that such a commentary would assist Code
construction in several important respects. First, the comments
would help lawyers and others440 to construe this lengthy and
434. See 1940 DRAFT, supra note 219, at 9 (asserting that a statute of
'freshly stated principle" must "be developed by the courts as common law
principles are developed, the fines of growth and the base lines being given,
but not of necessity the detail, nor the necessary extensions").
435. Llewellyn, Federal Sales Act, supra note 85, at 562.
436. Karl N. Llewellyn, Suggested Statement for a Foundation Project for a
Uniform Commercial Code and Commentary (Aug. 30, 1940) [hereinafter
Suggested Statement], in KLP, supra note 29, at J.H. l.c, at 1.
437. See Memo No. 1, supra note 29, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.II.l.a, at 3
(remarking that the Code could not "hope for adoption or hope for use, if
adopted, without the kind of buttressing by a book which Williston gave his
Sales Act, and the Negotiable Instruments Law failed to get"); see also Possi-
ble Code, supra note 412, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.II.l.b, at 4 (remarking
that "[t]he Sales Act has been tremendously helped by having [an adequate
commentary]"); 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, § 1-A cmt., at 49 (discussing the
Sales Act and Williston's treatise); TWINING, supra note 6, at 327; Braucher,
supra note 27, at 808-09.
438. Possible Code, supra note 412, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.Il.b, at 4.
439. Memo No. 1, supra note 29, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.II.l.a, at 3.
440. See Possible Code, supra note 412, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.II.1.b, at
2 ("Commercial law requires to be for consumption by commercial men, as
well as lawyers.").
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complex legislation as a single, coherent statute.441 As Llewellyn
saw it, the comments would make "the bearing of all other relevant
parts clear as to each particular part, so that lawyers and judges
[would] have []access to the whole, whatever the matter before
them" 4 2 Indeed, he believed that "it [was] only in the Comments
that the bearing of one section on other sections [could] be consis-
tently explored, and the Act integrated, for use, into a working
whole." 443 Each comment would help facilitate this process of inte-
gration by providing cross-references to related Code sections.
4 44
Second, Llewellyn hoped that an official commentary on the
Code would further the cause of uniform construction. As the Gen-
eral Comment to the present UCC stresses, "[u]niformity throughout
American jurisdictions is one of the main objectives of th[e] Code"
441. See id. at 4 (arguing that a condition for "sound developmenf' of the
Code by the courts "is an adequate commentary which guides to the legal ma-
terial concerned as a whole"). Indeed, the General Comment introducing the
UCC today states that "this Comment and those which follow the text of each
section' are set forth "to aid in viewing the Act as an integrated whole, and to
safeguard against misconstruction." U.C.C. 17 (1995) (General Comment of
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Law Institute).
442. Suggested Statement, supra note 436, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.II.1.c,
at 2.
443. 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, § 1-A cmt. 3, at 50.
444. See Statement, supra note 116, in 1 N.Y. REPORT 1954, supra note 24,
at 35 (asserting that the comments "cross-refer to almost everything else in the
Code which bears upon the section in hand; they give clear cross-reference to
the definition of any word of art whatever which the section may contain");
Karl Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. L. REv. 779, 782 (1953)
("By adding to the text of the statute a reasonably complete body of comment
indicating its purpose, with cross-references to other related sections of the
Code, the text and comment provide the material with which a man who has
never seen the Code before can work his way with effectiveness."); see also
TWINING, supra note 6, at 330 (remarking that the comments "help to integrate
the Code" and that "the cross-references make for speedy and efficient use").
But see WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 4, at 13 (remarking that the cross-
references are sometimes "not exhaustive"); Robert Skilton, Some Comments
on the Comments to the U.C.C., 1966 Wis. L. REv. 597, 606 (1966) (contend-
ing that the cross-references in the comments will "improve the chances that a
Code section will be considered in context with due regard to its proper place
in the whole" but that the references "may be concerned only with certain
points" and so should not be viewed as exhaustive).
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and the comments are provided "[t]o aid in uniform construction.",4
45
Indeed, uniformity was thought so important that Llewellyn promi-
nently featured it among the Code's "[u]nderlying purposes and poli-
cies" set forth in UCC section 1-102.446
1. The comments as an official statement of legislative intent
Llewellyn knew, however, that "substantial uniformity of con-
struction ... depends in turn on uniformity of intent, which depends
again in turn on an adequate record of the reason for and purpose of
the language chosen."447 Thus, the goal of uniform interpretation
could not be achieved unless the courts understood the same Code
sections to mean the same thing. To that end, Llewellyn conceived
of the comments as a sort of standardized legislative history that
would help ensure application consistent with the distinct purposes
behind the various Code provisions.448
445. U.C.C. 17 (1995) (General Comment of National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws and American Law Institute). Earlier ver-
sions of these statements can be found elsewhere in the Code drafting history.
See, e.g., 1949 DRAFT, supra note 403, § 1-102 cnt. 3; Selected Comments,
supra note 84, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.X.2.h, at 6.
446. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c) (1995). The goal of achieving uniform construc-
tion clearly appeared in the earliest Code drafts. See, e.g., 1940 DRAFT, supra
note 219, § 2 (stating that "the dominant purpose of the Act [is] to make uni-
form the law of those jurisdictions which enact it"); 1941 DRAFT, supra note
87, § 1-A (same); 1944 DRAFT, supra note 219, § 1 (describing uniformity as
"[o]ne of the main purposes"). Recently, some commentators have questioned
whether uniformity is a goal that can be advanced by the use of comments.
See Laurens Walker, Writings on the Margin of American Law: Committee
Notes, Comments, and Commentary, 29 GA. L. REv. 993, 1027-28 (1995).
447. 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, § 1-A cmt., at 49. A similar remark can be
found in Selected Comments, supra note 84, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.X.2.h,
at 6 (adding also that the comments would "safeguard against misconstruction
by mistake of intention"). Likewise, in 1941 Llewellyn argued in committee
that "the only way to get a uniformity of construction is to have a uniformity of
lines of construction, and the only way to have uniformity of lines of construc-
tion is to have an official comment that says what the lines of construction are
intended to be." 1941 Transcript, supra note 426, in KLP, supra note 29, at
J.IH.2.c, at 25.
448. See TWINING, supra note 6, at 326 ("The very full commentary which
accompanies the official text is the main device for articulating and explaining
the policies of the Code provisions."); Danzig, supra note 173, at 623 (re-
marking that the Code drafters sought to restrain state legislatures "from gen-
erating a unique legislative history by the prepackaged gloss provided in the
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Initially, Llewellyn sought to accomplish this by formally ac-
knowledging the authority of the comments in the statutory text. He
knew that it was at the very least "anomalous" to search for legisla-
tive intent "in the acts or declarations of persons who have no official
connection with the actual passage of the legislation." 449 Although
courts deciding cases under the Uniform Sales Act routinely cited to
Williston's treatise on sales as a primary source of authority,
Llewellyn believed that "our doctrinal scheme of statutory construc-
tion" did not allow for "the delegation to private persons of essen-
tially legislative power--e.g. the effective declaration of why legis-
lative language means what it does not say, or does not mean what it
does say., 450 In section 1-A(2) of the 1941 Draft, Llewellyn sought
to avoid these problems of delegation and authority. It provided that
"the Legislature declares that the Act is adopted for the purposes and
with the intent set forth in the Official Comments of the Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and that those comments
are to be used as a guide in the construction and application of this
Act."'45 ' Had it survived the drafting process, this section would
have permitted Llewellyn and his fellow drafters to state the reason
and purpose behind each Code section with undeniable authority.
This approach to the comments, however, failed to garner
the necessary support in the sponsoring body.452 Accordingly, the
reference to the comments in the 1944 Draft was changed from
being "mandatory and official" to being merely "permissive but
form of official commentary"); Skilton, supra note 444, at 602 ("A particular
reason for making use of the comments is that they may be viewed as part of
the legislative history of the Code."); Wiseman, supra note 10, at 499-500
("Llewellyn's Comments represented his effort not only to provide a substitute
for the Williston treatise, to which the courts had regularly resorted in con-
struing the 1906 Act, but also to provide an authoritative explanation of the
'purposes and reasons' that were essential to judicial application of the Code's
provisions in the Grand Style.") (footnotes omitted).
449. 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, § 1-A cmt., at 49.
450. Id.
451. Id. § 1-A(2). This draft attributes the comments to the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and not the American Law In-
stitute because it was prepared in 1941. The Institute did not agree to partici-
pate in the revision of the Uniform Sales Act until 1942. See Braucher, supra
note 27, at 800.
452. See 1941 Transcript, supra note 426, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.II.2.c,
at 21-29.
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suggested." Section 1(2) of the 1944 Draft provided that the com-
ments "may be consulted by the courts to determine the underlying
reasons, purposes and policies of this Act and may be used as a guide
in its construction and application. ' 453 Although it lacked the ex-
press delegation found in the 1941 Draft, Llewellyn still saw this
provision as "explicitly authoriz[ing] reference to [the] Comments to
determine the reasons, purposes and policies which should govern
judicial decisions., 454 Indeed, because the statute invited courts to
consult the comments, Llewellyn believed that the comments en-
joyed "a status more than equivalent to that of a Committee Report
on the basis of which a proposed bill has been enacted by a legisla-
ture.
' 455
In the 1949 Draft, the numeration of all the Code sections was
changed so that what had been section 1(2) of the 1944 Draft became
section 1-102(2). Although the operative language of this provision
remained exactly as before,456 a new comment was added. Like its
predecessor, the comment to section 1-102 suggested that the com-
ments as a whole would "aid in uniform construction" of the Code.457
It added, however, that because the comments "will have been before
the Congress or Legislature at the time of adoption" they would in
fact "disclos[e] the uniform intent of the lawmaking bodies in enact-
ing the Code.
458
Llewellyn's prediction that legislatures would somehow approve
of the comments in the process of enacting the Code itself did not
come true. "In some states the comments were not placed before the
enacting body prior to adoption of the Code. Indeed, some of the
present comments were not even in existence at the time the section
to which they are now appended was adopted. 4 59 Thus, the use of
453. 1944 DRAFT, supra note 219, § 1(2).
454. Id. at 70.
455. Id. at 72; see also Selected Comments, supra note 84, in KLP, supra
note 29, at J.X.2.h, at 2.
456. The only change that took place between the two drafts of this provision
was the deletion of the word "joint" modifying the word "comments," and re-
moval of the brackets around "The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws." Compare 1944 DRAFT, supra note 219, § 1(2), with
1949 DRAFT, supra note 403, § 1-102(2).
457. 1949 DRAFT, supra note 403, § 1-102 cmt. 3.
458. Id.
459. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 4, at 13-14 (footnote omitted); see
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the comments cannot be justified, as Llewellyn had hoped, in terms
of an express political endorsement.46 ° Still, the changes Llewellyn
made in the 1944 and 1949 Drafts demonstrate the advantages of a
well-executed strategic retreat. By removing the language of express
delegation from the statutory text, Llewellyn was able to satisfy his
critics. He then used the language in one particular comment to de-
clare the authority of the comments as a whole.46'
also TWINING, supra note 6, at 326 ("The term 'Official Comments' is some-
times used, but this may be misleading in that they have been formally adopted
neither by the floors of the sponsoring bodies nor by legislatures which have
enacted the Code and in some cases were not even made available to legisla-
tors."); Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, Commenting on "Purpose" in the
Uniform Commercial Code, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 419, 450 (1997) (remarking that
the reporter who drafts the comments "though anointed by the ALI and
NCCUSL, has not been elected to write the law and has no legislative authority
beyond the states' enactment of the black letter that has been the subject of
careful deliberations"); Skilton, supra note 444, at 604 ("Embarrassing ques-
tions multiply if one subjects the Comments to the standards often imposed for
recourse to legislative history. In some states the revised Comments had not
yet been drafted at the time of the Code's adoption. In others it is highly
doubtful that the Comments were laid before the legislators in the form of a
committee report explaining the legislation which the legislators were asked to
adopt") (quoting JOHN HONNOLD, SALES AND SALES FINANCING 19 (2d ed.
1962)); Walker, supra note 446, at 1021 (paraphrasing Easterbrook and argu-
ing that "marginal writing," like the Official Comments, "is even more difficult
to legitimize [than typical legislative history] because the authors lack author-
ity to enact legislation and ordinarily, there is no formal relationship between
authorship and enacting power"); Sean Michael Hannaway, Note, The Juris-
prudence and Judicial Treatment of the Comments to the Uniform Commercial
Code, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 962, 962 (1990) (remarking that the comments
"cannot accurately be described as legislative history in the traditional sense,
as there is little evidence that the state legislatures gave any extensive consid-
eration to them when adopting the Code") (likewise citing JOHN HONNOLD,
SALES AND SALES FINANCING, supra, at 19).
460. See Walker, supra note 446, at 1033 (concluding that "marginal writ-
ing," such as the Code comments, "cannot be placed within any category of
authority approved heretofore by the process of democratic government, and
therefore, should not be given weight"). But see TWINING, supra note 6, at
329-30 (commenting on the utility of comments); Skilton, supra note 444, at
602-03; Hannaway, supra note 459, at 985 (The author argues for a "contin-
uum" theory of legal authority and concludes that "[t]he truth of the matter is
that the Comments are authoritative. To say that legislatures did not enact
them says nothing more than that their authority is not the same as a stat-
ute's."); infra notes 634-644 and accompanying text.
461. While this "bootstrapping" has not escaped the eyes of some critics, see
JOHN HONNOLD, SALES AND SALES FINANCING, supra note 459, at 18, it has
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a. the ABA and the comments
Despite this clever drafting, the quasi-legislative status con-
ferred upon the comments remained a concern among some partici-
pants in the Code project. Beginning in 1947, the American Bar As-
sociation's Section for Corporation, Banking and Business Law
began to study successive Code drafts as they became available.462
In May 1950, the governing Council for this ABA section adopted a
series of resolutions asking the sponsoring bodies to delay final ap-
proval of the Code in order to allow for further study.463 In adopting
these resolutions the Council observed that many had objected "to
the conferring upon the Comments any form of official legislative
status, as is apparently accomplished by Section 1-102(2),464 In
September 1950, the Section's Committee on the Proposed Commer-
cial Code465 issued a report that was favorably disposed toward the
statute but which again urged further study.466 The Committee spoke
enthusiastically in support of the Code comments. 61 Indeed, given
their apparent importance, the Committee urged the drafters to
not prevented widespread use of the comments among courts and practitioners.
See Skilton, supra note 444, at 601.
462. See Walter D. Malcolm, The Proposed Commercial Code, A Report on
Developments During the Period from May 1950 Through February 1951
Particularly With Reference to Activities of the Section on Corporation, Bank-
ing and Business Law of the American Bar Association, 7 Bus. LAW. 113, 114
(1951) [hereinafter Malcolm, Developments].
463. See id. at 113-17. A copy of the Council's resolutions can also be
found in KLP, supra note 29, at J.XII.1.1. Other bar and trade associations
also urged the Institute and National Conference to delay final action on the
Code. See, e.g., Whitney North Seymour, Annual Report of the President, 5
THE RECORD OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 268, 295 (1950).
464. Malcolm, Developments, supra note 462, at 115.
465. This committee was created by, and served within, the ABA's Section
on Corporation, Banking and Business Law for the special purpose of studying
the proposed UCC. See Report of the Committee on the Proposed Commercial
Code, 5 Bus. LAW. 142 (1949-1950).
466. Malcolm, Developments, supra note 462, at 120.
467. See id. at 129 ("To us it is elementary that in the best drawn, as well as
in poorly drawn statutes, it is always helpful if some statement or comment is
available to give background, history, reference, examples or explanation
serving the simple purpose of throwing more light on the problem than the bare
words of the statute can give itself."). By way of contrast, the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York thought that the statutory text "should be
made 'clear without the crutch of official comments."' Id. at 128.
374
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devote "almost as much care" to the preparation of the comments as
to the statutory text itself.4 61 Still, the Committee asserted that the
comments "should not be part of the statute itself,-enacted as law
by legislatures. 4 69 Moreover, it recommended that the language in
468. Id. at 129. The need for the comments to be drafted with great care was
also expressed by a group of Harvard Law School faculty chaired by Robert
Braucher, see id. at 151-53, and later by Walter Malcolm, chair of the ABA
Committee, at a meeting of the Enlarged Editorial Board to which he was in-
vited to attend in January 1951. See Proceedings of Larger Editorial Board of
the American Law Institute (Jan. 1951) [hereinafter 1951 Proceedings], in
KLP, supra note 29, at J.XII.l.e, at 171. The faculty of the Harvard Law
School also expressed concern that in some instances the comments appeared
to "go beyond the terms of the statute, adding provisions which should be en-
acted as part of the statute" and that they sometimes "attempt[ed] to modify the
plain meaning of the statutory language." Malcolm, Developments, supra note
462, at 152. This overreaching on the part of the comments continued to be a
source of concern during the New York Law Revision Commission's study of
the Code. See N.Y. REPORT 1956, supra note 24, at 26-27, 357-58. Indeed, it
remains a problematic feature of the statute even today. See, e.g., Skilton, su-
pra note 444, at 628 ("Some comments obviously, some comments subtly, add
to or take away from the text. It is often hard to determine the point at which
'explanation' begins to take over the work that should be done by the text.");
Hannaway, supra note 459, at 975 ("In a few instances, the Comments pre-
scribe requirements that are so specific that they overstep their proper role as
interpretive guides."). Llewellyn believed that, initially, in order to garner
support for the Code, the comments would have to both explain the various
Code provisions and justify the policy choices contained therein. He hoped,
however, that in their final version the comments would be purely expository
in nature. See 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, at 3, 30; 1941 Transcript, supra
note 426, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.11I.2.c, at 21 ("Next year, when the draft
comes back to you, the comments will have a very different form. They will
be expository and nothing more. They will not argue, they will not defend,
they will simply state what is being done."). This original vision for the com-
ments was never fully realized. Some of the present comments are plainly ex-
pository while others are clearly argumentative and promotional. See Han-
naway, supra note 459, at 974; Skilton, supra note 444, at 608. This in part
accounts for the fact that at times the comments appear to go beyond the
statutory text See also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 4, at 13.
469. Malcolm, Developments, supra note 462, at 129. In an apparent rever-
sal from the position taken in the resolutions adopted by the Section in May
1950, the Committee concluded that section 1-102(2) as then drafted did not
codify the comments or confer any form of legislative status upon them. See
id. This change may have been in response to Llewellyn's sustained argument
that section 1-102(2) simply offered the comments "as a possible guide and a
permissive guide to the reasons and policies of the statute." Transcript of Dis-
cussion on the Uniform Commercial Code Joint Meeting, The American Law
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section 1-102(2) referring to the "underlying reasons, purposes and
policies of the Act" be dropped and that the words "may be con-
sulted" be substituted for the phrase "may be used as a guide., 470 As
the Committee's chairman, Walter Malcolm, later explained, this
change was suggested in order "to minimize the quasi-legislative
standing of the comments, if they have any such standing."47'
In response to some of the ABA's concerns that "the Reporters
circulated in late December 1950, a proposed amendment of Section
1-102 embodying a number of suggestions made by [ABA] Section
representatives., 472 Representatives from the ABA including Walter
Malcolm discussed this proposal at a meeting of the UCC's Enlarged
Editorial Board held in January 195 1.473  During this meeting,
Malcolm proposed that a provision be added to section 1-102 "to the
effect that in the event of any conflict between the statutory language
and the comments, the statutory language would control. ' 474 Taking
the ABA's suggestions into account, section 1-102 was revised and
approved by the Enlarged Editorial Board in March 1951 .47 Ac-
cordingly, section 1-102(3)(f) of the Spring 1951 Draft provided:
The Official Comments of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American
Law Institute may be consulted in the construction and ap-
plication of this Act but where text and comment conflict,
text controls.
476
Oddly enough, no comments accompanied this draft of the Code.
In May and September 1951, the Institute and the National Con-
ference gave final approval to the text of the Uniform Commercial
Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (May 1950) [hereinafter 1950 Transcript], in KLP, supra note 29, at
J.XII.1.i, at 7.
470. Malcolm, Developments, supra note 462, at 129-30.
471. 1951 Proceedings, supra note 468, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.XIII.l.e,
at 165.
472. Malcolm, Developments, supra note 462, at 179.
473. See 1951 Proceedings, supra note 468, in KLP, supra note 29, at
J.XIII.l.e, at 81-171. For the text of the proposal see id. at 84-85. For a list of
meeting participants, see id. at 2-3.
474. Id. at 170.
475. See Section 1-102 Purposes; Rules of Construction (March 1951 Draft),
in KLP, supra note 29, at J.XIII.I.c; Schnader, supra note 27, at 6-7.
476. SPRING 1951 DRAFT, supra note 21, § 1-102(3)(f).
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Code.477 Additional editorial work and preparation of the comments
delayed publication of a Text and Comments Edition of the UCC
until 1952.478 In spite of the changes made to the text of section 1-
102(3)(f) that followed from the ABA's involvement, the comment
explaining this provision remained exactly as it had in the 1949 Draft
discussed above.479 Just as before, the comment assumes that all of
the comments "will have been before the Legislature at the time of
the adoption" of the Code.480 Moreover, like its predecessor from
1949, the 1952 comment explains that the purpose of section 1-
102(3)(f) is to recommend the comments "to the consideration of the
courts to promote uniformity, to aid in viewing the Act as an inte-
grated whole, and to safeguard against misconstruction by mistake of
legislative intention.",
481
Remarkably, through more than ten years of drafts and revi-
sions, Llewellyn's original plan for the comments as an interpretive
aid remained largely intact. By embracing the modest changes sug-
gested by the ABA and others, Llewellyn was able to gain support
for the permissive use of the comments. Although section 1-
102(3)(f did not require courts to refer to the comments, the statu-
tory text still acknowledged their authority. Even with this dimin-
ished status Llewellyn expected that judges and lawyers would rely
on the comments and interpret the Code "according to its reason" in
the Grand Style.
b. the New York Law Revision Commission and the comments
Despite this apparent triumph for Llewellyn's approach to stat-
utes, the language in section 1-102 expressly authorizing use of the
comments did not survive the drafting process. In 1953 the New
York Law Revision Commission began a long and intensive review
of the Code that included public hearings and consultations with
numerous bankers, lawyers, manufacturers, and other interested
477. See Herbert F. Goodrich, FOREWORD, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
FINAL TEXT EDITION v (Nov. 1951), reprinted in 12 U.C.C. DRAFTS, supra
note 21, at 379; see also Schnader, supra note 27, at 7.
478. See Braucher, supra note 27, at 800; see also Herbert F. Goodrich,
FoREwoRD, 1952 OFFICIAL DRAFT, supra note 22, at v.
479. See supra notes 456-61 and accompanying text.
480. 1952 OFFICIAL DRAFT, supra note 22, § 1-102 crnt. 2.
481. Id.
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482parties. The Commission laid aside its other work and employed
eighteen special consultants in addition to its regular staff in order to
study each UCC provision in detail.
483
During the Commission's work on the Code, the sponsoring
bodies did not sit by as idle or indifferent observers. Instead, the
Code drafters sought to respond to many of the Commission's criti-
cisms and concerns before it issued its final report.484 As a result of
this work, the Editorial Board proposed a number of amendments
which the sponsoring bodies approved and published in January
1955 as Supplement No. 1 to the 1952 Official Draft of Text and
Comments of the Uniform Commercial Code.485 In Supplement No.
1, what had been section 1-102(3)(f) of the 1952 Official Draft be-
came section 1-102(5), however, the language of the provision re-
mained exactly as before.486
By cooperating with the New York Law Revision Commission
during its period of study, the Code drafters were able to resolve a
number of problems raised concerning the statute, but not all of
them. In February 1956, the Commission published its final report in
which it endorsed the goal of a single code bringing together differ-
ent aspects of commercial law. The Commission concluded, how-
ever, that the UCC was "not satisfactory in its present form and
[could not] be made satisfactory without comprehensive re-
examination and revision in the light of all critical comment obtain-
able., 487 In the body of its final report, the Commission criticized
the Code's "extensive use of 'Comments' to fill out the skeleton of
the statute itself., 488  The Commission also noted "a number of
482. For a collection of letters and memoranda received by the Commission
and stenographic reports of the public hearings see 1-2 N.Y. REPORT 1954, su-
pra note 24.
483. See 1 N.Y. REPORT 1954, supra note 24, at 7-9.
484. For a summary of the interaction between the reactivated Editorial
Board and the Commission during this time see John M. Breen, The Lost Vol-
ume Seller and Lost Profits Under U.C.C. § 2-708(2): A Conceptual and Lin-
guistic Critique, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 779, 877-78 (1996).
485. See SUPPLEMENT No. 1 to the 1952 OFFICIAL DRAFT OF TEXT AND
COMMENTS OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1955) [hereinafter
SUPPLEMENT NO. 1], reprinted in 17 U.C.C. DRAFTS, supra note 21, at 307.
486. Seeid. at3.
487. N.Y. REPORT 1956, supra note 24, at 68.
488. Id. at 25-26.
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instances of apparent conflict between text and Comments" as well
as "instances in which the Comments appear to qualify the text or to
add further rules not supported by the text., 489 In so doing, the
Commission simply reiterated a concern that had been raised by the
ABA and others involved in the drafting process,49° as weU as by the
Commission's own expert consultants.49' More importantly, the
Commission found that "the direct invitation to consult the Com-
ments" contained in section 1-102(5) was "unnecessary" in that
"[e]xisting principles of statutory construction would... permit re-
course to the Comments to resolve ambiguities., 492  Further, the
Commission feared that, by expressly encouraging courts to refer to
the official comments, section 1-102(5) "could lead to unprecedented
489. Id. at26.
490. See supra notes 462-476 and accompanying text.
491. Professors Carl Fulda of Rutgers University and Edwin Patterson, one
of Llewellyn's colleagues at Columbia University, were two of the special
consultants hired by the Commission to study the Code. Although each re-
viewed section 1-102(f) of the 1952 Official Draft, see 1 N.Y. REPORT 1955,
supra note 24, at 57-64 (analysis of Patterson), 156-63 (analysis of Fulda),
neither objected to use of the comments. Indeed, Professor Fulda observed
that even if the comments were not brought before the legislature they could
still be construed "broadly speaking, as part of the 'legislative history"' behind
the Code. Id. at 160. He noted that similar extrinsic aids had been used
"where courts considered the history of the times, the circumstances sur-
rounding the passage of the statute and the evils to be cured thereby." Id.
(footnote omitted). Accordingly, Fulda concluded that use of the comments
would be permitted under New York law, "it being, of course, necessary to
guard against inconsistencies between the Comments and the texts." Id. at
163. Professor Patterson likewise asserted that the Code would be "seriously
impaired" if "accompanied by 'official' comments which add to the rule of the
text, or subtract from it." Id. at 58. Moreover, Patterson preferred that the rea-
son for each Code provision "should be indicated in the text' rather than in a
separate comment. Id. at 64. Still, although Patterson did not object to the
comments as a means of expressing legislative purpose, he did object to the
comments as "an 'official' or mandatory source of interpretation." Id. Citing
his own experience in statutory drafting, Patterson added that to submit the
comments for legislative approval might "arouse more controversy and take
longer to get agreement on, than would the text itself." Id. (footnote omitted).
Patterson's support for the comments, or rather his lack of objection to them,
appears to be based on the belief that, even with the comments, courts would
still have to find or invent the reasons for the provisions "in about the same
way that they now are, for case law." Id.
492. N.Y. REPORT 1956, supra note 24, at 27.
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use of the Comments to expand and qualify the text." 4 93 As such, it
could not approve of section 1-102(5).
2. The comments as an unofficial interpretive aid
Rejection of the statute by the New York legislature would have
been fatal to the success of the Code project.494 Accordingly, in or-
der to gain New York's support, the Code drafters were highly re-
ceptive to many of the criticisms and suggestions offered by the New
York Law Revision Commission. 495 Although the exact degree to
which the work of the Commission influenced subsequent drafts of
the Code may never be known,496 the Editorial Board clearly ac-
cepted the majority of the Commission's recommendations.497 In the
493. Id. In the Excerpts from the Proceedings of the Commission published
in the same volume, see id. at 355-485, the Commission likewise noted its dis-
approval of section 1-102(5) "as inviting to an unprecedented extent reliance
on 'Comments' which have not been considered by Legislatures." Id. at 357-
58. The Commission further remarked that the provision did "not deal ade-
quately with the question of Comments that add to the text of the Code." Id. at
358.
These criticisms were not new. Other critics had expressed similar con-
cerns about the role of the comments long before the Commission had begun to
study the Code. See supra notes 447-481 and accompanying text Moreover,
the Commission had made its own views known a year before it issued its final
report. In its Interim Report on the Uniform Commercial Code dated February
1, 1955, see 1 N.Y. REPORT 1955, supra note 24, at 3-30, the Commission
strongly criticized section 1-102(3)(f) of the 1952 Official Draft. It found that
the comments were "unprecedented both in their detail and in the quantity of
elaboration" given to the statutory text. Id. at 22. The Commission likewise
remarked that "[a] great deal of the content of the Comments appears to add to
the text" and that some passages "completely alter the purport of the text." Id.
Thus, given the reliance invited by the comments, the Commission questioned
"the propriety of tendering dissertations of this kind to the courts and to law-
yers as official explanation for legislative intent confirmed as such by explicit
provision even though it be stated only as permission to consult the Com-
ments." Id. A year later section 1-102 still expressly authorized the use of the
comments, but the Commission's views had not changed. The comments may
well have enjoyed the status of a committee report (as Llewellyn had wanted)
but the Commission was still uncomfortable with such a status.
494. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text
495. See TW IN G, supra note 6, at 295; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, §
4, at 11.
496. Twining suggests that such an evaluation would involve "some intrac-
table methodological problems." TWINING, supra note 6, at 296.
497. See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
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fall of 1956, the Editorial Board completed its "thorough-going re-
examination of the Code" in light of the Commission's work495 and
published the 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board for the
Uniform Commercial Code.
The 1956 Recommendations contained the entire text of the
1952 Official Draft but did not include a set of the official com-
ments. Instead, an Explanatory Reason or Reason for Recommenda-
tion followed each section where some revision was suggested.
Many Code sections were unchanged from the 1952 Official Draft.
In those sections that were revised, however, the language deleted
from the 1952 Official Draft appeared in brackets while newly added
language appeared in italics. Although the 1956 Recommendations
included the substantive changes already adopted in Supplement No.
1, the numbering of Code sections was now based on the 1952 Offi-
cial Draft. Thus, what had become section 1-102(5) in Supplement
No. 1 appeared once again as section 1-102(3)(f).
In the 1956 Recommendations, the Editorial Board deleted sec-
tion 1-102(3)(f) from the UCC text. As a result, use of the comments
was no longer expressly permitted by the Code text itself. In the ex-
planatory Reason for Recommendation that followed, the drafters
noted that the New York Law Revision Commission had recom-
mended the deletion of section 1-102(3)(D. The drafters asserted,
however, that the section had been deleted "because the old com-
ments were clearly out of date and it was not known when new ones
could be prepared., 499 This explanation may account for the deletion
of section 1-102(3)(f in the 1956 Recommendations. 00 It cannot,
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE
MEETING IN ITS SIXTY-SIXTH YEAR 100-01 (1957) [hereinafter 1957
HANDBOOK] (denoting William Schnader's estimation that the drafters
"adopted fully ninety per cent [sic] of the recommendations of the New York
Law Revision Commission in one form or another"); Malcolm, Panel Discus-
sion, supra note 27, at 78.
498. See Herbert F. Goodrich, FOREwORD, 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra
note 23, at IV; see also Braucher, supra note 27, at 804; Schnader, supra note
27, at 9.
499. 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, § 1-102, Reason for Recom-
mendation.
500. There is some reason to doubt this claim. If Walter Malcolm was cor-
rect in his assertion that the vast majority of changes recommended by the New
York Law Revision Commission were not substantive in nature, but only mi-
nor points of drafting, see Malcolm, Panel Discussion, supra note 27, at 78,
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however, account for the absence of this provision from any subse-
quent version of the UCC to which revised comments were ap-
pended. For example, in 1958 the sponsoring bodies published a
new edition of the statute, the Uniform Commercial Code: 1957 Of-
ficial Text with Comments. The comments published with this ver-
sion of the statute were "a revision of the original comments" ac-
companying the 1952 Official Draft.50' As such, the comments were
plainly not out of date, yet nothing in the UCC text authorized their
use.
Since the publication of the 1957 Official Text, the sponsoring
bodies have published numerous revisions of the UCC. Neither sec-
tion 1-102(3)(f) nor its functional equivalent has appeared in any
subsequent version of the statute.50 2 Accordingly, although the
then the comments to the 1952 Official Draft may have been somewhat out of
date relative to the text of the 1956 Recommendations, but not necessarily. But
see TWINING, supra note 6, at 463 n.84 (noting that "it was in the interests of
[the drafters] ... to play down the extent of disagreement [with the Commis-
sion]"). Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that section 1-102(3)(f) was deleted
not because the comments were archaic, but because the Commission objected
to the clear authority given to the comments in the statutory text.
501. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1957 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH
COMMENTS 1 (1958) [hereinafter 1957 OFFICIAL TEXT], reprinted in 19
U.C.C. DRAFTS, supra note 21, at 33.
502. In 1963, the sponsoring bodies published the Uniform Commercial
Code: 1962 Official Text with Comments. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
1962 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS (1963), reprinted in 22 U.C.C.
DRAFTS, supra note 21, at 285. Unlike its predecessors, the 1962 Official Text
was introduced by a General Comment that summarized the UCC drafting
history, and acknowledged the work of many of the individuals involved in the
Code project. Although this General Comment as a whole was new, the first
paragraph was not. It provides as follows:
This comment and those which follow are the Comments of the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Law Institute. Uniformity throughout American jurisdic-
tions is one of the main objectives of this Code; and that objective
cannot be obtained without substantial uniformity of construction. To
aid in uniform construction these Comments set forth the purpose of
various provisions of this Act to promote uniformity, to aid in viewing
the Act as an integrated whole, and to safeguard against misconstruc-
tion.
Id. at 1. In only slightly varied form, this language appeared in comment 3 to
section 1-102 of the 1949 Draft Of course, unlike the 1962 Official Text, sec-
tion 1-102(2) of the 1949 Draft expressly authorized use of the comments "as a
guide" to "construction and application" of the Code. See 1949 DRAFT, supra
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comments continue to enjoy wide use among lawyers and judges," 3
the status of the comments remains in doubt. Unlike the statutory
text itself, the comments have not received the approval of any leg-
islature. Still, the comments are more than the idle gossip of strang-
ers who like to talk about things to which they have no connection.
Clearly, they enjoy some measure of authority beyond the commen-
tary of those who did not participate in the Code project. Absent,
however, some express authorization to use the comments, like that
found in the text of the earlier drafts, the textualist approach to
statutory interpretation cannot account for this practice.
G. The Attempt to Prohibit the Use of Legislative History in UCC
Interpretation
We have seen that in order to foster interpretation of the UCC in
the Grand Style of common law courts, Llewellyn sought to provide
judges with a clear statement of statutory purpose. Paradoxically,
Llewellyn believed that such purposive interpretation would both
promote uniform construction and avoid statutory obsolescence. We
have also seen that a primary means he employed for encouraging
this approach was the use of an official, authoritative commentary.
The historical record plainly shows that up until the time of the New
note 403, § 1-102(2). Comment 3 to this section provided:
Uniformity throughout American jurisdictions is the objective of this
Code; and that objective cannot be obtained without substantial uni-
formity of construction. To aid in uniform construction, these Com-
ments (which will have been before [the Congress] [the Legislature] at
the time of the adoption of this Act) set forth the purpose of various
provisions of this Act, thus disclosing the uniform intent of the law-
making bodies in enacting the Code. Therefore, subsection (2) of the
present section recommends these Comments to the consideration of
the courts to promote uniformity, to aid in viewing the Act as an inte-
grated whole, and to safeguard against misconstruction by mistake of
legislative intention.
Id. § 1-102 cmt. 3. The present UCC also contains an introductory General
Comment, a slightly altered version of the Comment to the 1962 Official Text.
See U.C.C. 17 (1995) (General Comment of the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute).
503. See, e.g., WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9; Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v.
Republic Nat'l Bank, 977 F.2d 122, 128 (4th Cir. 1992); Daitcom, Inc. v.
Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1578 (10th Cir. 1984); Weathersby v. Gore,
556 F.2d 1247, 1256 (5th Cir. 1977).
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York Law Revision Commission's Report, Llewellyn studiously
worked to secure some form of quasi-legislative standing for the
comments.
1. Llewellyn's skeptical view of legislative intent
Obtaining such an official endorsement for the comments was
important to Llewellyn in part because he rejected the frequent ap-
peals made to legislative intent popular in his day.50 4  Indeed,
Llewellyn shared with the legal realists of his generation the same
deep-seated skepticism concerning the existence of legislative intent
that the proponents of new textualism now assert in our own day.
To be sure, Llewellyn did not regard the idea of legislative in-
tent as wholly unintelligible. For Llewellyn "talk of 'intent' [was]
reasonably realistic" where there were "ideas consciously before the
draftsmen," such as "a known evil to be cured, a known goal to been
attained, a deliberate choice of one line of approach rather than an-
other."505 Llewellyn conceded that legislative history containing this
sort of information could "have significance" in the interpretive pro-
cess. 506 Beyond this level of generality, however, he believed that
legislative intent was "frequently non-existent., 50 7  "Few are the
legislatures," he asserted, "who, in passing any bill, pass it with any
real 'intention,' as to the question which is now before the court.
508
Legislative history that lacked this sort of particularity could not re-
alistically qualify as legislative intent nor could it function as such.
Thus, Llewellyn concluded that, in the vast majority of cases, talk of
legislative intent was illusory. It amounted to nothing more than a
"pure will-o'-the-wisp."
509
Furthermore, in those few cases in which legislative intent was
real and could be comprehended, Llewellyn feared that it would act
as "a false guide as a statute ages."5' 0 Avoiding statutory obsoles-
cence in the face of changed and changing circumstances was, of
504. See LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 83, at
528-29.
505. Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 86, at 400.
506. Id.
507. Llewellyn, Current Recapture, supra note 82, at 227.
508. Id. at228.
509. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 83, at 529.
510. Id.
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course, one of Llewellyn's primary concerns in drafting the UCC.51 '
He knew that over time a statute must "deal with circumstances ut-
terly uncontemplated at the time of its passage."5 12 An interpretive
approach that "run[s] primarily in terms of historical intent" cannot
"mak[e] sense" of the statute "in the light of the unforeseen."
513
Contrary to Llewellyn's ambition to create a "semi-permanent" piece
of legislation, 51 4 reliance on the statute's original meaning reflected
in the drafting history might hasten the process of obsolescence. Ac-
cordingly, Llewellyn believed that, as a statute ages, "the quest is not
properly for the sense originally intended by the statute, for the sense
sought originally to be put into it, but rather for the sense which can
be quarried out of it in the light of the new situation. 515
2. Legislative history and verbal formalism
This suggests that Llewellyn may also have feared that recourse
to historical sources would degenerate into a kind of rigid formalism
in which words would matter more than policy. As noted above,
Llewellyn envisioned a creative role for courts in statutory construc-
tion.516 Like the dynamic theorists of today, Llewellyn thought that
courts should further the underlying purposes of statutes rather than
mechanically apply legal formulae. Nevertheless, he recognized that
legal rules had to be expressed through the medium of language.
"The effectuation of [legal] purpose[s] .. .must be sought by
means of verbal formulation.51 7 However, focusing on the "fixed
511. See supra Part III.D.
512. Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 86, at 400.
513. Id. at 401.
514. See supra Part llI.D.
515. Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 86, at 400; see also LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADrrION, supra note 83, at 528-29 (arguing that instead of
fixating on legislative history as evidencing some compelling legislative intent,
the court should "settle down' to its "own real and responsible business of
trying to make sense out of the legislation, so far as text and context may al-
low"). Clearly, this passage demonstrates that Llewellyn believed that an un-
derstanding of context was important to statutory interpretation in the Grand
Style. For the reasons explained above, however, in preparing the UCC,
Llewellyn unfortunately chose to exclude the context of legislative history
from the interpretive process.
516. See supra Part IllI.C.3.a.
517. Llewellyn, Realistic, supra note 138, at 451; see also Llewellyn, What
Price, supra note 138, at 713 (observing in his "pseudo-history" of contract
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language" of legislative history in addition to that of the statutory
text could impair the purposive imagination of courts and lead to a
barren sort of legal calcification. 18 It was, in short, "bad engineering
to force all [interpretive] matters into the framework of a supposedly
fixed and absolute legislative intent ... .""9 Instead, courts should
look "to the essential reason of the rules laid down, as in the case of
common law principles.
' 520
3. The authority of history at common law and in the interpretation
of statutes
In preparing the UCC, Llewellyn tried to create a statute that
reconciled his high regard for statutory purpose with his dislike of
statutory history and legislative intent. History, of course, lay at the
heart of the common law method in that it required courts to look
back to past decisions as a source of law for the present day. Some
courts simply retrieved the rules of earlier cases and mechanically
applied them to the problems at hand, often "with regrettable conse-
quence.",521 At its best, however, the common law was not a prisoner
law that there is a "process of legal rigidification and divergence of legal from
non-legal" and that "[law must grow fixed, in most of its parts"). As Llewel-
lyn remarked in the comments that accompanied his 1941 Draft of the Revised
Uniform Sales Act: "The policies of our law require that official reasons be
fixed officially in fixed words ... ." 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, § 1-A cmt., at
50.
518. Cf Llewellyn, What Price, supra note 138, at 705 (referring to the "ri-
gidification of rule and of imagination-which is part of the price men com-
monly pay for a new systematization").
519. 1941 DRAFT, supra note 87, § 1-A cmt., at 47.
520. Id.; see also Llewellyn, Federal Sales Act, supra note 85, at 561-62 (de-
scribing his revision of the Uniform Sales Act at the time as "legislation which
is declaratory ofprinciple, which is in essence and intent the laying down of
rules to be developed by the courts as common law rules are themselves devel-
oped by the courts, and molded to the succession of unforeseen circum-
stances").
521. Llewellyn, Through Title, supra note 164, at 172 (discussing how under
the Uniform Sales Act the rule regarding passage of title is often "applied
blindly to situations in which a different implication is concerned, with regret-
table consequence") (footnote omitted); see also Llewellyn, Offer and Accep-
tance Part I, supra note 165, at 23 & n.50 (referring to the "wooden, persistent
grinding out of injustice" and citing to Roscoe Pound's famous law review ar-
ticle in which he coined the phrase "mechanical jurisprudence"); LLEWELLYN,
CASEBOOK, supra note 183, at x (referring to "the triumph of mechanical, de-
ductive reasoning from formulae which crush to death some needed, budding,
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to the past, nor was it a captive of verbal formalism. Instead, it both
"look[ed] back upon the heritage of doctrine and... forward into
prospective consequences and prospective further problems ....
Common law courts in the Grand Style engaged in "that on-going
process of check-up and correction, and further check-up and correc-
tion, which is the method and the very life of case-law." 523 While
they "carefully regarded" precedent,2 4 courts in the Grand Style
were engaged in a "future-directed quest," namely, "the on-going
production and improvement of rules which make sense on their face
.... ,,525 Plainly, they could not accomplish this "on-going renova-
tion of doctrine" 526 if they regarded prior decisions as "[expressions]
of single-line inevitability, 52 7 or as artifacts to be drawn from his-
tory and brought forward without change.
At common law, a prior decision was authoritative for Llewel-
lyn not because it recited a "well-settled" rule,528 but because the rea-
son behind the rule fit the case at hand. If experience showed that
the rule was no longer congruent with the facts that life presented,
then a new rule could be fashioned.5 29 Thus, to provide genuine
authority, Llewellyn believed that a prior case should "give not only
a rule but also a persuasive presentation of good life-reason in the
economic institution").
522. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 83, at 44.
523. Llewellyn, On the Good, supra note 117, at 264.
524. See Llewellyn, Current Recapture, supra note 82, at 217; Llewellyn,
Some Realism, supra note 158, at 1251 (urging courts to adopt an approach of
"conscious seeking, within the limits laid down by precedent and statute, for
the wise decision").
525. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 83, at 38; see
also Llewellyn, Current Recapture, supra note 82, at 218 (referring to courts in
the mid-19th century as being engaged in the "ongoing constant and overt re-
examination, redirection, rephrasing and general refreshment of the rules, in
the light of sense not for the case alone but for the type of situation").
526. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 83, at 36.
527. Id. at38.
528. Cf Llewellyn, Rule of Law, supra note 116, at 1249.
529. See Llewellyn, On the Good, supra note 117, at 264 (describing "the
common law at its high besf' as "[r]eason, reexamining in the light of reason-
ableness, on further experience, any and every prior ruling or prior reason
given, and then reshaping, reformulating, redirecting, each time need may ap-
pear in further reason").
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light of the type life situation. 5 30 If it failed in this regard, a prior
case could quickly cease to be authoritative.
The authority of legislation and legislative history are, by con-
trast, wholly different in nature. A statute is authoritative because it
has been duly enacted into law by the legislature. "Legal obligations
arise because we recognize law-making authority vested in certain
human beings.",531 The obligations created by a statute may not be
wise, or just, or even reasonable. The statute is nevertheless
authoritative in some sense532 because it has "gone through the con-
stitutionally specified procedures for the enactment of law. 533
Similarly, the authority of legislative history is not contingent upon
its merits in explaining the statute in question. Indeed, it may fail to
make a convincing case for the statute. The legislative history be-
hind a statute may not, in Llewellyn's words, give "a persuasive
presentation of good life-reason" with respect to the statute in ques-
tion.534 Instead, the authority of legislative history derives simply
from its historicity. 35 Unlike the statute itself, the legislative history
530. Llewellyn, Current Recapture, supra note 82, at 220 (emphasis omit-
ted). For a discussion of Llewellyn's use of the term "situation sense" see su-
pra Part III.C.2.
531. Kay, supra note 38, at 232.
532. Surely the authority of a statute would be enhanced if it imparted wis-
dom, advanced the cause of justice, or embodied the soul of reason. Still, even
in the absence of these qualities a duly enacted statute carries some authority
simply because it is the law. This authority may, however, be insufficient to
command the assent and compliance of those governed. I have in mind here
the difficult questions raised by conscientious objection and civil disobedience
in the face of unjust laws. See generally POLITICAL AND LEGAL OBLIGATION
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1970) (containing contributions
from James Luther Adams, at 293; Kent Greenawalt, at 332; and Gerald C.
MacCallum, Jr., at 370, concerning civil disobedience). This complex subject
is well beyond the scope of this article. Likewise, I also leave aside here the
authority of statutes that are unconstitutional despite having been duly enacted.
533. Sunstein, supra note 52, at 416; see also infra notes 679-683 and ac-
companying text
534. Llewellyn, Current Recapture, supra note 82, at 220.
535. Again, as in the case of the statute itself, whatever wisdom, justice or
reason is present in the legislative history is relevant to the authority that the
historical record will enjoy. For example, a committee report which makes a
compelling case for the legislation in question or which explains the objectives
sought by the statute's drafters with great clarity would surely enhance its own
authority. As I argue in detail below, however, such qualities go to the weight
to be accorded such sources in the interpretive process. They do not go to the
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behind a statute is not enacted into law.536 It is nevertheless authori-
tative in that it constitutes the historical context out of which the
statute emerges.
History, as is often said,- cannot be changed. Although it is
surely subject to reinterpretation, once history occurs it cannot be
undone. Likewise, the authority of legislative history as history can-
not be undone. Even if a statute were to be repealed, the legislative
history behind it would still be an authoritative source with respect to
the meaning of the statute.
This then was the problem that legislative history posed for
Llewellyn in drafting the UCC. Whereas common law precedent
could be revised and even abandoned where reason so indicated, the
authority of statutory history was far less mutable. Whereas experi-
ence and changed circumstances could undermine the authority of a
common law rule, legislative history retained its authority as history
even where it failed to address the sense of the situation. Llewellyn
believed that a statute "with no purpose or objective" was simply
"nonsense." 537 Although legislative history could be a useful vehicle
for communicating statutory purpose, it could also stifle a law's de-
velopment by focusing courts on a past that was no longer relevant.
Put another way, Llewellyn believed that "a realistic approach"
to any received body of law required one to examine it with a "fresh"
eye. 538 Taking a fresh look at the rules of the UCC would be all the
more difficult if courts were to dwell upon and be misled by the
drafting history behind the statute. Indeed, such a practice would se-
riously weaken Llewellyn's plan for a genuine "common law code"
that would avoid statutory obsolescence by directing judges to decide
cases in the Grand Style. Without the distractions of an equivocal
legislative history, courts could focus on the problem at hand and the
purpose behind the applicable rule while keeping an eye towards the
future.
issue of relevance, that is, authority, as an initial matter. See infra notes 672-
78 and accompanying text.
536. See infra notes 629-630, 679-683, 719-722 and accompanying text.
537. Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 86, at 400.
538. See Llewellyn, Realistic, supra note 138, at 453; see also Llewellyn,
Offer and Acceptance Part I, supra note 165, at 1 (arguing that the received
categories of offer and acceptance required a "fresh start").
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4. Restricting the use of prior code drafts
In April 1950, the sponsoring bodies published a revised text of
the Code 39 which was followed shortly in May by a complete Text
and Comments Edition.540 This was the first draft to address the is-
sue of the use of prior Code drafts in the interpretive process. Al-
though the statutory text was silent on the issue, comment 3 to sec-
tion 1-102 made the drafters' intentions clear. Like its counterpart in
the 1949 Draft discussed above, 54 1 section 1-102(2) of the May 1950
Draft recommended that courts use the official comments "as a
guide" in the construction and application of the UCC in order "to
determine [the statute's] underlying reasons, purposes and poli-
cies."5 42 Comment 3 to this section explained that this invitation to
use the comments was intended "to promote uniformity" and "to
safeguard against misconstruction by mistake of legislative inten-
tion."5 43 Although this positive rationale for the comments had been
asserted many times in the past,544 comment 3 now suggested for the
first time that reference to the comments also carried a negative im-
plication. It provided:
It is also intended by express reference to the comments to
preclude resort to prior drafts to ascertain intent. Frequently
matters have been omitted as being implicit without state-
ment and language has been changed or added solely for
clarity. The only safe guide to intent lies in the final text
and comments.
545
This brief passage represents the first attempt on the part of the draft-
ers to make the interpretive authority of the comments exclusive of
traditional appeals made to statutory history.
539. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, TEXT
EDITION (Spring 1950), reprinted in 9 U.C.C. DRAFTS, supra note 21, at 185;
Malcolm, Developments, supra note 462, at 119.
540. See MAY 1950 DRAFT, supra note 29, reprinted in 10-11 U.C.C.
DRAFTS, supra note 21.
541. See supra notes 452-461 and accompanying text.
542. MAY 1950 DRAFT, supra note 29, § 1-102(2).
543. Id. § 1-102 cmt. 3.
544. See supra notes 436-446 and accompanying text.
545. MAY 1950 DRAFT, supra note 29, § 1-102 cmt. 3.
390
LESSONS OF LLEWELL YN
The sponsoring bodies considered the May 1950 Draft at a joint
meeting held that month in Washington D.C.546 During the debate,
Llewellyn again argued that section 1-102(2) did not mandate the use
of the comments but only recommended them as "a permissive guide
to the reasons and policies of the statute."5 47 In addition to this oft-
repeated argument, however, Llewellyn informed the sponsoring
bodies that the Editorial Board wished to amend section 1-102(2) by
adding the language ".... but prior drafts may not be used to estab-
lish legislative intent. 548 He explained that he and his fellow draft-
ers had "been worried to the bottom of [their] souls by the concep-
tion of the use of the successive drafts of this Code as a guide to
legislative intent."549 He explained that the reason for this fear was
the "tremendous advantage" that wealthy litigants would have over
less-affluent parties in paying for lawyers to locate and review these
somewhat obscure materials.5 50 More importantly, Llewellyn argued
that use of the Code's drafting history would be "extremely mis-
leading" because of the wide variety of reasons employed for making
specific changes in the statutory text.55' Some changes were "made
merely for purposes of style ... though there was no change intended
at all in the meaning," while other changes were truly "a matter of
substance ...a change in policy produced . . . by votes on the
floor., 552 Still other changes were made to eliminate redundancy and
to conform different sections "in an effort to unify the entire material
of the Code., 553 Llewellyn stressed, however, that there was "no
guide anywhere" to indicate what kind of change had been effected
546. See Schnader, supra note 27, at 6.
547. 1950 Transcript, supra note 469, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.XII.l.i, at
7.
548. Id. at 8. A friendly amendment was later added which expanded the
prohibition to include prior drafts of both the statute and the comments. See id.
at 12.
549. Id. at 8.
550. See id. For a response to the argument that limited access to legislative
materials justifies prohibiting the use of such materials, see infra notes 657-
666 and accompanying text.
551. 1950 Transcript, supra note 469, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.XII.l.i, at
8.
552. Id.
553. Id.
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in each instance.554 As such, inferences concerning the purpose and
intent behind textual changes based on the drafting history would
likely be "misleading, troublesome and dangerous., 555 As an alter-
native, Llewellyn argued that lawyers and judges should rely on the
official comments in order to understand the statute.556 Although
some questioned the constitutionality of "tell[ing] the judiciary what
they may or may not consider in arriving at the interpretation of a
piece of legislation,, 557 the majority recommitted section 1-102 to
the Editorial Board for further work consistent with the proposed
amendment.-58
a. the ABA and the use ofprior drafts
As noted above, by this point in time the American Bar Asso-
ciation's Section for Corporation, Banking, and Business Law was
deeply involved in reviewing successive drafts of the proposed
UCC.559 In order to allay some of the ABA's concerns with respect
to section 1-102, the drafters circulated an amended version of this
section in late December 1950.560 Section 1-102(3)(g) of the pro-
posed amendment provided that "[i]n construing and applying [the
UCC] to effect its purposes ... [p]rior drafts of text and comments
may not be used to ascertain legislative intent."56' The Enlarged
554. Id. at 8-9.
555. Id. at 9.
556. See id. at 10.
557. Id. at 19-21 (remarks of Judge Thompson); see also id. at 12-13 (re-
marks of Mr. Hardin). For a more recent reflection on the constitutionality of
such "interpretive directives," see Alan R. Romero, Note, Interpretive Direc-
tions in Statutes, 31 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 211 (1994).
558. See 1950 Transcript, supra note 469, in KLP, supra note 29, at
J.XII.1.i, at 21-22.
559. See supra note 462 and accompanying text.
560. See Malcolm, Developments, supra note 462, at 179.
561. Id. at 179-80. In fact, the language quoted above from Walter
Malcolm's article differs from the proposed amendment circulated by the Code
drafters in two respects. First; in Malcolm's article the language above is des-
ignated section 1-102(3)(f), whereas it appears as section 1-102(3)(g) in the
proposed amendment. Second, the proposed amendment prohibited the use of
"[p]rior drafts," whereas Malcolm's version prohibited the use of "[p]rior
drafts of text and comments." Compare Malcolm, Developments, supra note
462, at 179-80, with 1951 Proceedings, supra note 468, in KLP, supra note 29,
at J.XIII.I.e, at 84-86. These discrepancies are due to Malcolm's editorial
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Editorial Board for the UCC and representatives from the ABA dis-
cussed this proposal at a meeting held in January 1951.562 During
the meeting, the ABA's Walter Malcolm reported that the governing
Council for the ABA Section reviewing the Code was "very much
pleased" with the substance of section 1-102(3)(g).163 Again, how-
ever, objection was raised as to the constitutionality of instructing a
court as to "what it may or may not do in the construction of a stat-
ute., 564 In response, Soia Mentschikoff argued that a legislature may
inform the court of its intent "and the intent [here] is that nothing that
happened in the past shall in any way reflect" how to construct the
statute.65 Quickly following up, Llewellyn noted that "parol evi-
dence is close to defined in the statute. 5 66 The purpose of this re-
mark was likely to show that legislative bodies do indeed have the
power to limit the materials courts may consider in the process of
interpretation, and that section 2-202 of the UCC was another exam-
ple of the exercise of this power. It also suggests, however, that the
connection between contract interpretation and statutory interpreta-
tion was not lost on Llewellyn.
Following the meeting, the Enlarged Editorial Board prepared
and approved an amended version of section 1-102 in March 195 1.567
This version of the statute was published as part of the Spring 1951
Draft of the Code. Section 1-102(3)(g) of this draft provided that
"[p]rior drafts of text and comments may not be used to ascertain
legislative intent. 5 68  Although this was the first Code draft to
work in preparing his article. The proposed amendment circulated in Decem-
ber 1950 contained a subsection (3)(e) that expanded the application of the
term "between merchants." This provision was subsequently deleted by the
Enlarged Editorial Board during the January 1951 meeting. Likewise, the En-
larged Editorial Board amended the language of the prohibition to include prior
drafts of the text and comments. See Malcolm, Developments, supra note 462,
at 181; 1951 Proceedings, supra note 468, in KLP, supra note 29, at J.XIlI.l.e,
at 170.
562. See 1951 Proceedings, supra note 468, in KLP, supra note 29, at
J.XIII.l.e, at 81-171.
563. Id. at 166.
564. Id. (remarks of Mr. Jenner).
565. Id.
566. Id.
567. See Section 1-102 Purposes; Rules of Construction (March 1951 Draft),
in KLP, supra note 29, at J.XIII.1.c; Schnader, supra note 27, at 6-7.
568. SPRiNG 1951 DRAFT, supra note 21, § 1-102(3)(g).
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contain such a prohibition in the statutory text, the Spring 1951 Draft
did not include explanatory comments.
The sponsoring bodies gave final approval to the text of the
UCC at meetings held in May and September 1951.569 Following
additional editorial work on the text and comments overseen by Pro-
fessor Charles Bunn of Wisconsin, a definitive Text and Comments
Edition of the UCC was published in the fall of 1952.570 In the
comment explaining section 1-102(3)(g), the drafters used precisely
the same language found in comment 3 to section 1-102 of the May
1950 Draft. That is, the comment asserts that "resort to prior drafts"
would not be a "safe guide" to legislative intent because
"[f]requently matters have been omitted as being implicit without
statement and language has been changed or added solely for clar-
ity."' 571 Instead, the comment urges those who use the Code to rely
on "the final text and comments" in interpreting the statute.572
b. the New York Law Revision Commission and section 1-102(3)(g)
In April 1953, Pennsylvania became the first state to enact the
UCC, including the prohibition contained in section 1-102(3)(g).
573
This legislative success did not, however, bring an end to the drafting
process. Instead, "various groups which had not actively studied the
Code's provisions came forward with strong recommendations for
certain changes."'"' Moreover, as noted above, at this time the New
York Law Revision Commission began an intensive study and cri-
tique of the Code.575 In response to these developments, the UCC's
Editorial Board sprang to life again. The reactivated Editorial Board
appointed nine new subcommittees to assist it, one for each of the
569. See supra note 477.
570. See 1952 OFFICIAL DRAFT, supra note 22, at v; Braucher, supra note
27, at 800.
571. 1952 OFFICIAL DRAFT, supra note 22, § 1-102 cmt. 2.
572. Id.
573. The Code did not take effect in Pennsylvania until July 1954. See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12A (1954) (amended 1959) (current version at PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13 (1984)).
574. FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ENLARGED EDITORIAL BOARD
FOR AMENDMENTS OF TEXT AND ANSWERS TO CERTAIN CRITICISMS iii (1954)
[hereinafter 1954 RECOMMENDATIONS]. Unfortunately this document is not
reprinted in U.C.C. DRAFTS, supra note 21.
575. See supra notes 482483 and accompanying text.
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Code's several articles. The subcommittee members were instructed
to review the comments and criticism then being generated and,
where appropriate, to recommend changes to the statute.576 During
the course of this renewed study, the sponsoring bodies published
Supplement No. 1 to the 1952 Official Draft. Although a number of
Code sections were amended in this draft, the language in section 1-
102(3)(g) prohibiting the use of prior drafts to ascertain legislative
intent remained exactly as it had before. The section was renum-
bered, however, as section 1-102(6).577
The analysis of this provision conducted on behalf of the New
York Law Revision Commission was not nearly as favorable as the
Editorial Board's own review. Professor Carl Fulda of Rutgers, the
special consultant to the Commission responsible for this section,578
was highly critical of the Code drafters for "attempt[ing] to establish
a proper boundary between what shall be considered as relevant
'legislative history' and what shall not be so considered. 5 79 To be-
gin with, Fulda noted that traditionally "the question of admissibility
of extrinsic aids ha[d] been a matter for the court's decision" and that
courts had "generally been liberal in examining 'the events leading
up to the introduction of the bill out of which the statute under con-
sideration developed.' 580 Consequently, the legislative command in
section 1-102(3)(g) prohibiting courts from looking at legislative
history "may possibly be held unconstitutional as an interference
with the judicial function."
581
Moreover, Fulda found that "[a]s a categorical prohibition, Sec-
tion 1-102(3)(g) 'fails to distinguish between legal admissibility and
576. See 1954 RECOMMENDATIONs, supra note 574, at v-x; Braucher, supra
note 27, at 803; Schnader, supra note 27, at 9.
577. See SUPPLEMENTNO. 1, supra note 485, § 1-102(6).
578. Although Supplement No. 1 had renumbered the section prohibiting the
use of prior drafts as section 1-102(6), because the New York Law Revision
Commission began its work on the UCC in 1953, the Commission focused on
the 1952 Official Draft which designated this same language as section 1-
102(3)(g). See 1 N.Y. REPORT 1955, supra note 24, at 129. For the language
attributing this analysis to Professor Fulda, see id. at 133.
579. 1 N.Y. REPORT 1955, supra note 24, at 164.
580. Id. (quoting 2 FRANK E. HORACK, JR., SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 5001 (3d ed. 1943)).
581. Id. at 165.
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weight.', 5 2 That is, even though a judge may wish to review the
drafting history behind a statute, she need not find that history dis-
positive. Indeed, it may prove to be decidedly unhelpful to her in the
interpretive process. The judge should, in any event, be allowed to
consider this material and assign to it the weight she deems appropri-
ate. Thus, Fulda objected to section 1-102(3)(g), because it flatly
'tells the judges not to do what they might want to do. 583
As part of its annual report to the New York legislature, the Law
Revision Commission issued an Interim Report on the Uniform
Commercial Code in February 1955.84 In commenting on sections
1-102(3)(f) and (g), the Commission noted that the legislature had
frequently considered proposed statutes in the past that were accom-
panied by explanatory notes and that it was "well established that
when a problem [arose] in interpreting a statue, such notes [could] be
consulted as an aid in determining the intent of the Legislature. 5 85 It
further noted that the comments explaining a statute "prepared by its
draftsman" had been consulted even where "they were not before the
legislature when it acted. 586 Although the reliance to be accorded
such materials was "a matter of degree," the Commission clearly fa-
vored giving courts access to this sort of contextual evidence.
587
A year later the Commission issued its final report on the Uni-
form Commercial Code to the New York legislature. Although the
language of the provision prohibiting the use of prior drafts remained
exactly as before, what had been section 1-102(3)(g) of the 1952
Official Draft was now designated section 1-102(6) of Supplement
No. 1. In its final report the Commission recommended that sec-
tion 1-102(6) be eliminated. In a passage strongly reminiscent of
582. Id. (quoting Board of Nat Missions v. Neeld, 9 N.J. 349, 361 (1952))
(Jacobs, J., concurring).
583. Id. Fulda also noted that this prohibition was in stark contrast to the
permissive language contained in section 1-102(3)(f) concerning the use of the
comments. The operative language in section 1-102(3)(f) stated that the com-
ments "may be consulted" in the process of interpreting the Code. Id. In his
analysis, Fulda quoted Llewellyn quoting Learned Hand as saying: "Well,
what this comes to is to say that we may do what we shall do anyway." Id.
584. See id. at 3-30.
585. Id. at 21-22.
586. Id.
587. Id. For a further discussion of the Commission's Interim Report with
respect to the UCC's comments, see supra note 493.
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Llewellyn's purposive approach to statutes and his otherwise deep
appreciation for context, the Commission concluded: "Underlying
policies should of course be considered in construing a commercial
code. It is inadvisable to limit by statute the sources from which the
reason for the text-and in this way the meaning of the text--may be
found., 588 The Commission made plain that it did "not object" to the
other interpretive rules contained in section 1-102 that were "sup-
plementary to the rules ordinarily applied to all statutes."589 Never-
theless, it rejected the notion "that courts and lawyers should be pre-
vented or discouraged from using the many rules of interpretation
ordinarily employed to determine [the] meaning of [a] text."'5 90 With
respect to the UCC, the traditional "extrinsic aids to interpretation of
a statute" would "go far beyond" the official comments offered by
the Code sponsors.591 These would include "[t]he more immediate
background and legislative history" generated by the several states in
the course of enactment.592 Because of their potential to explain the
statute in question, the Commission concluded that the use of these
materials should not be curtailed.593
5. Removing the restriction on the use of prior drafts
The Code drafters took these criticisms to heart in preparing the
1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code. As noted above, the statutory text for this draft
was based on the 1952 Official Draft as well as the changes adopted
588. N.Y. REPORT 1956, supra note 24, at26.
589. Id. By this the Commission was presumably referring to the language
in section 1-102 providing that the UCC was to be "liberally construed and ap-
plied to promote its underlying purposes and policies" and identifying those
purposes and policies to include simplification and modernization of commer-
cial law and uniformity "among the various jurisdictions." 1952 OFFICIAL
DRAFT, supra note 22, § 1-102(1) and (2).
590. N.Y. REPORT 1956, supra note 24, at 26.
591. Id.
592. Id.
593. See id. The Commission also summarized its work on Supplement No.
1 in its Excerpts from the Proceedings of the Commission, a work published in
the same volume as the Commission's final report. See id. at 355-485. In
these excerpts the Commission noted that section 1-102(6) had been "disap-
proved, as attempting to limit the judicial doctrine of resort to extrinsic aids in
determining legislative intent and as inappropriate in view of revisions of the
Code subsequent to the 1952 Official Text and Comments edition." Id. at 358.
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in Supplement No. 1. Because the Code section numbers were based
on the 1952 Official Draft, however, what had been section 1-102(6)
in Supplement No. 1 appeared once again as section 1-102(3)(g) in
the 1956 Recommendations.
In this important revision, the Editorial Board recommended that
section 1-102(3)(g) be deleted from the Code. This was clearly done
in order to appease the concerns of New York lawmakers. In the ex-
planatory Reason for Recommendation that followed section 1-102,
the drafters acknowledged that "[t]he New York Commission rec-
ommended that paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (g) of subsection (3) be
deleted. ' 5 94 In what must be regarded as a plainly specious attempt
to gloss over their clear capitulation, however, the drafters stated that
section 1-102(3)(g) "was deleted because the changes from the text
enacted in Pennsylvania in 1953 are clearly legitimate legislative
history.5
595
To be sure, this capitulation was for the better in that it permit-
ted lawyers and judges to examine the thought and purpose behind
the various Code provisions and the articulation of that purpose as it
developed over the years. The reason for the change in section 1-102
was not, however, the sudden realization that legislative history was
indeed relevant to the interpretive process. The drafters believed that
recourse to the drafting history, wherein "matters ha[d] been omitted
as being implicit without statement and language ha[d] been changed
or added solely for clarity," would lead to "misconstruction by mis-
take of legislative intention. 5 96 Moreover, although they ostensibly
recognized the changes enacted by Pennsylvania as "legitimate leg-
islative history," the Code drafters did not suggest that the danger of
misconstruing legislative intent was no longer present. Instead, the
drafters' reversal on this issue should be attributed both to the im-
portance of New York as a commercial law state 597 and to the im-
portance that the New York Law Revision Commission attached to
context in statutory construction.
594. 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, § 1-102, Reason for Recom-
mendation.
595. Id.
596. 1952 OFFIcIAL DRAFT, supra note 22, § 1-102 cmt. 2.
597. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
LESSONS OF LLEWELLYN
The sponsoring bodies approved the revised statutory text which
appeared in the 1956 Recommendations 598 and published it in 1957
as the Uniform Commercial Code: 1957 Official Edition.5 99 A set of
revised comments was added to the statutory text which the spon-
soring bodies published in 1958 as the Uniform Commercial Code:
1957 Official Text with Comments.60 0 Neither version contained any
trace of what had been section 1-102(3)(g). Indeed, since the dele-
tion of this provision in the 1956 Recommendations, nothing in ei-
ther the text or the comments of any subsequent version of the UCC
has prohibited or in any way restricted the use of prior Code drafts in
the interpretive process. Today, it is common-place for judges and
advocates to refer to Code drafting history as they attempt to discern
the meaning of the statutory text.60 1 Thus, although many courts and
commentators have warmly embraced Llewellyn's purposive ap-
proach to Code interpretation,602 at the same time, most have been
unwilling to forsake the historical sources available to help them in
this endeavor.0 3
598. See 1957 HANDBOOK, supra note 497, at 101; 34th Annual Meeting,
A.L.I. PRoc. 53-54 (1957).
599. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1957 OFFICIAL EDITION (1957), re-
printed in 18 U.C.C. DRAFTS, supra note 21, at 341.
600. See 1957 OFFIcIAL TEXT, supra note 501.
601. See supra note 28 (citing relevant case law).
602. See, e.g., Julian B. McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform
Commercial Code: Some Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REv.
795 (1978) (setting forth a theory of "purposive construction" and relating it to
Llewellyn's theory of "patent reason'); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 4,
at 18 (citing McDonnell); InRe Copeland, 391 F. Supp. 134 (D. Del. 1975),
affd in part and vacated in part, 531 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1976); Barclays Bank
D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1973); Columbian
Rope Co. v. Rinek Cordage Co., 461 A.2d 312 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
603. For example, although Professors White and Summers urge that "judges
and lawyers should interpret and construe Code words, phrases, and sections in
light of their rationales," WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 4, at 18, they
also gladly avail themselves of prior Code drafts and other legislative and his-
torical sources. See, e.g., id., § 4, at 9-14 (in general) and §§ 7-10 to 7-13, at
316-329 (citing prior Code drafts and the New York Law Revision Commis-
sion reports with respect to UCC § 2-708(2)). These two approaches are not
inconsistent Indeed, recourse to the drafting history may be the surest way of
learning the rationale behind the Code section in question.
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IV. THE RELEVANCE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The removal of section 1-102(3)(g), first chamnpioned by the
New York Law Revision Commission and ultimately accepted by the
sponsoring bodies, marks the end of restrictions on the use of prior
Code drafts. Although Llewellyn wanted courts to construe the rules
contained in the UCC as if they were common law rules, in many re-
spects, interpretation of the Code itself now more closely resembles
the interpretation of sales contracts under the Code. In each case the
nature of language itself informs the interpretive approach taken. In
each case the purpose behind the text in question can best be under-
stood if it is situated within the social and historical context out of
which it emerged. With respect to sales agreements under the Code,
this context includes whatever evidence can "explain or supplement"
the meaning of the contract terms without contradicting them.604 In-
deed, the Code expressly provides that such evidence includes proof
of "consistent additional terms" as well as proof of trade usage,
course of dealing, and course of performance. 0 5 With respect to the
Code itself, this context includes the history of the statute's prepara-
tion and enactment.
This then is the lesson to be learned from Llewellyn's successful
attempt to integrate context into contract interpretation, and his failed
attempt to exclude legislative history from statutory construction.
Legislative history is always relevant because language is always
language, even when it is used in a statutory text. The nature of lan-
guage itself is not altered by the use of language in different genres
or for different purposes. Whether it appears in a business contract, a
statute, a novel, a poem, or a post-card, language is always used by
someone with a purpose in mind. "Words are only meaningless
marks on paper or random sounds in the air until we posit an intelli-
gence which selected and arranged them. 606 Language is not a natu-
rally occurring phenomenon like the weather, but is instead the most
basic of human artifacts, a product of human thought. Furthermore,
the use of language always occurs within a particular historical and
604. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (1995).
605. Id.
606. Kay, supra note 38, at230 (footnote omitted).
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social context. Legislative history is relevant because the meaning of
words is in part a function of the context in which they are used and
the purposes for which they are employed. Because language is al-
ways the product of consciousness, "meaning is an affair of con-
sciousness not of words. 60 7 Because one always uses language with
a purpose in mind, the thinking behind the use of language is always
relevant to the question of meaning.
A. Meaning and the Purposeful Use of Language
The use of language, however, is not simply a function of the
particular words chosen and the order in which they appear.60 8 The
use of language always occurs within some set of social and histori-
cal circumstances, that is, within a given context. This context may
be quite ordinary in nature and may even go unnoticed, but it is al-
ways present.60 9 Accordingly, to understand any particular use of
607. HIRScH, supra note 297, at 4.
608. The study of language by linguists is typically divided into two catego-
ries, semantics and pragmatics. Semantics is the study of language in terms of
the rules of grammar, word order (or syntax) and word choice (or diction).
Pragmatics, by contrast, is the study of language in terms of its usage in a par-
ticular context. While the former is concerned with "sentence meaning," that
is, the meaning of words and phrases "abstracted from any particular occasion
of utterance," the latter deals with "utterance meaning," that is, the meaning
that a sentence has "when uttered by someone in some particular situation."
Moore, NaturalLaw, supra note 342, at 289-90; see also FISH, supra note 271,
at 284-91; Graff, supra note 309, at 407. Both Graff and Fish acknowledge
that philosopher John Searle is one author responsible for this distinction. See
JOHN R. SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING: STUDIS IN THE THEORY OF
SPEECH ACTS 117-36 (1979); John R. Searle, Indirect Speech Acts, in SYNTAX
AND SEMANTIcs 3: SPEECH ACTS 60 (Peter Cole & Jerry Morgan eds., 1975);
see also Paul Grice, Logic and Conversation, in SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS 3:
SPEECH ACTS 41 (Peter Cole & Jerry Morgan eds., 1975); Paul Grice, Ut-
terer's Meaning and Intentions, 78 PHIL. REv. 147 (1969); Paul Grice, Mean-
ing, 66 PHIL. REv. 377 (1957).
609. In contrast to this contextual view of language, the redoubtable Profes-
sor Michael Moore argues that words possess "ordinary meanings" which
"exist antecedently of any interpretive enterprise in law [such that] a theory of
interpretation in law is free to incorporate such ordinary meanings or not."
Moore, Natural Law, supra note 342, at 288; see also supra note 608 (dis-
cussing the related concept of "sentence meaning"). Moore claims "that in le-
gal interpretation there must be a place for ordinary meaning, no matter what
one's theory might be as to what such meanings are." Moore, Natural Law,
supra note 342, at 313. This claim is in turn based on a normative argument
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language, one must understand the context in which that use oc-
curs.
6 10
Again, the use of language is not accidental. It is not a naturally
occurring phenomenon or a random event, but a personal and inten-
tional act designed to impart some meaning to an audience whose
that ordinary meanings support the rule of law better than do competing theo-
ries of meaning such as functionalism and contextualism. See id. at 313-21.
Hedging his bets a bit, Moore asserts that ordinary meanings are only a starting
place which can be "modified or supplanted entirely by the technical meanings
given the words by prior case law, by the purpose a statute serves, or by an all-
things-considered moral judgment about the injustice of the rule under an ordi-
nary language interpretation." Id. at 320.
Moore's theory has much to recommend it, but Moore is mistaken in at
least one important respect He argues that if the meaning of language was
simply a matter of contextual use then "we would not know how to put sen-
tences together to express our thoughts on particular occasions." Id. at 304.
Indeed, "[i]f words were such chameleons," radically changing their meaning
with each change in context, "we would not be able to use them to communi-
cate." Id. But communication does take place because the users of language
employ the "ordinary meanings" of words, the meanings they possess in "the
null context" or in a "contextless situation." Id. at 304, 290.
Although words can communicate ordinary meanings and sentence types
can express sentence meaning, these meanings are not divorced from any con-
text They are instead dependent upon some context which is assumed because
it is the most common or frequently used within a given social group. Indeed,
as Professor Fish has stated, words and sentences can have a normal context
and, hence, a normal meaning, "[b]ut what is normal (like what is ordinary, lit-
eral, everyday) is a function of circumstances in that it depends on the expec-
tations and assumptions that happen to be in force." FISH, supra note 271, at
287. Put another way, words and sentences may possess ordinary meanings,
but "that meaning doesn't reside in the expression," rather the expression "has
acquired certain standard meanings only because of a history of use that has
established those meanings as normal and conventional." Graff, supra note
309, at 408. Thus, even though words may possess "ordinary" meanings, these
meanings are not wholly divorced from context Rather, the context which
brings these meanings to mind are assumed.
610. Since Wittgenstein, modem language theory has tended to view the
meaning of words primarily as a function of their use. See LUDWIG
WITrTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 43 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 3d ed. 1958) ("For a large class of cases-though not for all-in which
we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined as thus: the meaning of a
word is its use in the language."); see also Christian Zapf & Eben Moglen,
Linguistic Indeterminacy and the Rule of Law: On the Perils of Misunder-
standing Wittgenstein, 84 GEo. L.J. 485 (1996) (arguing that Wittgenstein's
theory does not support the radical theory of linguistic indeterminacy champi-
oned by some critical scholars).
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identity may or may not be known. If the speaker in a conversation
or the author of a text wishes to be understood 6 1' he will utilize
those background assumptions and beliefs which he believes the
audience will bring to the interpretive process. Indeed, "[t]he words
would be useless to him if he could not anticipate how they would be
understood by these other persons. ' 612 Accordingly, "[t]he legislator
will be interested primarily in the conventions of statutory interpre-
tation-that is, in the current conventional approaches by judges,
administrators, lawyers and citizens to the understanding of stat-
utes.'613 Put another way, the legislator has "the intention to say
what one would be normally understood as saying, given the circum-
stances in which one said it."'614 But the circumstances surrounding
611. The assumption that the author or speaker wishes to be understood may
appear uncontroversial, but it is in fact a conclusion drawn by the reader or
listener that may be mistaken. Every expression need not be communicative.
Because law is an inherently social endeavor and because democratic govern-
ment is at least presumably rational if not always deliberative, we "should as-
sume, unless the contrary unmistakably appears, that the legislature was made
up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably." HART &
SACKS, supra note 322, at 1415. Thus, more often than not the debate is not
over whether the legislature wanted to be understood, but how it wanted to be
understood. The same cannot be said for all other kinds of authors and speak-
ers.
612. GERALD C. MACCALLUM, JR., Legislative Intent, in LEGISLATIVE
INTENT AND OTHER ESSAYS ON LAW, POLITICS, AND MORALITY 3, 8 (Marcus
G. Singer & Rex Martin, eds., 1993). This essay was originally published as
Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L. J. 754 (1966).
613. See MACCALLUM, supra note 612, at 8.
614. Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW:
ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 249, 268 (Robert P. George ed., 1996). Al-
though both MaeCallum and Raz contend that the legislature intends to be un-
derstood "given the circumstances of the promulgation of the legislation, and
the conventions of interpretation prevailing at the time," id. at 271, Raz only
briefly considers the use of legislative history as an important convention of
interpretation that the legislature bears in mind in the process of generating
statutes. This point is instead more prominent in MacCallum's work. See
MACCALLUM, supra note 612, at 33 (noting that "one should consider whether
the established use of references to legislative intent does not itself produce
conditions under which the references become more reasonable as the practice
of making them becomes entrenched," indeed even forming "part of the insti-
tutional background against which legislators recognize themselves to be act-
ing when proposing, investigating, discussing, and voting for bills"); cf An-
thony D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of
Statutes?, 75 VA. L. REv. 561, 592-93 (1989) (arguing that although radical
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the creation of a statutory text are reflected in its legislative history.
Indeed, this history of drafting, deliberation, and negotiation is rele-
vant to statutory interpretation because it provides, at least in part,
the context out of which the law emerged. 15
Although Llewellyn was an acknowledged leader among the le-
gal realists of his generation, in urging courts to ignore legislative
history, he engaged in the most unrealistic conceit of all. To ignore
the context in which a statute is generated and out of which it
emerges is to pretend that language is not the product of human con-
sciousness. To ignore the drafting history of a particular text is to
pretend that the language used is not used by someone situated in
history and with a purpose in mind. Under this conceit, the work of
legislators has no meaningful relationship to the statute that is even-
tually enacted. For example, by prohibiting the use of prior Code
drafts, section 1-102(3)(g) would have required courts to construe the
statute independent of the thoughtful work that created it.
1. The minimalist view of legislative intent
Without specifically relying on Llewellyn, some commentators
today have repeated this same conceit. They contend that in the case
of statutes, the legislature's only purpose or intent is to enact into law
the specific language that is now at issue. The legislature has no
further intentions with respect to the content of what it enacted.
616
reinterpretation of a text is always possible "if the audience already has a cer-
tain mind-set, the meaning of the message is less susceptible to radical reinter-
pretation" and that the legislature may "precondition the audience so that stat-
utes will fall on friendly ears"); Richard H. Weisberg, Text into Theory: A
Literary Approach to the Constitution, 20 GA. L. REV. 939, 979-80 (1986) (ar-
guing that although the author's pure meaning, unaffected by the reader's own
background and beliefs is unattainable, there may be "clues" that may "lead to
an ideal manner of interpretation" because "many texts display a discernable
desire to be understood a certain way").
615. But see REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
STATUTES 137-97 (1975) (arguing that legislative history is not part of a stat-
ute's context and should not be considered in the interpretive process). For
other arguments that the context provided by legislative history is irrelevant
because statutory language is not a "communicative act," that is, the use of
language between a speaker or author and her audience within a specific con-
text, see Heidi Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99 YALE L. J. 945 (1990); Moore,
NaturalLaw, supra note 342, at 288-91, 304-07.
616. See Raz, supra note 614, at 266-67 (arguing that "it must be the case
404
LESSONS OF LLEWELLYN
Its only purpose is to execute the formal procedures of law-making
with respect to the text before it.
Such a minimalist view of legislative intent, while "intelligible,"
is hardly satisfying.617 It appears to render the bulk of legislative ac-
tivity a meaningless side-show. Under this view, the work of legis-
lators in proposing legislation, holding investigative hearings, and
discussing and debating matters is without any meaning or signifi-
cance. The statute might just as well have emerged as the result of
some random act of nature or as the product of a mechanical device
that produces statutes instead of widgets.618 Indeed, if the process
whereby language becomes law is irrelevant to its meaning, then the
that whenever one legislates one intends, under some description to make the
law one is enacting"). Raz says that this fundamental law-making intention
need not be accompanied by some "comprehensive statement of [the law's]
content," id. at 266, only by an intention that it will be construed according to
"the conventions of interpretation prevailing at the time." Id. at 271; see also
Moore, Natural Law, supra note 342, at 339 (noting that the passage and
wording of a law are intentional acts, and "no accident").
617. See Raz, supra note 614, at 266-67 (demonstrating the "intelligibility"
of the view that "legislators make the law that they intend to make, and that
they make that law by expressing the intention to do so" and that this intention
need "not include any understanding of the content of the legislation").
618. Cf Raz, supra note 614, at 258-59 (discussing an "invisible hand
mechanism!' that produces laws). While Raz's thesis, that a legislature need
have no intention as to the content of the law it enacts, may be intelligible in
certain respects, in other respects it "makes no sense." As Raz himself says,
"[i]t makes no sense to give the lawmaking power to any person or body unless
it is assumed that the law they make is the law they intended to make." Id. at
258. He assures us that
the notion of legislation imports the idea of entrusting power over the
law into the hands of a person or an institution, and this imports en-
trusting voluntary control over the development of the law, or an as-
pect of it, into the hands of the legislator. This is inconsistent with the
idea of unintentional legislation.
Id. at 265-66 (footnote omitted). The minimalist intention to make a law
which this argument establishes is, however, inadequate even on its own
terms if the reason for giving the law-making function to a body of indi-
viduals is so that they may exercise their thought and deliberation, that
they will exercise their judgment in deciding what the law ought to be.
Perhaps Raz has in mind a legislature that does not itself make the law but
only appoints those who do. If this is not the case, however, then some
understanding of the content of the substantive law under consideration
must be part of the legislative process. In sum, one cannot exercise delib-
eration and judgment in the absence of such an understanding of content
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identity of legislators and the judgment they exercise is wholly in-
consequential. Instead of elected representatives who deliberate pro-
posals, under this view "legislators are similar to the typing mon-
keys, who, if given enough time, will eventually type every word of
Hamlet.' ,619 The idea, however, "that a legislative body aimlessly
chooses words for a statute by a mental process equivalent to ran-
domly selecting words from a hat is simply preposterous.,
620
Further, the minimalist account of intention cannot explain the
role that intention is widely thought to play with respect to other
texts. The author of a letter, for example, 621 does not intend simply
to generate a document which he then wishes to be construed as
a "letter" under the conventions of the day. Instead, by writing
the letter and sharing it with the recipient, the author hopes to com-
municate some meaning. Surely the conventions prevalent in the
culture that pertain to the interpretation of letters aids the reader in
619. Redish & Chung, supra note 38, at 826; see also DICKERSON, supra
note 615, at 75 (comparing the finger paintings of the chimpanzee at the Bal-
timore Zoo in the 1950s to statutes so conceived and concluding: "What dev-
astating discouragement it would heap on the legislative draftsman, who works
under the illusion that he is somehow helping the legislature to communicate to
the public!").
620. Redish & Chung, supra note 38, at 819; see also id. at 875 (remarking
that "[t]he crudity of the new textualist perspective is even more apparent
when one considers the logical implications of its assumption that a legislative
body exhausting enormous resources would exist merely to pass purposeless
statutes. If this were true, statutory language could be deemed a function of
some random process, as if the words had been simply drawn from a hat.")
(footnotes omitted).
621. For other works comparing the interpretation of statutes to that of per-
sonal correspondence, see, for example, DICKERSON, supra note 615, at 112-
13; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Fetch Some Soupmeat, 16 CARDOZO L. REV.
2209 (1995) (discussing a famous example provided by 19th century legal
scholar Francis Lieber); Graff, supra note 309, at 409 (discussing the receipt of
an unsigned note). Closely related to this comparison is the analogy between
legislative commands and the garbled or incomplete commands of a military
officer to his men in battle. First articulated by Judge Posner, this analogy has
gained the attention of many commentators. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 32, at
285-92; Farber & Frickey, supra note 57, at 461-65; Maltz, supra note 52, at
20-22; Posner, supra note 61, at 189-90, 199-201; see also D'Amato, supra
note 614, at 565-70 (discussing communications with military personnel, extra-
terrestrials, and domestic servants); Sunstein, supra note 52, at 424 (arguing
that "legislative instructions are often unclear and the claim of a command is a
myth").
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ascertaining this meaning. The goal, however, of this interaction is
communication. Thus, as a fundamental matter, the letter-writer
wants to be understood, not to have the standard conventions of let-
ter-interpretation followed. The latter are only a means of attaining
the former. If the standard conventions fail to accomplish this goal,
other means may be employed.622 An approach to interpretation that
"requires that we intentionally ignore exactly the kind of additional
contextual information that we use routinely and unselfconsciously
in everyday life to understand communications" is mistaken and
should not be followed.623
2. Legislative intent and legitimacy-political and linguistic
The claim that the a-historical, a-contextual approach to statu-
tory interpretation reflected in section 1-102(3)(g) is unrealistic does
not mean that such an approach is unworkable. Clearly the practice
622. There are, of course, means of clarifying the meaning of a letter which
are not available to the judge or lawyer struggling with the meaning of a stat-
ute. A letter recipient who is puzzled by a particular passage in a letter can
normally speak with the author to ask for an explanation. A judge, on the other
hand, cannot telephone Congress to inquire into the meaning of a particular
statute. Legislatures, unlike juries, cannot be polled after they render a deci-
sion. It is significant to note in this regard that recourse to the intentions of
legislators has been and continues to be a widely accepted convention for the
interpretation of statutes. See supra notes 28 & 614 and accompanying text.
623. Solan, supra note 37, at 252. There are of course many differences
between statutes and personal correspondence. Nevertheless, because the way
in which the language operates remains relatively constant, the similarities
between letters and statutes are profound. For example, the background of
prior correspondence and conversations between friends might provide the
context necessary to understand their idiosyncratic use of language in a letter
(e.g., a woman referring to her boyfriend as "the Big Creep"). Likewise, this
same background might help explain why a particular letter was sent and what
the writer hoped to accomplish in sending it. Although Judge Easterbrook is
certainly correct in maintaining that "[s]tatutes are not exercises in private lan-
guage," Easterbrook, Role, supra note 34, at 60, the use of a particular word or
phrase may be peculiar to the field of regulation. The words used are not a
private code between friends. They have a public meaning but one which is
specialized, perhaps even unique to the area. Legislative history may help re-
mind the reader of this specialized usage even where the statutory text fails to
do so. In the same way, legislative history may set forth a common basis for
understanding the purpose behind legislation. Cf. DICKERSON, supra note 615,
at 142-47 (distinguishing between "expounding texts," which explain specific
meanings, and "motivating texts," which set forth purpose).
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of ignoring legislative history does not render statutes meaningless.
The practice has long been a part of English jurisprudence. 62 4 Like-
wise, neither Justice Scalia nor Judge Easterbrook has been rendered
mute by the explicit disavowal of legislative history. They are still
quite able to attribute some purpose to the statutes that come before
them.
The issue, however, is not whether one can read a text so as to
reflect some purpose. All interpretation is intentional and purposive
because all language must possess a purpose, must reflect an inten-
tion, in order to be language, and in order to be meaningful. 625 Be-
cause the meaning of language is always a matter of consciousness,
the issue is not whether a given statute must be purposive in order to
be meaningful. Instead, the issue is whose purpose should control.
626
One may, of course, "assign a meaning different from the one in-
tended by the original authors, but this merely substitutes some other
hypothetical author for the historical ones., 627 If, however, the goal
of statutory interpretation is to understand what the legislature under-
stood and intended by its words, then one ought to regard the stat-
ute's legislative history as at least relevant to the interpretive process.
Indeed, the legitimacy of the interpretive process is in some way
tied to the relevance of the intentions of the lawmakers. Although
624. See, e.g., Beswick v. Beswick, 2 All E.R. 1197, 1202 (H.L. 1967);
Davis v. Johnson, 1 All E.R. 1132 (H.L. 1978); Hadmor Prods. v. Hamilton, 1
All E.R. 1042 (ILL. 1982); The Queen v. Hertford College, 3 Q.B.D. 693, 707
(C.A. 1878); Totherglee v. Monorch Aulinis, Ltd., 1981 App. Cas. 251, 279-
80; DICKERSON, supra note 615, at 170-74 (commenting on the absence of
legislative history in English statutory interpretation); TERENCE INGMAN, THE
ENGLISH LEGAL PROCEss 255-62 (6th ed. 1996); William S. Jordan, Legisla-
tive History and Statutory Interpretation: Relevance of English Practice, 29 U.
FLA. L. REv. 1 (1994).
625. See RONALD DwoRKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 50-51 (1986) [hereinafter
DwoRKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE] (arguing that all interpretation of language is pur-
posive in nature).
626. See HIRSCH, supra note 297, at 3 ("What had not been noticed in the
earliest enthusiasm for going back to 'what the text says' was that the text had
to represent somebody's meaning - if not the author's then the critic's."); see
also Paul Campos, Three Mistakes About Interpretation, 92 MICH. L. REv.
388, 389 n.3 (1993) ("Supplying old texts with new authors is becoming a
common methodological recommendation in contemporary legal theory.")
(citing Aleinikoff, supra note 37).
627. Kay, supra note 38, at 231.
408
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this legitimacy is political in nature, it is not political in the sense that
is frequently asserted. Many contend that recourse to legislative
history helps to ensure the exercise of popular sovereignty by demo-
cratically elected legislatures. This, so the argument goes, helps to
hold the policy-making power of courts in check thereby fostering
the principle of separation of powers.628
Clearly the status of a text as law depends upon the intent of
those who enacted it. The language of a statute is not "the law" be-
cause of some innate quality it possesses. Instead, the legitimacy of
the text as law is derived from the authority of the lawmaking
body.629 It is the will of that body formally expressed through the
628. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 47, at 356 ("To the extent that the
Court can recover [the] original meaning [of the statute] it subserves demo-
cratic values by enforcing the law as the legislature understood it, thus limiting
judicial discretion and power."); see id. at 326 ("If the legislature is the pri-
mary lawmaker and the courts are its agents, then requiring the courts to follow
the legislature's intentions disciplines judges by inhibiting judicial lawmaking,
and in so doing seems to further democracy by affirming the will of elected
representatives."); Farber, supra note 32, at 288 (arguing that "a statute's lan-
guage and legislative history together preclude at least some interpretations");
see id. at 293 (arguing that by failing to implement the clear statutory language
and intent courts "impair the basic social norm of democratic self-government"
by arrogating to themselves "the ultimate power to make public policy");
Merrill, supra note 38, at 24 (concluding that "the separation of powers princi-
ple ... supports an 'originalist' mode of textual interpretation, but not neces-
sarily a 'nonoriginalist' mode"); Redish & Chung, supra note 38, at 871 (ar-
guing that their theory of "textual originalism," which includes the use of
historical materials, "would lead to a better-functioning, more responsive
democratic government"); see id. at 861 (arguing that "absent a finding of un-
constitutionality, it is an illegitimate usurpation of legislative authority for an
unrepresentative judiciary to circumvent policy choices made by democrati-
cally elected branches of government"); Sunstein, supra note 52, at 430 (ob-
serving that "[w]ithout reference to the history, interpretation sometimes be-
comes far less bounded"); see id. at 437 (agreeing with the view that "it would
be improper for judges to construe statutes to mean whatever the judges think
best" because of "the lawmaking primacy of the legislature, with its superior
democratic pedigree"). But see Eskridge, Dynamic, supra note 42, at 1498-
1503 (arguing for a lawmaking role for courts and against Merrill's view of
separation of powers which he describes as "formalist"); Eskridge, New Textu-
alism, supra note 37, at 667-68 ("Once the statutory text is unencumbered by
evidence of original legislative expectations, it is free to evolve dynamically,
especially where the statute is open-textured.").
629. See Kay, supra note 38, at 232 ("Legal obligations arise because we
recognize law-making authority vested in certain human beings.") (footnote
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process of enactment which tells us "which statements, of all the
statements there are in any natural language such as English, are
authoritative and should be taken as part of the law."6 30  Accord-
ingly, "to construe the text squarely contrary to the collective under-
standing of the legislature weakens its claim to legitimacy. ' ' 631 Al-
though recourse to legislative history may further the democratic
values of popular sovereignty and separation of powers, the principal
reason for consulting the context out of which a statute emerges is
linguistic not political.
First, consulting the drafting history of a statute would not serve
democratic values if the process whereby the statute became law was
not itself democratic. Suppose for example, that the nation was gov-
erned by an unelected monarch who alone possessed the power to
make, enforce, and adjudicate the law. Under such a regime, no
amount of research into the monarch's thinking as reflected in prior
drafts of royal edicts, conversations, and correspondence with palace
advisors would advance the causes of popular sovereignty or separa-
tion of powers. It is, however, entirely possible--even likely-that
the citizens of such a country would want to have access to this sort
of contextual evidence in order to discern the monarch's meaning.
632
Second, the political rationale for the use of legislative history
may be overstated. In many ways, the view that supports the use of
legislative history in statutory interpretation contemplates a firm
separation of powers among the three branches of government.
Many believe that, as a constitutional matter, the lines that demarcate
the authority of the distinct branches of government are largely
blurred or porous. As such, they contend that courts may legiti-
mately assume a generous policy-making role in the course of adju-
dication.633 Even if this is correct, however, a court may still want to
omitted).
630. Moore, NaturalLaw, supra note 342, at 282.
631. Farber, supra note 32, at 291; see also Farber & Frickey, supra note 57,
at 460 (arguing that "when a court ignores congressional intent in implement-
ing a statute, it weakens the legitimacy of the statute by detaching the imple-
mentation from the actual purposes of the electorate's representatives").
632. Cf Raz, supra note 614, at 257-58 (noting that the "law exists in many
non-democratic countries" such that any theory which justifies reference to the
intentions of lawmakers must apply to these regimes as well).
633. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW
§ 2-2, at 18-19 (2d ed.1988) (disagreeing with the notion that each branch of
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know the legislature's view of a statute's meaning if only as a coun-
terpoint to its own. Even a court operating under such a lax under-
standing of separation of powers would recognize the statutory text
as something not of its own making.
Third, and most importantly, the vast majority of drafting his-
tory behind any statute is not generated by those who possess the
law-making faculty.634 Indeed, "much legislation is [itself] actually
drafted by people outside the [legislature] which is then persuaded to
enact it, often without much discussion or alteration., 635 The mean-
ing attributed to these statutes by such non-legislative drafters "is
often of interest" to interpreters and is usually "preserved in hearings
and letters where the drafters explain the statute to the legislators. 636
The opinions of non-legislative drafters and sponsors may coincide
with popular views regarding the meaning of legislation. Likewise,
the lawmakers who actually vote may agree with the interpretations
of proposed legislation proffered by such drafters and sponsors.
the government legitimately should exercise only the powers appropriate to its
function and endorsing the notion that the Supreme Court makes law under its
Article III judicial power).
634. See Redish & Chung, supra note 38, at 823 (noting that "the creation of
legislative history is often left to unelected committee staff members"); Zep-
pos, Fact-Finding, supra note 37, at 1303 ("The image of the unelected, unsu-
pervised staff person making law in a committee report is obviously at odds
with the textualist's vision of representative democracy. Legislative history
not only bypasses article I procedures, it is not even produced by the elected
members of the legislature.") (footnote omitted).
635. Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 37, at 632. Many important acts
of legislation fit this description, including the Uniform Commercial Code. As
discussed at length above, the UCC was drafted by Karl Llewellyn, Soia
Mentschikoff, and their colleagues under the auspices of the American Law
Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. See supra notes 5-10, 66 and accompanying text. Although each is a
prominent legal organization, neither the Institute nor the National Conference
is an authoritative legislative body. Each may function like a law-making body
and may even be subject to political influence like a legislature. See Alces &
Frisch, supra note 459, at 441-58; A. Brooke Overby, Modeling U.C.C.
Drafting, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 645 (1996) (citing authorities); Alan Schwartz
& Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA.
L. REv. 595 (1995). Despite these apparent similarities, however, the Institute
and the National Conference are merely private organizations. They do not
make laws, they only make proposals which they hope will become law.
636. Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 37, at 632.
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This may make the use of the statutory history generated by
non-legislators appear to support democratic values. If this is true,
however, it is true only by accident. Because non-legislators do not
hold office, because they do not possess any law-making authority
within the political process, reference to their opinions cannot with
any certainty be said to advance popular sovereignty.637 Thus, the
connection between the use of drafting history generated by non-
legislators and democratic theory is at least somewhat attenuated.
38
The drafting history behind a statute may still be authoritative,
however, even though its authority is not necessarily political in na-
ture. The drafting history generated by non-legislators may be re-
garded as "authoritative" because (as the word suggests) it is derived
from the author herself. This authority is linguistic in nature. Be-
cause the non-legislative drafter lacks the requisite political authority
to enact a statute she is not the author of the law. She is, however,
the author of the text upon which the law is based.
a. Llewellyn in the role of Shakespeare
In this way, the non-legislative drafter is similar to the play-
wright whose work is produced and acted by a group of people over
whom she exercises no control. The play's director may choose to
have the play performed in a way that closely tracks what the play-
wright intended it to mean. Nothing, however, compels the director
to follow this approach. Indeed, the director may well feel at liberty
to change the language of the script in one way or another. Even if
637. It is, of course, also possible for elected representatives to vote in a way
that is contrary to the popular views of their constituencies. Elected officials
are not obliged to vote as the majority of people would have them. Indeed, to
do so automatically would actually be contrary to the view that "popular sov-
ereignty" involves not only popular opinion but also reasoned deliberation.
See Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, in EDMUND BURKE ON
GOVERNMENT, POLITIcs AND SOCIETY 156, 157 (B.W. Hill ed., 1976) ("Your
representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he be-
trays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.").
638. The political justification for the use of legislative history generated by
non-legislators is stronger where, for example, the opinions of an outside
drafter or sponsor are later expressly endorsed by a legislator or where the leg-
islator directs his or her staff in the preparation of a committee report or other
interpretive aid. See Note, Nonlegislative Intent as an Aid to Statutory Inter-
pretation, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 676 (1949).
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the text of the play remains exactly as it was written, however, the
play that is performed is a different text from what the playwright
wrote. Each is a distinct use of language.63 9 Even though the actors
do not compose any part of the script, in reciting and acting it out,
the actors in effect make the text their own. They imbue it with their
own meaning, a meaning which may or may not coincide with what
the playwright intended to communicate.
640
Still, it would be strange to suggest that in trying to understand
the meaning of a contemporary production of Hamlet, thoughtful
members of the audience could not refer to the Bard's original work
and the circumstances surrounding its creation.64' It would be fool-
ish to assume, as an initial matter, that the performance and the writ-
ten play carry different meanings. Although they are distinct, they
are not unrelated or wholly independent of one another.
In the same way, a legislature may enact the text of a statute
prepared by a non-legislative drafter. The legislature may change the
text in some way or enact it into law without alteration. In either
case, the statute that is enacted is a distinct text from the proposed
statute composed by the non-legislative drafter. The meaning in-
tended by the authors of these two distinct texts may or may not co-
incide. Nevertheless, the lawyer or court who must interpret the
statute should be free to consult the work of the non-legislative
drafter.
639. Paul Campos provides a useful example of this phenomenon using two
notes which are textually identical but which have different authors and differ-
ent recipients. He employs this example against the claim that the meaning of
the constitutional text changes over time. He concludes, in both cases, that
"even if the interpreter is willing to jettison original authors and replace them
with someone else, the new author(s) would, from an intentionalist perspective,
generate a new text, even if that text should remain verbally identical with the
text it replaces." Campos, supra note 626, at 390.
640. For a wonderfully humorous example of how a bad play can be trans-
formed into an amusing one, see THE PRODUCERS (Embassy Pictures 1968).
641. Again, although a text can be made to mean something radically differ-
ent from what the author intended, such a possibility does not demonstrate the
irrelevance of historical materials that relate to the author's intended meaning.
See Stanley Fish, Wrong Again, 62 TEX. L. REV. 299, 303, 313-15 (1983)
[hereinafter Fish, Wrong Again] (suggesting new interpretations of Hamlet);
D'Amato, supra note 614, at 589-93 (also proposing novel interpretations of
Hamlet).
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In this fashion, the linguistic rationale can account for how it is
that courts frequently look to interpretive aids that were neither
drafted by legislators nor approved by any legislative body. Without
a doubt, the most striking example of this sort of interpretive aid is
the official comments to the UCC. Although the comments are fre-
quently cited by courts and are widely regarded as authoritative,
642
reference to the comments cannot be justified in terms of political
values. The comments, after all, are not the statutory text itself.
They are not the law and have not been adopted by any legislature.643
Thus, use of the comments cannot be justified in terms of bolstering
either popular sovereignty or the principle of separation of powers.
Accordingly, if use of the comments is to be justified at all, it must
be justified on linguistic, not political grounds.644
B. The Official Comments and the Failure of Llewellyn 's Theory of
Patent Reason
Llewellyn knew that it was preposterous, that it was fundamen-
tally unrealistic, to read business agreements in the abstract. He
clearly believed that courts ought to consider the context of sales
642. See Skilton, supra note 444; WHoTE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 4, at
12 (describing the comments as "by far the most useful aids to interpretation
and construction" and observing that "courts take to the comments like ducks
to water even though the legislatures did not enact the comments"); Hannaway,
supra note 459, at 985 (concluding that the comments "derive their authority
not only from their character as largely contemporaneous notations of the
drafters of the Code itselt but more importantly from their role in the jurispru-
dence of the Code"); McDonnell, supra note 602, at 806 ("The Code was for-
mulated with the assumption that text and Comments would be considered as a
unit") (citation omitted). With respect to Hannaway's conclusion, it is worth
pointing out that the Code's jurisprudence is itself a product of the work of the
drafters, especially Llewellyn. Thus, to the extent that the jurisprudence be-
hind the Code legitimizes the use of the comments, it does so only because this
jurisprudence and the comments themselves derive from the same source.
643. See supra notes 53-54, and infra notes 679-683 and accompanying text.
644. See Skilton, supra note 444, at 602-03 (arguing that the comments may
be regarded as authoritative because "they express opinions on meaning and
purpose of text and were written by men who supposedly either participated in
the drafting of the sections involved or were close to those who did") (footnote
omitted). But see Walker, supra note 446, at 1033 (concluding that "marginal
writing cannot be placed within any category of authority approved heretofore
by the process of democratic government, and therefore, this material should
not be given weight").
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contracts in order to ascertain the intent of the parties involved. For
Llewellyn, this context included not only the background of beliefs
and assumptions gathered from the commercial context, but also the
parties' attempts to define the agreement in writing.645 Llewellyn
also clearly believed that statutory texts should be "read in the light
of some assumed purpose. 646 If, however, the goal of statutory in-
terpretation is the explication of statutory purpose, this goal will best
be served by allowing judges and lawyers to study the historical rec-
ord behind the legislation in question. "We should not insulate our-
selves from the context in which legally significant words were ut-
tered if we care about ascertaining what the speaker intended to
convey.
647
The presence of the comments demonstrates that Llewellyn ap-
preciated the importance of contextual evidence even in the case of
statutes. As noted above, Llewellyn conceived of the official com-
ments as a sort of standardized legislative history that would buttress
the Code's policies and encourage uniform application of the statute
across jurisdictions.648 As such, however, the comments themselves
seriously undermine Llewellyn's theory of "patent reason." A
statutory text that "shows its reason on its face 649 should not be in
need of a voluminous interpretive aid like the comments.650 A stat-
ute made up of "rules which make sense on their face, and which can
be understood and reasonably well applied even by mediocre
men"651 should not require such a thorough explication. Indeed, the
confidence evident in Llewellyn's description of the theory of patent
reason is belied by the lengthy exposition of statutory purposes found
in the official comments.652
645. See Part I.C.5.
646. Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 86, at 400.
647. Solan, supra note 37, at 256.
648. See supra Part 1H.F.
649. See supra Part III.C.3.
650. See Skilton, supra note 444, at 597 ("In quantity of words, these com-
ments are a great deal more than the text That says a lot, for the text itself is
of no small length.").
651. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 83, at 38.
652. In his defense, Llewellyn's own notes indicate that at a fairly early
stage he failed to convince some of his fellow drafters of the merits of includ-
ing express statements of purpose in the statutory text. This led Llewellyn to
attempt to make "the purpose of [each] provision appear on its face by the
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choice of language and by the organization of the thought in the light of the
situation" and to rely even more on the comments "to promote underlying rea-
sons, purposes and policies." Plans, supra note 83, in KLP, supra note 29, at
J.VI. L.e, at 6. Even if Llewellyn had convinced his fellow Code-drafters of the
need for express statements of purpose in the statutory text, interpretive ques-
tions would still arise. Indeed, no text, no matter how cleverly drafted could
ever achieve that degree of clarity because clarity and ambiguity are not quali-
ties that inhere in texts. As Professor Stanley Fish notes, these qualities "are
not linguistic, but contextual or institutional." Fish, Fish v. Fiss, supra note
271, at 1335. A given document "is neither ambiguous nor unambiguous in
and of itself. The document isn't anything in and of itself, but acquires a shape
and significance only within the assumed background circumstances of its pos-
sible use .. . ." Fish, Middle Ages, supra note 272, at 784. Accordingly,
"when there is a disagreement about the shape or meaning of a sentence, it is a
disagreement between persons who are reading or hearing (and therefore con-
stituting) it according to the assumptions of different circumstances." Fish,
Fish v. Fiss, supra note 271, at 1335; see also FISH, supra note 271, at 284 ("In
order for the sentence to be perceived as ambiguous (or to be perceived at all)
it must already be in a context, and the context, rather than any natural prop-
erty, will be responsible for any ambiguity the sentence will then (in a limited
sense) have.").
The legislative history behind a statute constitutes part of the "back-
ground circumstances" of its actual use by the legislature. Accordingly, this
history is relevant to interpretation of the statute. Even so, the meaning of the
statute does not inhere "in the language of the text... or in the context.., in
which it is embedded, but in the cultural assumptions within which both texts
and contexts take shape for situated agents." Fish, Middle Ages, supra note
272, at 783. Indeed, the context in which the text is embedded is itself subject
to interpretation. Put another way, every context is itself a text. See Fish,
Wrong Again, supra note 641, at 304-05 (arguing that "while it is certainly true
that context constrains interpretation, it is also true... that context is a product
of interpretation and as such is itself variable as a constraint"). Thus, the leg-
islative history behind a statute, no matter how complete, cannot yield a "lit-
erar' or "uninterpreted" meaning which can then be used to construe the stat-
ute. See FISH, supra note 271, at 277-81 (discussing the construction of the
testamentary law at issue in Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (1889)).
This might strike some as quite unsettling. If the context of each text is
itself a text, then an infinite regress follows. Cf D'Amato, supra note 614, at
563 (observing that if one articulated a meta-theory of interpretation it "would
constitute a text, and thus itself be in need of interpretation. It would require a
meta-meta-theory of interpretation in order to be interpreted. We thus process
into infinite regress"). From this, some have concluded that because each text
possesses an infinite number of meanings (and so on a practical level is mean-
ingless) we cannot know whether genuine communication between individuals
ever actually occurs. See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND
SOLIDARITY (1989) (discussing the numerous meanings of text).
What saves us from this infinite regress, what pulls us back from this
abyss of indefiniteness, is the fact that we share certain background assump-
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That Llewellyn saw the relevance of context even in the case
of statutory construction probably relieves him of the charge of hu-
bris, if not over-confidence. The wisdom of limiting courts to an
tions and beliefs. Surely the same text can mean different things "in the light
of different assumptions," Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Inter-
pretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 551, 554 (1982) [hereinafter
Fish, Chain Gang], and within different "interpretive conditions." Fish, Wrong
Again, supra note 641, at 303. It is only by sharing certain beliefs and as-
sumptions about reality that makes communication possible. In order to com-
municate, individuals
must understand the world in sufficiently similar ways and have inter-
ests and convictions sufficiently similar to recognize the sense in each
other's claims, to treat these as claims rather than just noises. That
means not just using the same dictionary, but sharing what Wittgen-
stein called a form of life sufficiently concrete so that one can recog-
nize sense and purpose in what the other says and does, see what sort
of beliefs and motives would make sense of his diction, gesture, tone
and so forth. They must "speak the same language" in both senses of
that phrase.
DwoRKrN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 625, at 63-64; see also id. at 50-68, 219-
38 (describing these shared understandings as beliefs and assumptions about
identity, integrity, coherence and value); Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpreta-
tion, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527, 530-35, 540 (1982); Ronald Dworkin, My Reply to
Stanley Fish (and Walter Benn Michaels): Please Don't Talk About Objectivity
Anymore, in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 292-97 (W.J. Thomas Mitchell
ed., 1983).
Some measure of proof that we do in fact share some of the same as-
sumptions and beliefs about the world can be found in the work of D'Amato,
Fish, Graff, and others. In their respective writings, each presents a single
sentence and then demonstrates the use of that sentence in radically different
contexts. The radically different meanings which then appear to the reader
demonstrate the power of context and how it can alter the meaning of a text for
an interpreter. See, e.g., D'Amato, supra note 614, at 568-70 ("Drop every-
thing and come running."); Fish, Fish v. Fiss, supra note 271, at 1335 ("I like
her cooking."); Graff, supra note 309, at 407-08 ("Keep off the grass."). These
demonstrations would not work, however, if the reader did not understand each
context and the difference between the two. To take but one example, in order
to see that the text "keep off the grass" can be either an instruction not to walk
on a well-kept lawn or a warning not to smoke marijuana, the reader must be
able to appreciate the difference between "the cry of a gardener" and "the ex-
pression uttered by a narcotics-counselor." Graff, supra note 309, at 407.
Thus, in their examples, D'Amato, Fish, and Graff assume that the reader al-
ready understands each context and its significance. Moreover, D'Amato,
Fish, and Graff likewise expect that by specifying or limiting the context at
work in each instance, the meaning of the text will correspondingly be speci-
fied or limited in the reader's mind.
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abbreviated and purified form of legislative history is, however, still
very much in doubt. He imposed no similar limitation with respect
to parol evidence in the interpretation of contracts.653 On the con-
trary, the rules concerning contract interpretation manifest an open-
ness to various sources of meaning, an openness which narrows only
where reasonable construction cannot avoid a contradiction between
the evidence offered and the express terms of the agreement. 4
C. Llewellyn and the Same Old New Textualism
As noted above, the contextual approach to contract interpreta-
tion emphatically restated by Llewellyn in the UCC has greatly in-
fluenced the interpretation of contracts in general. Evidence that
common law courts once considered extrinsic to the agreement is
now properly viewed as central to the meaning of the agreement.
655
With respect to statutes, however, it may be fair to say that, despite
Llewellyn's efforts to restrict access to legislative history, courts
have continued to regularly consult sources outside the "four cor-
ners" of the statutory text.
Nevertheless, in recent years the proponents of new textualism
have attempted to resurrect the long-dead spirit of section 1-
102(3)(g). So far they have not attempted to apply this a-contextual,
a-historical approach to the UCC itself.656 Like Llewellyn and
his fellow legal realists, however, these modem-day opponents of
653. Some might contend that in the case of sales contracts there is no ana-
logue to the pre-packaged interpretative aid found in the Official Comments.
Typically, the parties to sales agreements do not sit down and formally identify
those extrinsic materials which indicate the parties' meaning or which may be
used to interpret the terms of the agreement. On the contrary, it is far more
likely that the parties will have employed a merger clause which attempts to
exclude the use of contextual materials in the interpretive process. See WHITE
& SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 2-12, at 111. The point, however, is that the rules
concerning the use of contextual evidence under the UCC are all quite liberal,
though they could have been far more restrictive. For example, Llewellyn
could have provided that extrinsic evidence would not be omitted unless it was
written, or signed by one or both parties, etc. That Llewellyn was relatively
open with respect to contextual evidence in the case of contracts only goes to
show that he could have been similarly open in the case of the Code itself.
654. See supra Part lI.C.5.
655. See supra Part II.C.5.
656. But see DICKERSON, supra note 615, at 146-47, 159-60, 165, 176-77
(arguing against the use of the comments and prior Code drafts).
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legislative history have employed a variety of practical and theoreti-
cal arguments.
1. Practical arguments against the use of legislative history
For example, as a practical matter many have argued that even if
legislative materials are relevant to statutory construction, the limited
availability of these sources renders their use manifestly unfair.6 57
Either litigants will be unable to obtain access to the materials or,
once obtained, will be unable to pay their counsel for the time that
must be invested to study them 658 Llewellyn himself employed just
such an argument in defending the restriction contained in section 1-
102(3)(g),65 9 and many Code commentators have expressed concern
over the limited availability of Code drafting-history. 660 Today,
however, even those who oppose the use of legislative history con-
cede that "[t]he communications revolution has made legislative
materials more accessible than they were a few decades ago."66' In-
deed, with the exponential growth of legal resources on the Internet,
the argument based on the unavailability of legislative history will
continue to wane.
662
657. See, e.g., DICKERSON, supra note 615, at 147-54.
658. A frequently-cited articulation of this argument can be found in
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396-97 (1951)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
659. See supra notes 546-550 and accompanying text.
660. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 4, at 11 (asserting that "[t]hese
materials are not as accessible to lawyers as are the usual aids to interpretation
and construction" and decrying the loss of section 1-102(3)(g)); Skilton, supra
note 444, at 602 n.13 (referring to several special library collections of Code
materials and concluding that "[i]tems of this kind have such a restricted avail-
ability that most practitioners would be greatly disadvantaged by emphasis
upon them to shed light on 'intent"); RICHARD E. SPEIDEL ET AL.,
COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAw 44 (2d ed. 1974).
661. Movsesian, supra note 89, at 1187; see also Wald, supra note 97, at 200
(asserting, perhaps somewhat prematurely that "[t]echnology has made an
anachronism" of arguments against legislative history based on unavailability).
662. Even before the advent of the Internet, materials concerning the drafting
history behind the UCC had become more widely available. These resources
included Elizabeth Kelly's compilation of Official Code drafts, U.C.C.
DRAFTS, supra note 21, as well as her more recent compilation with Ann
Puckett of confidential Code drafts. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
CONFIDENTIAL DRAFTS (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly & Ann Puckett eds., 1995)
(10 vols.). Further, the Karl Llewellyn Papers, KLP supra note 29, have been
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The argument that appropriate review of legislative materials
will be prohibitively expensive for most litigants663 is, by contrast,
not so much an argument against the use of legislative history as it is
a complaint concerning the allocation of legal services within our
system of justice. It has always been the case in the United States
that the wealthy receive better legal representation than the poor.
664
That a rich person can afford to pay counsel for the time necessary to
review the often voluminous legislative record behind a statute while
a poor client cannot is to be expected. This does not differ in princi-
ple from the fact that the lawyer for the rich client can afford to
spend additional time researching case law and conducting discov-
ery. Perhaps this state of affairs is unjust,665 but the right solution
hardly seems to be to limit the use of legislative history any more
than it would be to restrict discovery in litigation.666
A second but related practical argument focuses on the work of
courts. In short, some who oppose the use of legislative history
contend that judges are simply not up to the task of construing stat-
utes in the light of these materials.667 Legislative history is often
complex and is always subject to manipulation by legislators and
available on microfilm for a number of years. See Patterson, supra note 99, at
194 n.169 (remarking that the Karl Llewellyn Papers "are available on micro-
film from William Hein & Co.").
663. See Movsesian, supra note 89, at 1187-88; see also W. David Slawson,
Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the
Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 408 (1992).
664. See NORMAN LEFSTIEN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR,
METHODS AND PROGRAMS FOR PROVIDING LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND THE
NEED FOR ADEQUATE FINANCING 2 (1982). For an overview of case law re-
garding the representation of the poor in the United States see ELI JARMEL,
LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1975).
See also Richard J. Medalie & Ralph Nader, Justice for All-Who Have
Money, WASH. POST., Sept. 25, 1995, at A2.
665. See Medalie & Nader, supra note 664, atA2.
666. But see Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial
Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1833, 1871 (1998) (arguing that an open approach to legislative history will
"skew judicial evaluation in favor of claims about legislative history advanced
by affluent parties").
667. See Easterbrook, Statutes, supra note 34, at 550-51 (noting that statu-
tory construction "is an art' that "requires the rarest of skills" and concluding
that the "number of judges living at any time" who can do it well "may be
counted on one hand").
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clever advocates. 66' Thus, "the effort required" to understand the
statute against this background "would be enormous. 669 Moreover,
even in those few instances where the legislative history is straight-
forward, the sheer volume of materials can easily consume the work
of a judge and her clerks whose time is better spent on other mat-
ters.670
Perhaps it should come as no surprise that the proponents of this
argument based on "efficiency" have advocated a similarly economic
approach to other legal problems.67' Efficiency, however, is not the
only or even the primary value at stake in adjudication. Moreover,
what a judge may see as a pointless, time-consuming exercise will be
viewed by others as due process and the search for truth and mean-
ing.
To say that legislative history is relevant to statutory interpreta-
tion is not to suggest that it will always be dispositive or that it is not
subject to manipulation by lawyers and law-makers. Indeed, the use
of contextual materials is no panacea for the problems of statutory
construction that confront courts today. Rather, it will frequently be
the case that the legislative history behind a statute will not answer
the issue at hand.672 Moreover, the sources that make up this history
668. See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
669. Movsesian, supra note 89, at 1186 (footnote omitted); see also Slaw-
son, supra note 663, at 408 ("Legislative history requires extraordinary
amounts of research.").
670. See SCALIA, supra note 35, at 36-37:
The most immediate and tangible change the abandonment of legisla-
tive history would affect is this: Judges, lawyers, and clients will be
saved an enormous amount of time and expense. When I was head of
the Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice Department I estimated that
60 percent of the time of the lawyers on my staff was expended find-
ing, and poring over, the incunabula of legislative history. What a
waste. We did not use to do it, and we should do it no more.
Id.
671. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84
MICH. L. REv. 1696 (1986); Frank H. Easterbrook & Danial R. Fischel, Opti-
mal Damages in Security Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 611 (1985).
672. See DICKERSON, supra note 615, at 73 ("The errors [sic] seems to be in
assuming that, if there is an ascertainable legislative intent, it necessarily re-
solves the question at hand, and conversely that, if it does not resolve the
question at hand, it must not have existed."); id. at 79-80 ("That there is some
actual and reasonably inferable legislative intent behind every statute does not
mean that there is always, or even often, a specific legislative intent with re-
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may be incomplete or may contain statements inserted by duplicitous
legislators that do not accurately reflect the views of most members.
Further, the legislative history behind a statute is always susceptible
to manipulation by advocates and by judges already inclined to reach
a certain result.
a. judicial resistance to the judicial role
It would be wrong to suggest that the review of a statute's
drafting history and legislative background will be easy or that
statutory analysis in light of this context will be simplified.673 On the
contrary, the review of legislative history will often "require [a]
complex and tedious investigation., 674  Moreover, the judge must
avoid being misled both by the actions of legislators who behave in a
strategic fashion675 and by the distorted presentations of legislative
history made by interested advocates. Instead, judges must over-
come these pitfalls in order to determine the proper significance to be
given to various portions of the legislative record.676
spect to the particular issue in question or, if there is only a general relevant
intent that it resolves the issue.") (footnote omitted).
673. But see Farber & Frickey, supra note 57, at 452 n.105 (citing sources
that contend that the use of legislative history falsely simplifies the interpretive
process).
674. MACCALLUM, supra note 612, at 12 (footnote omitted).
675. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
676. It is beyond the scope of this article to argue how courts should go
about making this judgment of relative significance. Still, judgments of this
sort must be made and not only in the case of statutes. Indeed, as discussed in
detail above, the UCC contains rules that establish the relative priority of dif-
ferent kinds of contextual evidence employed in the interpretation of contracts.
See U.C.C. §§ 1-205(4), 2-208(2) (1995); supra notes 240-252, 279-284 and
accompanying text. A number of commentators on statutory interpretation
have likewise discussed or proposed hierarchical rankings or priority rules that
address the relative worth of different sources of legislative history. See
George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions":
The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other
Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39; Eskridge, New Textualism,
supra note 37, at 636-40; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 47, at 353-62; Maltz,
supra note 52, at 24-28; Redish & Chung, supra note 38, at 830-31, 870. For
an alternative view, see Vermeule, supra note 666, at 1879-80 (arguing that
such hierarchies are "poorly theorized and practically unstable").
Although the basic problem of giving priority to different sources of
contextual evidence is similar in the case of contracts and statutes, there are
also clearly some important differences. For example, the principle of hierar-
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Those who oppose the use of legislative history rightly contend
that this is a demanding challenge, but it is also a task that falls
squarely within the judicial role. In the adjudicative process, judges
must frequently decide the weight to be assigned facts that are pre-
sented to them This task is not easy. It requires an open mind and
fair disposition, as well as acute study, careful balance, and thought-
ful deliberation. In short, it calls for the exercise of sound judgment.
Although it may not be easy to attain, that is the judge's art. Indeed,
it might well be easier or more "efficient" to refuse to engage in this
inquiry by simply ignoring legislative history altogether. In the in-
terpretation of contracts and other texts, however, a judge may not
ignore what is relevant simply because it is tedious or because its
significance is not readily apparent.
Accordingly, the practical objections raised against the use of
legislative history are valid, but only to a point. They go to the
weight to be accorded contextual sources, not to their relevance.
6 77
chy at work in sections 1-205(4) and 2-208(2) is one of specificity, i.e., the
more specific the source of contextual evidence the more likely it is to manifest
the parties' true understanding of their agreement. See U.C.C. §§ 1-205(4), 2-
208(2) (1995). Accordingly, where they cannot be reconciled, express terms
have priority over course of performance, which has priority over course of
dealing, which has priority over usage of trade. Although specific manifesta-
tions of the legislature's intent should carry more weight than evidence of gen-
eral design, the mere specificity of the evidence presented is not sufficient.
Whereas the UCC rules presume that the more specific the source the more
representative of the parties' intent, the same cannot be said of legislative his-
tory. See DICKERSON, supra note 615, at 155. A legislator's statement made
during a floor debate may be quite specific regarding the aim of a particular
provision, but it may also fail to represent the views of most legislators. See
id. ("Materials in hearings and floor debates are so heterogeneous and frag-
mentary and so influenced by the tactics of promoting enactment that they
have almost no credibility for the purposes of later interpretation.") (footnotes
omitted).
677. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., Note, in FRANK C. NEWMAN & STANLEY S.
SURREY, LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 668-71 (1955). Hart is cor-
rect in concluding that legislative history constitutes a relevant part of the
context within which the statute is to be construed. He is also correct in as-
serting that the real inquiry should be the weight to be accorded different parts
of this history. Hart is wrong, however, to limit this history to what was "offi-
cially before the legislature at the time of its enactment." Id. at 670. As dis-
cussed above, a linguistic rationale may justify review of materials beyond
those brought before the law-making body. See supra notes 639-44 and ac-
companying text.
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"[T]hey suggest only the need for care in the consideration of legis-
lative history, not total abandonment of the use of such materials. 678
2. Conceptual arguments against the use of legislative history
Although the types of argument employed frequently overlap,
the more serious challenges to the use of legislative history tend to be
more conceptual in nature. The most prominent of these arguments
is the "often overlooked truth 679 that "[t]he text of the statute-and
not the intent of those who voted for or signed it-is the law. 68°
Only the statutory text, and not the legislature's intent, how-
ever so conceived, survives the formal constitutional requirements
of enactment that warrant recognition as law. 681 "Men may intend
678. Maltz, supra note 52, at 24; see also Eskridge, New Textualism, supra
note 37, at 689 ("At the very least the new textualists urge a more critical use
of legislative history, and I join their call, based upon the realist problems with
legislative history in many cases."); Karkkainen, supra note 37, at 420 ("Even
if we accept Justice Scalia's criticisms of legislative history at face value, how-
ever, they are at best arguments for not treating legislative history as law and
for discounting its evidentiary value; they are not convincing reasons to ex-
clude legislative history altogether.") (citation omitted); Redish & Chung, su-
pra note 38, at 830 ("Rather than completely jettisoning legislative history, a
more sensible approach would set conditions or guidelines for its use."); id. at
864 n.259 (arguing that the reservations new textualists have for the use of
legislative history "recommend a cautious and guarded use of legislative his-
tory under circumstances in which the text does not itself provide a definitive
answer"); Sunstein, supra note 52, at 431 ("In short, courts should approach
legislative history cautiously.") (citation omitted).
679. Sunstein, supra note 52, at 416.
680. Easterbrook, What Does, supra note 89, at 444.
681. In the case of federal legislation, proponents of new textualism empha-
size the formal requirements of bicameralism and presentment set forth in INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). See DICKERSON, supra note 615, at 9-10
(noting that before Chadha was decided, by "negative implication" Article I
appeared to set forth the "exclusive means by which [Congress could] create a
new law" and that most state constitutions had similar requirements); Eskridge,
New Textualism, supra note 37, at 654 ("The only legitimate statutory law is
that which has been approved by both chambers of Congress and by the Presi-
dent (or passed over a veto)."); Easterbrook, Role, supra note 34, 64-65 (argu-
ing that the rigorous process of law-making adopted by the Framers "was the
most important achievement of the Constitution"); Eskridge & Frickey, supra
note 47, at 327 (arguing that "any theory of interpretation that formally gives
conclusive weight to the views of a legislative subgroup is in tension with the
bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I"); Farber, supra note
32, at 288 ("The Constitution contains procedural barriers intended to hinder
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what they will; but it is only the laws that they enact which bind
US." 6 8 2
Although the gist of this argument is vital and bears repeating,
its practical import is quite limited. The argument serves chiefly to
remind us of the unrivaled primacy of the statutory text. Once this is
acknowledged, however, the statutory text must still be inter-
preted.683 It is, after all, the meaning of the statute in light of the
controversy at hand that the court must determine in the process of
adjudication. "Statutory terms are not self-defining, and words have
no meaning before or without interpretation. 684 The opponents of
legislative history are plainly right to insist that historical materials
not be allowed to undermine, let alone replace, the central impor-
tance of the statutory text. 85 Clearly, it would not be legitimate for a
court to subvert or ignore the meaning of a statute. In order to know
the transformation of legislators' preferences into law. Hence, to give legal
effect to legislative intentions in the absence of any relevant statutory text
would undermine the constitutional scheme."); Sunstein, supra note 52, at 416
("Statutory terms-not legislative history, not legislative purpose, not legisla-
tive 'intent'-have gone through the constitutionally specified procedures for
the enactment of law."); id. at 430 (noting that "the words rather than the intent
survived the procedures of article I").
682. SCALIA, supra note 35, at 17; see also Eskridge, New Textualism, supra
note 37, at 671 (describing Scalia's position as resting on the belief that "the
only thing that actually becomes law is the statutory text; any unwritten inten-
tions of one House, or of one committee or of one Member, in Congress are
not law unless it can be shown that they were understood and accepted by both
Houses and by the President"); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 47, at 354
("Formally, all that is enacted into law is the statutory text, and at the very least
legislative supremacy means that an interpreter must be attentive to the text.");
Redish & Chung, supra note 38, at 822 ("In fact, as new textualists correctly
point out, the only thing that has satisfied the Constitution's procedural re-
quirements for passage of law is the text itself."); Sunstein, supra note 52, at
427 (noting that "purposes are expressed through and have no life independent
of statutory words. The words represent the law."); id. at 431 ("Congress en-
acts statutes rather than its own views about what those statutes mean ....
The words, not the 'intent,' represent the law.").
683. See Posner, supra note 61, at 187 ("No matter how clear the text seems,
it must be interpreted.., like any other conmmication .....
684. Sunstein, supra note 52, at 416.
685. See SCALIA, supra note 35, at 31 (recalling the lawyer's joke that the
statutory text should be consulted only when the legislative history is unclear);
Easterbrook, Statutes, supra note 34, at 539 (remarking that delving into leg-
islative history "is to engage in a sort of creation" whereby the court fills in the
blanks of the legislative text).
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what that meaning is, however, the court must first engage in the
interpretive process. The formalist critique of legislative history has
nothing positive to recommend in this regard.686
The most powerful argument against the use of legislative his-
tory directly challenges the problematic concept of "legislative in-
tent." Traditionally, those lawyers and judges who have consulted
legislative history have justified their actions as a means of discern-
ing the intent of the legislature.687 The legislature, however, is a cor-
porate body "comprise[d of] many members" with numerous distinct
intentions. 688 As such, it does not possess a single, coherent intent
"hidden yet discoverable., 689 Although such a shared intent is not a
logical or ontological impossibility, "with respect to 99.99 percent of
the issues of construction reaching the courts, there is no legislative
intent., 690  Consequently, references to the legislative record are
"much more likely to produce a false or contrived legislative intent
than a genuine one.,' 691 In the main, the proponents of new textual-
ism contend that "shared meaning in the legislative process is limited
to the rules to be established" and does not extend to "what the draft-
ers intended these rules to achieve.,
692
Although this argument against the use of legislative history
enjoys considerable currency today, 93 it is by no means new. The
first commentator to articulate this critique was Professor Max Radin
of Berkley, Llewellyn's contemporary and fellow legal realist.
694
686. See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 37, at 646-50 (referring to
the line of argument that legislative history is not law as "formalist").
687. See Easterbrook, Role, supra note 34, at 60-61 (noting that the "com-
mon uses of legislative history assume that intent matters" because it is thought
to be the "real law" embedded in "the minds of the legislators").
688. Easterbrook, Statutes, supra note 34, at 547.
689. Id.
690. SCALIA, supra note 35, at 32.
691. Id.
692. Easterbrook, What Does, supra note 89, at 445.
693. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They" Not an "It": Leg-
islative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
694. See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930)
[hereinafter Radin, Statutory]. Llewellyn clearly considered Radin to be a fel-
low legal realist. See Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 158, at 1227 n.18,
1234 n.35, 1259. See generally LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE:
1927-1960 (1986) (discussing Radin's place within legal realism). For other
sources attributing this argument against legislative intent to Radin see Blatt,
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Nearly seventy years ago he confidently argued that "[a] legislature
certainly has no intention whatever in connection with words which
some two or three men drafted, which a considerable number re-
jected, and in regard to which many of the approving majority might
have had, and often demonstrably did have, different ideas and be-
liefs.' 695 As such, Radin estimated that the chances of hundreds of
legislators sharing a determinate intent were "infinitesimally
small., 696 Moreover, "[e]ven if the contents of the minds of the leg-
islature were uniform," it would likely remain "undiscoverable in
any real sense., 697 Indeed, the practical problems involved in com-
puting such a legislative intent would discourage "even venturesome
mathematicians. 698 Accordingly, Radin urged courts and lawyers to
supra note 315, at 827; Eskridge, Dynamic, supra note 42, at 1507; Manning,
supra note 58, at 684-85; Movsesian, supra note 89, at 1181, 1186; Jane S.
Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory
Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REV. 593, 599-600 (1995). Contemporary aca-
demics not associated with new textualism have also found the substance of
Radin's critique of legislative intent to be appealing. See RONALD DWORKIN,
A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 33-71 (1985) [hereinafter DWORKIN, A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE]; Paul Brest The Misconceived Quest for the Original Under-
standing, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980).
695. Radin, Statutory, supra note 694, at 870.
696. Id.
697. Id.
698. Id. at 871. Contemporary critics have further developed Radin's argu-
ment concerning the computation of legislative intent. Constructing a coherent
aggregate legislative intent would require much more than a simple mathe-
matical tabulation. For example, as an initial matter one must decide whose
intentions will be counted in this calculation. Should it be limited to those who
voted for the measure? What about those who voted against it? What if those
who voted against the measure did so because they misunderstood it? How
should one count the legislators who voted for the statute but who never ex-
pressed an opinion about the meaning of the statute? Should the executive
who signed or unsuccessfully vetoed the statute count? See, e.g., Easterbrook,
Role, supra note 34, at 63 (noting that "the court has endless flexibility in se-
lecting who is asked the question" of what they understood the legislation to
mean); Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 37, at 632-34, 639 (noting that
courts in the past have not taken into account the views of those who did not
support the legislation); Maltz, supra note 52, at 13 (remarking that "the key
issue" is "which legislators' intent should matter for purposes of judicial inter-
pretation"); Slawson, supra note 663, at 404 (discussing the plethora of sources
to draw upon in construing intent and recounting the advent of presidential
sign-up ceremonies as part of legislative history); id. at 395 (referring to Jus-
tice Scalia's statement in United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 371-77 (1989)
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study the rules that have been enacted by legislatures rather than the
drafting histories which have not.6 99
a. the problematic concept of legislative intent
By almost all accounts, this critique renders the idea of legisla-
tive intent problematic. 7°0 An individual may intend some meaning
by his or her use of language, but the individuals who make up the
legislature can exercise their law-making authority only in a collec-
tive fashion. Difficult to grasp in the case of a natural person,
"[i]ntent is . . . fictive for a collective body.",70 1 Moreover, even
if some corporate intent is assumed to exist, the conceptual and prac-
tical problems of aggregating multiple individual intents seem in-
surmountable. Thus, many have concluded with Llewellyn that
(Scalia, J., concurring), that the treaty in question also "manifests the intent of
the President"). Provided these questions are answered one must then deal
with the vexing problem of somehow combining multiple inconsistent inten-
tions of varying degrees of specificity and intensity. That is, the intent of each
person whose intent would be included would have to be assigned a value in
terms commensurable with the value assigned to the intent of everyone else.
After completing this process of valuation the resultant intention values would
then have to be tabulated together in some fashion that addressed the specific
interpretive question at hand. This tabulation would, of course, have to ac-
count for those legislators who voted for the statute but for whom no evidence
of intent is available, aside from the vote itself See DWORKIN, A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE, supra note 694, at 34-57; Brest, supra note 694, at 209-22; Sun-
stein, supra note 52, at 427.
699. See Radin, Statutory, supra note 694, at 871-73. Twelve years later
Radin modified his position concerning the use of legislative history, declaring
that his earlier "statements were undoubtedly somewhat too sweeping." Max
Radin, A Short Way With Statutes, 56 HARv. L. REv. 388, 410 (1942). In ret-
rospect, Radin asserted that he had intended to argue that legislative materials
were "neither irrelevant nor incompetent but that they [were] in no sense con-
trolling." Id. at 410-11. Although he maintained that the meaning of a statute
did not "depend on discovery of the 'intention' or the 'will' of the legislature,
or of the legislator," id. at 406, Radin found that sponsor statements and com-
mittee reports could be considered and might "greatly aid in making the [stat-
ute's] purpose apparent" Id. at 411.
700. For a careful point-by-point response to Radin's argument, however,
see DICKERSON, supra note 615, at 67-86.
701. Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Inter-
pretation, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 68 (1994) (citation omitted).
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legislative intent is a "pure will-o'-the-wisp, 7 °2 and that ref-
erences to it are either hopelessly contrived or fatuous.
Although the concept of legislative intent is problematic, it is
not wholly incoherent. Rather, the realist critique advanced by Ra-
din, Llewellyn, and others makes plain that certain accounts of leg-
islative intent are either incoherent or impracticable. If legislative
intent is taken to be the product of a sort of intention calculus, then it
is truly an illusory concept. The myriad problems involved in tabu-
lating an aggregate legislative intent are both vexing and intracta-
ble.7 °3 Thus, even if such an intent exists as an ontological matter, as
a practical and cognitive matter we are incapable of comprehending
it.70 Consequently, if legislative intent is to be part of the process of
statutory interpretation, then it must be conceived of as something
other than the sum of multiple individual intents.70 5
702. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 83, at 529; see
also supra notes 55-62, 504-509 and accompanying text; Llewellyn, Offer and
Acceptance Part I, supra note 165, at 6 n.13 (crediting Radin and Dean James
Landis with encouraging "common law attitudes" in the interpretation of stat-
utes which are necessary for "statutory drafting in simpler, broader terms" to
become more wide-spread).
703. See supra note 698 and authorities cited therein.
704. Radin grasped this point from the beginning. See Radin, Statutory, su-
pra note 694, at 870-71 ("Even if the contents of the minds of the legislature
were uniform, we have no means of knowing that content except by the exter-
nal utterances or behavior of these hundreds of men, and in almost every case
the only external act is the extremely ambiguous one of acquiescence, which
may be motivated in literally hundreds of ways, and which by itself indicates
little or nothing of the pictures which the statutory descriptions imply."); see
also Easterbrook, Statutes, supra note 34, at 547 ("Although legislators have
individual lists of desires, priorities, and preferences, it turns out to be difficult,
sometimes impossible, to aggregate these lists into a coherent collective
choice.") (citation omitted).
705. That is to say, we are not limited to conceiving of "legislative intent" as
the aggregate sum of multiple individual intentions. Instead, using Professor
Dworkin's terminology, this view is but one of several competing "concep-
tions" all of which attempt to define the "concept" of legislative intent. For
Dworkin, a concept is a general idea, a plateau of thought, in relation to which
a conception is a particular and detailed articulation of what that idea is. See
DwoRKN, LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 625, at 70-71; RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-37 (1978). Regardless of the subject matter
of the concept, each conception has a distinct set of criteria that distinguish it
from others. Although Dworkin does not say so expressly, we may regard
these criteria as conventions, that is, as some agreed upon means for identify-
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b. intent as a matter of convention
Our frequent references to the intentions and intentional acts of
collective bodies suggests that some alternative conception is already
well-established. For example, "[w]e find no problem in attributing
intentions to corporations, groups, and institutions in ordinary life,
and the law assumes that corporations and some other legal subjects
who are not human beings can act intentionally., 70 6 Even more to
the point, we "speak quite freely and precisely about legislatures de-
liberating, and this, aside from our talk about their debating, investi-
gating, etc., implies a capacity for purposive behavior. '70 7 Surely, an
entity like a corporation, which is admittedly an imaginary person, a
"legal fiction, ' '7° 8 cannot have a real intention in the same way that
we believe that real human persons have intentions. 70 9 Nonetheless,
as a matter of convention we regard such entities as having not
merely intentions, but intentions to which legal consequences at-
tach.
710
ing the thing in question. See Moore, Natural Law, supra note 342, at 298-99
(describing Dworkin as a "deep conventionalist," who "can distinguish the
conventions that define deep concepts from those that define more specific
(and often competing) conceptions of those concepts") (footnotes omitted); see
also Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for
the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871, 941-57 (1989) (critiquing Dworkin's con-
ventionalism); Michael S. Moore, Metaphysics, Epistemology and Legal The-
ory, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 453 (1987) (book review) (same).
706. Raz, supra note 614, at 263; see also Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 865
(1992) ("In practice, we ascribe purposes to group activities all the time with-
out many practical difficulties."); Posner, supra note 61, at 196 ("Institutions
act purposively, therefore they have purposes.").
707. MACCALLUM, supra note 612, at 14.
708. For the classic discussion of this concept see L.L. Fuller, Legal Fic-
tions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363 (1930); L.L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV.
513 (1931). These essays were later published together as a book. See L.L.
FULLER, LEGAL FicTIoNs (1967). For a more recent treatment of the subject
see Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REv. 871 (1986).
709. See MACCALLUM, supra note 612, at 15 (summarizing the skeptic's re-
sponse to the attribution of intentional acts to legislatures as being that
"[l]egislatures are not men, and if only men clearly have intentions, then one's
arguments must cultivate analogies between legislatures and men-the point
being to argue that legislatures are enough like men in important respects to be
counted as having intentions").
710. See ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 17 (1986) (stating that the law
views corporations as if they were natural persons) (citing authority); Zeppos,
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Legislative intent is also a matter of convention. 711 A proposed
statutory interpretation may be supported by voluminous and precise
citations to the legislative record. Still, what we describe as the
"legislative intent" or "legislative purpose" 712 of a specific statute or
provision will always be an "intellectual construct. 71 At best it will
be a reasonable approximation of what the legislature had in mind,
an accurate reflection but not the thing itself.
71 4
Fact-Finding, supra note 37, at 1341 ("As with a legislature, the hundreds of
individuals that form a corporation cannot be said to have a single intent. Still,
corporations are routinely convicted of crimes which include intent as an ele-
ment of the offense.") (citation omitted).
711. See Aleinikoff, supra note 37, at 25 (observing that because "recovery
of specific intent is quite unlikely," those who believe legislative intent is rele-
vant "must satisfy themselves... [with] something they are willing to call in-
tent derived from the materials deemed appropriate to consult in the search for
intent"); Redish & Chung, supra note 38, at 865 (explaining that under their
theory of"textualist originalism' even though "unanimity was never reached"
among legislators that does not mean that "no ascertainable intent exists" since
their theory requires "merely a good-faith effort designed to determine if the
balance [of evidence regarding intent] can be tipped in favor of any one inter-
pretation within the universe of possible interpretations") (citations omitted).
But see Moore, Natural Law, supra note 342, at 348-58 (arguing that in vary-
ing degrees one can be either a realist or conventionalist concerning the exis-
tence of legislative intent and that while the former is non-existent the latter is
objectionable on moral grounds); Raz, supra note 614, at 263 (rejecting the
claim that the search for statutory intent at most "establishes a fictitious
author's intent" and asserting that his own thesis will only be helpful "if it re-
fers to real intentions").
712. Many commentators distinguish between legislative intent and legisla-
tive purpose. See, e.g., DICKERSON, supra note 615, at 88 (suggesting that "the
word 'intent' coincides with the particular immediate purpose that the statute is
intended to directly express and immediately accomplish, whereas the word
'purpose' refers primarily to an ulterior purpose that the legislature intends the
statute to accomplish or help to accomplish"); Eskridge, Dynamic, supra note
42, at 1479-80 (distinguishing between "original intent" and the more general
"original purpose"); Redish & Chung, supra note 38, at 812-17 (distinguishing
between "intentionalisnd' and "purposivisnd'). But see MACCALLUM, supra
note 612, at 27-29 (questioning the validity of the distinction).
713. Cf Fallon, supra note 310, at 1212, 1254 (describing the ubiquitous
"fiamer's intent" of constitutional law as an "intellectual construct" or a "theo-
retical construct").
714. See HIRSCH, supra note 297, at 17 ("Since genuine certainty in inter-
pretation is impossible, the aim of the discipline must be to reach a consensus,
on the basis of what is known, that correct understanding has probably been
achieved."); Gerald L. Bruns, Law as Hermaneutics: A Response to Ronald
Dworkin, in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 315-16 (W.J. Thomas Mitchell
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In hoping to yield some conventional understanding of the leg-
islature's intent, the lawyer or judge who reviews the historical rec-
ord is not thereby settling for "second best." To suggest that courts
should resolve difficult questions of statutory interpretation by re-
course to the "true" or "actual" intentions of the legislature rather
than some conventional "imitation" or "imposter" is to misunder-
stand both the subject matter of the inquiry and the role that conven-
tion plays in our understanding of reality.
i. conventions and instrumental values
A "convention" may, of course, refer to a social practice that has
no truth value but is followed simply as a matter of convenience
within a given culture. The choice of such a convention does not
purport to describe reality in any way, rather its value is purely in-
strumental. A convention of this sort may be a matter of explicit
agreement (such as driving on the right hand side of the road) or it
may be an unspoken custom (such as addressing a person by his or
her individual name followed by his or her family name). For virtu-
ally every convention of this sort in one culture its opposite may be
found in another. Which convention is followed is entirely contin-
gent upon the history and culture in which one is situated.
Both language itself and law are conventions of this kind. With
respect to language, it is entirely arbitrary, a matter of mere conven-
tion, that the English word "dog" refers to a class of carnivorous,
quadruped mammals rather than the word "fish." The convention
could have been otherwise. It Could have been the case that the word
"Hunt" or "poisson" or "elephant" referred to these animals. That
these words are not typically used in this fashion reflects the domi-
nant social practice, the conventions of the English language.71 5
ed., 1983) (noting that interpretation aspires to be "what interpretation never
quite manages to be, namely, the objectification of a hidden or authorial inten-
tion"); D'Amato, supra note 614, at 576 (remarking that "[n]o one can ever
know with certainty what any author's intention or strategy was" but that we
can "invok[e] probabilities") (footnotes omitted); Graff, supra note 309, at 408
(noting that "the degree to which we can be confident about our inferences
[concerning an author's intent] depends on the amount of evidence available,
evidence which itself is open to criticism and may well be fallible").
715. See Moore, Natural Law, supra note 342, at 291-93 & n.26; see also
Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399, 427 n.72 (1985) ("I
can imagine worlds in which the noises or marks 'square' represent a figure
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Indeed, we could not recognize something as a word, rather
than as merely a contour (or range of contours) of sounds or
a certain form (or range of forms) of scribblings if we were
not aware that sounds and scribblings with such contours
and forms have a significance, function, or value resulting
from the growth or stipulation of such conventions.716
Communication occurs, or rather we believe it occurs, because of
convention, that is, "because of agreement over the governing rules;
[which] enable people to understand each other, and [which] sharply
limit the number of possible interpretations."7 17
Law, like language, is a vast system of conventional practices
and understandings. For example, the process whereby a proposed
bill becomes a legally binding statute in this country is wholly con-
tingent upon the law-making practices we have chosen to embrace.
It is entirely a matter of convention that we regard the language
passed by a majority of both houses of Congress and signed by the
President (or passed over his veto) to be the law of the United States.
These conventions are neither natural nor necessary. Indeed, there
was a time when a quite different set of conventions determined the
law of the land.715 Citizens surely need some "rule of recognition" in
order to distinguish legal from non-legal texts. They need some
means of identifying those specific pieces of language (of all the lan-
guages in the world) that constitute "the law., 719 The precise content
with five sides. I also can imagine that some people in this world might use
the noises or marks 'square' to denote a figure with five sides. But squares
still have four and not five sides, which I can say because I understand the
conventions of this language as used in this context, the context in which this
culture developed and uses this language.").
716. MACCALLUM, supra note 612, at 11.
717. Sunstein, supra note 52, at 441-42 (footnote omitted); see also
DICKERSON, supra note 615, at 37-38 ("Although all language is conventional
in the sense that words have no inherent meanings, its effectiveness in commu-
nicating meaning depends on the establishment of its conventions as observ-
able usage.").
718. For a basic exposition of the law-making procedures under the Articles
of Confederation, see GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, at 356-57 (1969). For a survey of the British parlia-
mentary and English common law that governed colonial America, see
PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REvOLUTION: 1750-1776, at 115-30 (Bernard
Bailyn ed., 1965).
719. The term "rule of recognition" was coined by Professor H.L.A. Hart to
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of such a rule or set of rules is, however, purely a matter of conven-
tion.720 Although "[legal obligations arise because we recognize
[that] law-making authority [is] vested in certain human beings,721
the identity of the people who possess this authority and how we go
about recognizing them is, likewise, entirely a matter of conven-
tion.
7 22
The law is a matter of convention not only with respect to the
procedures that create legal obligations, but also with respect to the
content of law. For example, it is a matter of convention that we re-
gard certain results as constituting "injury" and certain actions as
constituting "negligent conduct" to which liability attaches and for
which the responsible parties must pay damages. It is a matter of
convention that we regard some actions as constituting an "offer"
and others an "acceptance" whereby the individuals involved form a
binding contract. These conventions could be different than they are
refer to those conventions which enable the members of a given society to
identify the specific texts which constitute the authoritative norms of social
obligation, i.e., the law. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 97-107
(1961).
720. By this I do not mean to suggest that there are no sound normative rea-
sons for choosing one set of law-making procedures over another. As a gen-
eral matter, law-making procedures that are democratic in nature are superior
to conventions that are not because democratic procedures more directly em-
body the notions of popular sovereignty and human dignity. The laws that re-
sult from democratic law-making conventions may, nonetheless, be morally
objectionable in content if not in pedigree.
721. Kay, supra note 38, at 232.
722. Joseph Raz obliquely and perhaps unintentionally makes a similar
point Raz asks us to imagine the "ridiculous example" in which "the legisla-
ture has passed a law decreeing that, if John Doe eats a melon before Christ-
mas, then strikes will be banned." Raz, supra note 614, at 265. This example
demonstrates Raz's point that legislation is always made with reference to leg-
islative intent, even if the sole content of that intent is merely the intention to
legislate. If "John Doe is unaware of the legal power that his culinary habits
have acquired," then his consumption of a melon is not a legislative act be-
cause "[o]nly acts undertaken with the intention to legislate can be legislative
acts." Id. Although we may find its actions perplexing, even irrational, the
legislature has in fact legislated, even though the effect of its legislation turns
on some other contingency. Although it may sound bizarre and ridiculous to
our ears, other cultures and societies could require the consumption of food or
the performance of other acts as conventions in the law-making process. On
the other hand, our conventions may strike others as equally strange. See, e.g.,
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (exemplifying an unusual, and unconsti-
tutional, legislative procedure used in an attempt to deport an alien).
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at the present time. For example, it used to be the case that an em-
ployer was not considered "negligent" under the law, even though
his or her employee was careless and caused injury to a fellow
worker.723 It also used to be the case that one could not sue another
person for the psychological injury he or she may have caused.2
Likewise, it used to be the case that the terms of an "acceptance" had
to exactly correspond to the terms of the "offer" made. If the of-
feree's response was not the "mirror image" of the offer taken, it was
not an "acceptance," but a "rejection" and a "counteroffer., 725 There
may well be good reasons to opt for one set of conventions over an-
other, but the choice between them will not be a matter of fidelity to
some empirical truth. Instead, the content of legal conventions
changes over time to reflect changing normative beliefs concerning
the value to be accorded certain forms of conduct.
726
723. See, e.g., Boley v. Larson, 419 P.2d 579, 581-82 (Wash. 1966) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 474 (1958)).
724. See, e.g., Carter v. Lake Wales Hosp. Ass'n., 213 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist
Ct. App. 1968).
725. See, e.g., 1 WILLISTON, supra note 124, § 73, at 209-10. The demise of
the mirror-image rule in sales contracts was yet another innovation brought
about by Llewellyn in preparing Article 2 of the UCC. See U.C.C. § 2-207
(1995).
726. For a general discussion of the law as an elaborate system of conven-
tions, see Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85
MICH. L. REv. 621 (1987) (citing authority). Law is the expression of a nor-
mative order. It establishes the fundamental ways in which the state must re-
late to individuals, as well as the ways in which individuals must relate to the
state, and to one another. We often describe this normative order as being
moral or immoral, just or unjust Accordingly, law may not be wholly con-
ventional either with respect to the procedures of its creation or with respect to
its content. It is possible to believe that morality and justice are not simply a
matter of convenience or fiat but instead have some truth value and that their
existence is independent of our beliefs or assertions about them. If this were
the case, then law would still be a matter of convention, but it would not be
purely a matter of convention. For an interesting collection of essays con-
cerning the status of moral claims, see ESSAYS ON MORAL REALIsM (Geoffrey
Sayre-McCord ed., 1988). See also Michael Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 WIS.
L. REv. 1061 (claiming the existence of a moral reality which judges should
keep in mind as they interpret and apply the law). Moore's views were se-
verely criticized in Brian Bix, Michael Moore's Realist Approach to Law, 140
U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1992). For Moore's response, see Michael S. Moore,
Moral Reality Revisited, 90 MICH. L. REv. 2424 (1992).
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ii. conventions and truth values
In contrast to conventions of this sort are those conventions that
are not merely a matter of convenience but instead reflect some as-
pect of reality not of our own making. Because we are unable to
fully define or recognize the presence of some things or qualities that
exist, we do so by means of convention. Conventions of this kind
involve not only approximation with respect to the existence, quality,
or quantity of the thing in question, they also necessarily involve
normative judgments.
For example, most teachers 727 believe that their students either
do or do not have some command of the subject matter which they
have been taught. The quality of possessing a certain knowledge is
real. It exists, but it is difficult to determine whether and to what
extent someone has attained it. We make this determination as a
matter of convention. We evaluate students by requiring them to
take an examination, write a paper, or perform some other sort of ex-
ercise. Each of these tasks is thought to measure, in some real sense,
the underlying reality that the student either knows, or does not
know, the material that has been assigned.
No matter what means the teacher selects to determine the stu-
dent's competence, it will be a matter of convention in at least three
senses. First, the means of evaluation will be conventional in the
sense that the teacher could have selected some other means. Just as
we here in the United States could have decided to drive on the left-
hand side of the road instead of the right, a teacher may choose to
administer an essay exam instead of a multiple choice exam, or a re-
search paper in lieu of any examination altogether. The choice of
one method over another is, in this respect, simply a matter of con-
venience.
727. For a discussion of how student evaluation is conventional but never-
theless attempts to gauge a real quality that students may or may not possess,
see ROBERT M. THORNDIKE ET AL., MEASUREMENT AND EVALUATION IN
PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION 9-16, 23-25, 49-56, 140-43, 176-80 (5th ed.
1991). There are some educators who believe that all evaluation of student
learning is hopelessly arbitrary and a mere convention (like driving on the
right-hand side of the road), which does not correspond with the underlying
reality it purportedly measures, or that it merely reflects the normative bias of
the person conducting the evaluation. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education
and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL EDUc. 591, 600-01 (1982).
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Second, the means of evaluation chosen is also a matter of con-
vention in the sense that it measures only in an approximate fashion
what the student knows. There must, however, be some connection,
some correspondence between what was taught and what the student
has learned. Thus, although the method selected to measure the stu-
dent's competence is a matter of convenience, it is not purely so. 72 8
Further, no matter which method is employed, the correspondence
between what the student actually knows about the subject and what
the method measures will be only approximate. Teachers know
when they give a test that some students actually know more about
the subject than they are able to demonstrate within the parameters of
the examination. Indeed, no matter how thorough the test may be,
the teacher is incapable of learning all that the student knows be-
cause she will obtain this knowledge through the medium of the
exam.729 Instead, the chosen means of evaluation will produce a
conventional measure of the student's knowledge, an estimate, but
not the thing itself.
Third, because the method of evaluation used is devised by the
teacher, the measure of student competence obtained will always re-
flect a normative judgment. That is, in deciding what material to test
728. For example, it might be more convenient for the teacher to administer
an already-prepared examination he has borrowed from a colleague and has
readily at hand. Ift however, the exam given were to test the student's knowl-
edge of material not assigned for the course, then this basic correspondence
would be lacking. An even more egregious case would be where the exam
tested the student's knowledge of a subject matter altogether different from the
subject matter of the course (e.g., questions about the Turks' sack of Byzan-
tium in 1453 in a course on organic chemistry, or questions about the law of
sexual harassment in a course on securities regulation). Such an exam would
not measure the student's knowledge of the subject matter of the course ap-
proximately because it would not measure that knowledge at all. I am not sug-
gesting that some connection between two ostensibly different subject matters
could not be drawn, even in an exam setting. What I am suggesting is that it is
possible for an examination to fail to measure the student's competence in a
given field. No one would feel safe riding in an airplane where the pilot's only
qualification as a pilot was that he or she had graduated from medical school.
729. This will be the case even where the test asks the student to recite eve-
rything he or she knows about a given subject matter, for example, "Tell me
everything you know about ... the Allies' D-Day landings in Normandy, Wil-
liam Shakespeare's A Mid-Summer Night's Dream, or the Latham Act; etc."
Such an open-ended question might not stimulate a thorough response even
from a student who knows a great deal about the subject.
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and how much weight is to be given to each portion, the teacher is
deciding what the student ought to know about a given subject matter
if he or she wishes to be judged competent. In this, the teacher is de-
fining what it is that constitutes "command of the subject matter."
The teacher is identifying what it is that the teacher is attempting to
measure. Further, in requiring the student to show his or her knowl-
edge in a given conventional format, the teacher is making an im-
plicit moral judgment. That is, even if the student knows more than
can be conveyed in the exam given or in the paper assigned, the stu-
dent still ought to be able to demonstrate his or her competence un-
der the conventions chosen.
Conventions of this sort can be found not only in teaching
but in virtually every walk of life.7 30 All of them possess the same
730. Although the example I have used here is "knowledge" and the subject
we are concerned with is "intention," conventions of this sort are not limited to
entities or qualities that are cognitive in nature. For example, each fall, news-
paper sportswriters rank college football teams for the Associated Press and
other news services. The writers who participate in these polls have in mind
what they believe is a very real quality, namely, that of being the best college
football team in the country. This overall quality is a combination of a team's
many characteristics including its defense and offense, its speed, strength, ma-
turity, and desire to win. The writers gauge this quality of being "the best"
based upon their judgment of these characteristics as well as the team's win-
loss record, the strength of its schedule, and its ability to win on the road as
well as at home. Clearly, the ranking of any given team by any given writer
involves the exercise of normative judgment. One writer will think a team's
running game is the most important factor while another believes that pass de-
fense is critical. Further, even if two different writers agree upon the weight to
be given a certain category (or the polling group predetermines this matter) the
writers must still determine how well a team has performed within each cate-
gory. The ranking is clearly a matter of convenience, a substitute for having
every team play every other team every week throughout the season. (Even if
this were possible, it would not fully capture the quality of being "the best"
team because teams change over time and a game only measures in an ap-
proximate fashion the relative quality of two teams under certain conditions
(e.g., weather, location) at a given point in time. Indeed, this explains why we
determine which team is the best within a given period of time, i.e., a season.
The duration of this period of time, when it begins and when it ends, are estab-
lished as a matter of convention.) Although it often functions only as a crude
estimate, both writers and players firmly believe that the poll measures a real
quality that a team does or does not possess. See generally College Football
Preview, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 31, 1998 (describing the pre-season
"top-25" college football rankings); Ed Sherman, The Best? No Way to Know,
But No Way to Stop Debate, CHi. TRIB., Mar. 30, 1999, at C3.
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characteristics. Because they seek to describe reality in some fash-
ion, these conventions are not purely instrumental, a mere matter of
convenience. Although this reality exists independent of our beliefs
about it, the conventions we use to measure it also identify it, or
rather, they define our understanding of it. Further, our choices as to
how to measure and thus define this aspect of reality involve the ex-
ercise of normative judgment.
c. legislative intent as a matter of convention
What lawyers and judges mean when they refer to "legislative
intent" is conventional in this sense. It is a matter of probability, in-
ference, and approximation. As such, judgments of legislative intent
necessarily involve judgments that are instrumental, descriptive, and
normative in nature. First, determinations of legislative intent are in-
strumental in that the sources used to understand this intent are re-
stricted as a matter of convenience or practical necessity. A com-
plete account of the legislative history behind even the most basic
form of legislation "is a practical and philosophical impossibility.",73'
The historical record to which judges and lawyers refer in arguing
about the content of legislative intent does not include "a transcript
of every telephone call, every lunch-table conversation with a lob-
byist, and every arm-twisting message from the White House or the
Democratic National Committee chairman . . .. , Although the
intended meaning of statutory language may have been discussed at
length in the course of these events, we make no attempt to include
every discussion of the proposed statute in the legislative record. As
Likewise, use of the number 17 is also conventional in this sense. The
number 17 denotes the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter.
See MATHEMATICS DICTIONARY 272 (James & James eds., 3d ed. 1968). Be-
cause II is a transcendental number, it cannot be calculated to the last decimal
point Accordingly, when mathematicians and engineers use fl in their calcu-
lations by convention they use only so many decimal places. Although the use
of an approximate value for II is clearly a matter of convenience that involves
the exercise of normative judgment, the number 1 also has an actual value that
is not subject to change by human fiat. It has a value of 3.14159265 (base ten,
Arabic numerals, to the eighth decimal place) not 5.62951413 or 3.56295141
or 31.4159265.
731. Moglen & Pierce, supra note 64, at 1215; see also id. at 1205 (stating
that "[t]he real legislative history of any statutory enactment is not retriev-
able").
732. Id. at 1216.
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the UCC itself shows, the materials that make up the available record
can be quite broad and include many sources generated by non-
legislative drafters. As a matter of practical convenience, however,
the search for legislative intent must be limited in some fashion.
Second, although it is instrumental, legislative intent is not
purely instrumental like the grammar of a language or the rules of a
game. As a general matter, the law regards questions of intent as
questions of fact.733 Thus, judgments concerning legislative intent
are thought to describe some aspect of reality, namely, what the leg-
islature as a whole intended by the language it used in enacting the
law in question. 3 Conclusions regarding legislative intent are fac-
tual in that they are "dependent upon and constrained by historical
materials," but they also "embody implicit or explicit normative
judgments., 735 As such, legislative intent is not purely descriptive.
It is not "a simple fact awaiting discovery by the industrious re-
searcher" but is instead an "intellectual construct" that combines
both normative and descriptive elements.736 It exists, not because we
believe it exists, though our beliefs surely shape the contours of what
we take it to be.
Third, although the conventions of legislative intent are surely
normative in character, they are not purely normative. These con-
ventions are normative in that they value legislative history as one of
the best sources of evidence of what the legislature intended to say.
Thus, the judge or lawyer who hopes to understand the intent of the
legislature ought to examine these sources rather than some other
733. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274 (1952) (hold-
ing that intent is a question of fact and not a matter of law where intent "is an
ingredient of the crime charged").
734. See DICKERsON, supra note 615, at 72-73 (suggesting that it is "not en-
tirely fatuous" to speak of a "general consensus" among legislators and that the
possibility such a consensus "suggests the further possibility of a real (not fic-
titious) corporate legislative intent, consisting, not of the shared intent of a
group of improbably like-minded legislators, but of the composite thrust of
many individual intents, no one of which need wholly coincide with the com-
posite") (footnotes omitted).
735. Fallon, supra note 310, at 1213 (discussing the use of the Framers' in-
tent in constitutional law).
736. Id. at 1212; see also Redish & Chung, supra note 38, at 866 (describing
legislative purpose as "an inference drawn from an evaluation of the available
evidence").
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materials. Crudely put, committee reports are a better indication
of what the legislature thought than are stock reports or weather re-
ports.
The conventions of legislative intent are not normative in the
sense of being simply a matter of political choice. The content of
legislative intent is not whatever one thinks it ought to be. If that
were the case, then the sources of evidence and means of inquiry for
deriving legislative intent would not be limited to those currently
employed. If legislative intent were simply a matter of political
choice, it would not matter whether a court referred to committee re-
ports or weather reports in determining the meaning of a statutory
text. Although legislative intent is a matter of convention, it is not a
matter of fiat. That sponsor statements are more highly valued in
statutory interpretation than tarot card readings surely reflects a nor-
mative judgment. It is also clear that this judgment is guided and
tempered by the factual orientation of the inquiry. There must be
sufficient evidence to justify the inferences made, bearing in mind
that what is sufficient is in part a normative judgment.737
737. It is of course still possible to argue that legislative intent understood as
a matter of convention is a purely political construct. Under this view courts
make frequent reference to materials generated in the legislative process rather
than to other kinds of texts, not because the materials evidence legislative in-
tent, but in order to legitimize what courts declare that intent to be. In other
words, reference to the conventional sources of legislative intent actually frees
courts to make policy under the guise of implementing the policy of the legis-
lature. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. It is of course possible
for anyone engaged in any human activity to act in bad faith. For example, it
is possible for a teacher in writing his or her exam to test the students on mate-
rial that was not assigned or to give each student a grade without reading the
exam or paper that the student submitted. The teacher who acts in this way
does not seek to determine whether or not the students learned what they were
taught. That someone may act in bad faith is always possible, but this possi-
bility by itself cannot undermine the convention in question. If it could then no
human activity would be deserving of our confidence. See Breen, supra note
484, at 854 n.304 (discussing how a bad-faith actor in a given activity is not
truly engaged in the enterprise); DICKERSON, supra note 615, at 77 ("That the
concept [of legislative intent] has been abused does not, however, deny its im-
portance as a fundamental presupposition of the legislative process."). Fur-
thermore, it is at least as reasonable to conclude that the discipline imposed by
the conventions of legislative intent has a substantive effect on the interpreta-
tion of statutes than to conclude that these conventions affect only the appear-
ance and rhetoric of statutory argument.
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d. intent as a matter of convention elsewhere in the law
The question of intent under the law is, and in all likelihood will
always be, a matter of convention. This is true not only for legisla-
tive intent, but also for intent in the law of contracts,7 38 civil rights,
and the criminal law, to name only the most obvious examples that
leap to mind. So long as the human race is not a race of telepaths,
739
there is no alternative to regarding intent as a matter of convention.
Depending on the circumstances, the conventions we adopt may be
blunt and inaccurate or detailed and precise, stylized and structured
or loose and informal. For example, generally we regard the taking
of a public oath of office or the exchange of wedding vows as dem-
onstrating the participant's intention to be bound by certain commit-
ments. Unfortunately, these conventions have often proved to be a
poor indication of the parties' actual intentions. By contrast, mens
rea, the intent to commit some criminal act, must be culled from the
details of the defendant's conduct. We place a great deal of confi-
dence in these conventions in that we use them to determine matters
of public safety, freedom and incarceration, life and death. In each
case, however, ascertaining intent is a matter of probability, infer-
ence, and convention.
It cannot be denied that the use of legislative intent presents a
number of daunting practical and theoretical problems, but these
problems do not render the concept wholly unintelligible or unwork-
able. Properly understood, legislative intent is a matter of conven-
tion that involves a number of complex judgments. Indeed, under
the law, ascertaining intent is always a matter of convention and
could not be otherwise. Thus, if one wishes to question the legiti-
macy of legislative intent because it is conventional, then in some re-
spects one must also question the use of intent in other areas of the
law, including contract interpretation under the UCC.
740
738. See supra Part II.C.6.
739. Cf HIRSCH, supra note 297, at 17 ("I can never know another person's
intended meaning with certainty because I cannot get inside his head to com-
pare the meaning he intends with the meaning I understand, and only by such
direct comparison could I be certain that his meaning and my own are identi-
cal.").
740. See supra Part Il.C.
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D. Understanding Statutory Purpose and the Use of Prior
UCC Drafts
Nearly fifty years after it was first enacted, the Uniform Com-
mercial Code remains a remarkable work of legislation that reflects
the brilliance of its principal draftsman, Karl Llewellyn. Since the
time of its creation, the Code has provided an eminently reasonable,
workable and predictable legal framework for those who engage in
commercial transactions. The fact that Article 2 is only now under-
going some substantial revision demonstrates the durability of a
well-crafted statute.
Notwithstanding this great success, Llewellyn was wrong to try
to prohibit courts from consulting prior drafts of the Code in an effort
to discern the meaning of the statute. Although the UCC manifests a
deeply felt appreciation for the nature of language and the signifi-
cance of context in contract construction, Llewellyn abandoned this
approach with respect to interpretation of the UCC itself. In prepar-
ing the Code, Llewellyn sought to draft "that rightest and most beau-
tiful type of legal rule, the singing rule with purpose and with reason
clear.",741 He believed that "[o]nly the rule which shows its reason
on its face" can hope to avoid obsolescence and "claim maximum
chance of continuing effectiveness. '742 By drafting the UCC in this
fashion, Llewellyn hoped to encourage statutory construction in the
Grand Style, in which courts would either expand or curtail the rule
in question according to its purpose and the sense of the situation.
743
Despite his considerable talents as a drafter and legal thinker,
Llewellyn was unable to realize these ambitions. Although he as-
pired to write a statute that "showed its reason on its face," even the
most carefully worded text may fail to convey the meaning intended
by its author. Indeed, the lengthy comments which accompany the
UCC show that Llewellyn felt compelled to provide an elaborate in-
terpretive aid to explain the statute and its application.
74
741. Llewellyn, On the Good, supra note 117, at 250; see also U.C.C. § 2-
401 cnt. 1 (1995) (stating that the "basic policy" behind Article 2 is that
"known reason and purpose should govern interpretation").
742. Llewellyn, On the Good, supra note 117, at 250.
743. See supra Part llI.C.
744. See supra Parts lFl, IV.B.
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Llewellyn insisted that for a statute "to make sense, it must be
read in the light of some assumed purpose. '7 45 Even if a statute is
exceedingly well-drafted, however, the purpose behind the statute
cannot declare itself. Statutory purpose is not a self-evident fact or a
pre-interpretive conclusion. 746 Instead, discerning statutory purpose
is itself a principal goal of the interpretive process.
747
Recourse to the particular historical and social context out of
which a statute emerges may help a court to understand the law's
purpose.745 Even if a judge is sincerely committed to implementing
745. Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 86, at 400. Many commentators today
would describe Llewellyn's basic approach to statutory construction as one of
"purposivism." See McDonnell, supra note 602, at 797-801; Jonathan R.
Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpre-
tation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLum. L. REv. 223, 250-51 (1986) (de-
scribing purposivism as the dominant method of statutory interpretation today).
746. Cf Fish, Chain Gang, supra note 652, at 554, 559 (asserting that the
meaning of a text "does not announce itself' and so does not enjoy "the status
of a brute fact" that is simply "found"); Fish, Wrong Again, supra note 641, at
301 (disputing the claim that meaning is "available in an uninterpreted shape");
supra notes 271273, 639-654 and accompanying text.
747. Accordingly, although Llewellyn was right to encourage thoroughly
reasoned, carefully worded legislation, the theory of "patent reason" will al-
ways fail because it is contrary to the nature of language. As Professor Twin-
ing has correctly observed: "Statements of purpose are at least as susceptible
as are statements of 'substantive' rules to vagueness, ambiguity, obscurity, dif-
ficulty of reconciliation with other statements, and so on. The task of the in-
terpreter is first and foremost to interpret the instrument of the policy rather
than the policy itself." TWINING, supra note 6, at 324. One might add that in
construing what Twining calls "the instrument of the policy" the interpreter
will necessarily discover what he or she believes is the policy behind it As an
epistemological matter there is, after all, no alternative to purposive interpreta-
tion. See supra notes 606-623 and accompanying text.
748. Some readers will surely note that the drafting and legislative history
behind a statute is also composed of many texts. The texts that make up these
contextual sources cannot declare their own meanings anymore than the statute
can. Instead, each source must be interpreted in its own right. Thus, every
source, as a text, must be situated in its proper context, which is also composed
of texts subject to interpretation, etc., etc., etc. An infinite regress would result
and even the most rudimentary form of communication could not occur but for
the fact that the author and the reader (or in the case of a statute, the legislature
and the court) share certain background assumptions and beliefs. This is an-
other way of saying that meaning is a matter of consciousness and not of
words. The act of communication, that is, the sharing of consciousness, is
contingent upon the participants already sharing in some level of conscious-
ness, of them already being of "one mind" on a certain level. See supra notes
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the reason behind a statute, she cannot be certain she is advancing
that reason unless she understands it in the first instance. Thus, even
if one agrees with Llewellyn that statutory interpretation is princi-
pally the determination of purpose and the application of that pur-
pose to the facts of the case, it would still be "inadvisable to limit...
the sources from which the reason for the text-and in this way the
meaning of the text--may be found., 749 The UCC freely permits the
use of contextual evidence in contract construction so that courts and
lawyers may obtain a "true understanding" of what the parties in-
tended by their use of language. 750  This evidence includes prior
drafts of the agreement in question and the circumstances surround-
ing its formation.75 ' Likewise, in the case of statutes, the goal of im-
plementing the legislature's purpose will be better served by allow-
ing judges and lawyers to consult legislative history and to
incorporate historical sources into their advocacy and opinions.
In the absence of restrictions on the use of Code drafting history
like those found in section 1-102(3)(g), courts and commentators
have freely employed the rich historical sources surrounding the
creation of the UCC. The use of these materials has not been so fre-
quent as to call into question the central importance of the UCC text.
Still, the cases and academic literature concerning Code interpreta-
tion contain a number of examples that ably demonstrate the use of
historical sources in ascertaining statutory purpose.752 Prior drafts of
the text and comments have been used to help resolve a broad range
of interpretive questions including the notice requirements of a
charge-back statute, the "honesty in fact" component of "good faith,"
606-23 and accompanying text.
749. N.Y. REPORT 1956, supra note 24, at 26.
750. See U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 2 (1995).
751. See, e.g., ITT Corp. v. LTX Corp., 732 F. Supp. 1225, 1236-37 (D.
Mass. 1990) (determining that it is proper under UCC § 2-202 to look to prior
contracts of the same type between parties to interpret the contract at issue);
Cibro Petroleum Prods., Inc. v. Sohio Alaska Petroleum Co., 602 F. Supp.
1520, 1551-52 (N.D.N.Y. 1985) (determining that it was proper under UCC §
2-202 to look to similar contracts with third parties to interpret the contract in
dispute).
752. See McDonnell, supra note 602, at 807 (arguing that the "purposive in-
terpreter" of the UCC should not only read the statutory text and comments but
should also "take the additional step of examining the history of the text or the
problem before him!').
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the meaning of unconscionability, the proper construction of the
parol evidence rule, the obligation of "good faith" in presenting de-
mand notes for payment, and the award of profit damages to ag-
grieved sellers who successfully resell the contract goods at the
original contract price.75 3 Unfortunately, some courts and commen-
tators have reviewed the historical record in a cursory fashion
or have employed it selectively in support of conclusions al-
ready held. 5 That this has occurred is not surprising. It simply
753. For cases that employ Code drafting history in resolving interpretive
problems, see Herzog Contracting Corp. v. McGowen Corp., 976 F.2d 1062,
1069-70 (7th Cir. 1992) (the parol evidence rule); Julien Co. v. Rollins Cotton
Co. (In re Julien Co.), 168 B.R. 647, 665-66 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1994) (at-
tachment of security interest by possession); Northpark Nat'l Bank v. Bankers
Trust Co., 572 F. Supp. 524, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (notice requirements of
charge-back statutes); Southwestern Resolution Corp. v. Watson, 964 S.W.2d
262, 263-64 (Tex. 1998) (promissory note indorsement by attachment); Getty
Petroleum Corp. v. American Express Travel Related Services Co., 683 N.E.2d
311, 316-17 (N.Y. 1997) ("good faith" and "honesty in fact" standard); United
States Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Boge, 814 P.2d 1082, 1089 (Or. 1991) (same). For
commentators who rely on Code history, see Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscion-
ability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485
(1967) (unconscionability); Kirst, supra note 14 (parol evidence rule); Patter-
son, supra note 99 (good faith and demand notes); Breen, supra note 484
(profit damages for sellers). Perhaps the best example of this kind of academic
writing is Professor Wiseman's masterful article. See Wiseman, supra note 10.
754. A splendid example of how the poor use of Code drafting history can
lead to flawed interpretations of the Code text involves the award of profit
damages under UCC § 2-708(2) to aggrieved sellers who successfully resell
the contract goods at the original contract price. For commentators who have
written in support of so-called "lost volume sellers" by relying upon a history
of the profit remedy that is both erroneous and incomplete, see 1 ROBERT L.
DUNN, RECOVvRY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS §§ 2.8-2.9 (4th ed. 1992);
ROBERT J. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 177 (1970);
WITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, §§ 7-8 to 7-14; Roy Ryden Anderson,
Damages for Sellers Under the Code's Profit Formula, 40 Sw. L.J. 1021
(1986); Robert J. Harris, A Radical Restatement of the Law of Seller's Dam-
ages: Sales Act and Commercial Code Results Compared, 18 STAN. L. REV.
66 (1965); WilliamL. Schlosser, Construing U.C.C. Section 2-708(2) to Apply
to the Lost-Volume Seller, 24 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 686 (1973); Sebert, supra
note 173, at 393-96; Note, Seller's Recovery of Lost Profits for Breach of a
Sales Contract: Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-708(2), 11 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 227 (1985). For cases that have used this same faulty his-
tory in awarding damages to such sellers see, for example, R.E. Davis Chem.
Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc., 826 F.2d 678, 684-85 (7th Cir. 1987); Teradyne, Inc.
v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 676 F.2d 865, 868 (1st Cir. 1982); Famous Knitwear
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underscores the fact that the proper use of statutory history requires
thoroughness, balance, a lack of interest, and careful deliberation, in-
deed, the very habits of mind that we should demand and come to
expect from our judiciary.
It is often said that if something is worth doing, it is worth doing
well. The truth, however, is that "if a thing is worth doing, it is
worth doing badly., 755 An approach to statutes that allows for the
use of legislative history reflects the way in which language operates
better than an approach which precludes the use of historical materi-
als. It recognizes that meaning is not simply a function of words,
that no text ever "speaks for itself." Instead, it recognizes that
meaning is a function of the use of language within a particular time
and place. Such an approach to statutory interpretation should be
done well. Because it is really worth doing, however, we should not
abandon this approach to statutory interpretation out of frustration
when it is done poorly.
V. CONCLUSION
In place of the linear, geometric cleanliness 75 6 of classical con-
tract theory, Llewellyn gave us something messy, 757 an approach to
contract interpretation that more closely resembles biology than ge-
ometry. Order is present, but it must be sorted out. Legislative
Corp. v. Drug Fair, Inc., 493 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1974); Nederlandse
Draadindustrie NDI B.V. v. Grand Pre-Stressed Corp., 466 F. Supp. 846, 853-
54 (E.D.N.Y.), affid mem. 614 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1979); National Controls,
Inc. v. Commodore Bus. Mach., Inc., 163 Cal. App. 3d 694, 696-99, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 636, 641-43 (1985); Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311, 314
n.2 (N.Y. 1972); Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Assocs. Inc., 380 A.2d 618,
624-25 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977). For a more thorough review of the relevant
history, see Breen, supra note 484.
755. G.K. CHESTERTON, WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE WORLD 367 (1910).
756. Cf Llewellyn, On the Good, supra note 117, at 228 (describing Lang-
dell's legal "aesthetics" as "the one most clean of line" and his approach to ac-
ceptance and consideration as "coincid[ing] the equal triangles"); see also
Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, U. PITT. L. REv. 1, 16 (arguing that
"[t]he aspiration of classical orthodoxy [in Langdell's theory of contract] to-
ward a conceptually ordered and universally formal legal system readily sug-
gests a structural analogy with Euclidean geometry").
757. See Graff, supra note 309, at 410 (remarking that interpretation is "es-
sentially a messy business of guesswork predicated on practical knowledge of
language, conventions, and the situations in which they operate").
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history, like much of life, is also messy business, but this lack of ti-
diness should not dissuade us from making the effort to understand
it. We are of course free to refrain from this exercise, to ignore the
complexities of life in favor of what we hope will be simple and
certain. If, however, we acknowledge that context is always a part of
the function of language, then the simplicity we desire is revealed to
be artificial and the certainty we seek is exposed as an illusion. Fi-
delity to the nature of language and the political process requires us
to take up the task of interpreting each statute with reference to its
historical and social context. Llewellyn's mistake of ignoring con-
text in the case of statutes while embracing it in the case of contracts
was overcome in the UCC drafting process. Courts today can avoid
Llewellyn's error by acknowledging the relevance of legislative his-
tory to statutory interpretation.
